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Samenvatting
Deze thesis stelt technologische gereedschappen voor die privacy waarborgen voor
communicatie op het Internet en in het Internet of Things (IoT). IoT werd decennia
geleden voorgesteld als een alomtegenwoordig netwerk, bestaande uit alledaagse
dingen die informatie over hun omgeving kunnen waarnemen, wijzigen en verwer-
ken. Voor IoT wordt een hoge mate van heterogeniteit verondersteld van deelne-
mende apparaten en netwerken. IoT apparaten kunnen qua rekenkracht en ener-
gieverbruik zwaar of licht zijn, en deze kunnen een vaste locatie hebben of mobiel
zijn met een potentieel instabiele verbinding. Netwerken van IoT apparaten kunnen
variëren van netwerken waarbij de apparaten fysiek dicht bij elkaar zijn opgesteld
tot netwerken waarbij de afstand tussen apparaten aanzienlijk groter is.
De huidige IoT oplossingen verschillen van hoe ze werden voorgesteld. Eén van
de belangrijkste verschillen is de afhankelijkheid van het Internet als enige netwerk.
Een typisch IoT consumentenapparaat is vandaag de dag verbonden met een bac-
kend via het Internet, wat meestal een IoT cloud is. Bediening op afstand van het
apparaat is vaak mogelijk via een ander apparaat dat is verbonden met dezelfde
cloud. Zonder deze verbinding bieden IoT apparaten beperkte of geen functionali-
teit. Hierom betrekken we ook het Internet bij onze discussies over privacy in het
Internet of Things.
In veel scenario’s is het beschermen van enkel de inhoud van de communica-
tie niet voldoende. De identiteit van de communicerende partijen dient ook be-
schermd te worden. Voor communicatie via het Internet is voor bijna alle gebruiks-
doelen informatie nodig die gebruikt kan worden om de identiteit van gebruikers
te onthullen. Een voorbeeld hiervan is de onthulling van netwerkadressen van zen-
ders en ontvangers, wat hen kwetsbaar maakt voor identi catie en tracking. Trans-
acties via het Internet hebben vaak unieke persoonsgegevens nodig van gebruikers
voor verschillende functies, zoals authenticatie, autorisatie en het  lteren van infor-
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matie. Transacties die gekoppeld zijn aan dezelfde persoonsgegevens zijn te volgen.
Hierdoor zijn gebruikers te volgen en wordt hun privacy bedreigd.
Deze thesis verkent communicatieprotocollen die privacy bieden op het Internet
en in netwerken van apparaten die dicht bij elkaar geplaatst zijn. Besproken appara-
ten variëren in rekenkracht en energieverbruik, van lichtgewicht tot zwaargewicht.
Voor verschillende soorten netwerken en apparaten verbeteren of introduceren we
concrete protocollen die de privacy beschermen door het beperkt vrijgeven van in-
formatie door communicatieprotocollen en applicaties.
Hoofdstuk 3 is toegewijd aan het bestuderen van de transacties van gebrui-
kers in het IoT, met de nadruk op verzoeken vanaf IoT gebruikersapparaten naar
diensten waarvoor de gebruiker is geregistreerd. Attribute-based (AB) authentica-
tie zorgt voor privacy door te voorkomen dat transacties met elkaar kunnen worden
geassocieerd. Ook wordt in dit hoofdstuk aangetoond dat AB authenticatie gebrui-
kers controle geeft over hun persoonsgegevens, en dat het zorgt voor gegevens-
minimalisatie en doelbeperking, twee belangrijke principes voor gegevensbescher-
ming
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op privacy-vriendelijke protocollen die overeenkomende
attributen kunnen herkennen tussen twee RFID tags en een RFID lezer. Deze pro-
tocollen werken zonder dat zij waardes van de attributen prijsgeven aan de lezer of
andere RFID tags. De omschreven protocollen kunnen meerdere attributen verge-
lijken per tag, waardoor hun toepassingsgebied wordt verbreed. Daarnaast zijn de
protocollen zeer e ciënt met betrekking tot de benodigde rekenkracht. Dit geldt in
het bijzonder voor één van de omschreven protocollen, die enkel een lichtgewicht
hashfunctie vereist op de tags. Twee andere protocollen hebben daarnaast ook
asymmetrische encryptie nodig, wat mogelijk is met krachtigere tags.
Anonieme communicatieprotocollen worden onderzocht in hoofdstuk 5. Een
voorstel wordt gegeven om een anoniem planningsprobleem op te lossen voor het
Dining Cryptographers protocol, wat is voorgesteld door Chaum in 1988. Dit pro-
tocol zorgt voor sterke waarborgen voor anonimiteit, maar is beperkt in snelheid
en schaalbaarheid, en kent verschillende problemen die praktische implementaties
complex maken. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een speci ek probleem opgelost, namelijk
het reserveren van slots voor communicatie. Het gebruik van footprint scheduling
wordt voorgesteld als een nieuwe techniek voor deelnemers om communicatieslots
te onderhandelen zonder verlies van anonimiteit. Daarnaast blijft het aantal actieve
deelnemers onbekend. Footprint scheduling is simpel, e ciënt, en het resultaat is
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zeer goed, in het bijzonder in zeer dynamische netwerken waarbij de deelnemers
en de hoeveelheid activiteit regelmatig veranderen.
Hoofdstuk 6 introduceert een nieuwe methode genaamd Elligator, dat zich richt
op het voorkomen van censuur. Elligator verbergt het uitwisselen van cryptogra-
 sche sleutels tussen communicerende partijen. Dit voorkomt het onderscheiden
en blokkeren van gebruikers op basis van het soort protocol dat zij gebruiken. Zulke
blokkades kunnen zich richten op anonieme communicatiesystemen, bijvoorbeeld
wanneer deze systemen verboden zijn of gebruikt worden om censuur te omzei-
len. Elligator maakt patronen in de verstuurde informatie bij het uitwisselen van
sleutels onherkenbaar, en richt zich in het bijzonder op elliptische kromme punten.
Deze punten worden verstuurd bij het uitwisselen van cryptogra sche sleutels in
elliptische kromme cryptogra e.
In hoofdstuk 7 wordt een nieuwe versie van een alombekende benadering voor
anonieme communicatie gepresenteerd. Dit heeft betrekking op mix-nets, welke
sterke bescherming bieden. Het nieuwe protocol maakt mix-nets bruikbaar voor
lichtgewicht apparaten binnen het IoT. Het LightMix protocol vereist enkel dat clients
eenmalig asymmetrische cryptogra sche operaties uitvoeren tijdens registratie. Door
het vooraf uitvoeren van berekeningen zijn real-time asymmetrische cryptogra -
sche operaties niet meer nodig voor zowel zenders, ontvangers als mixnodes. Hier-
door is er minder vertraging als gevolg van cryptogra sche berekeningen en is er
minder rekenkracht vereist bij de clients. De basis real-time fase voert alleen enkele
snel te berekenen modulaire vermenigvuldigingen uit. Deze eigenschappen maken
LightMix bruikbaar voor applicaties die afhankelijk zijn van korte doorlooptijden op
lichtgewicht apparaten terwijl de uitstekende garanties van mix-nets met betrek-
king tot privacy behouden blijven, waaronder het ontbreken van de koppeling tus-
sen zenders en ontvangers, en de bescherming tegen veel aanvallen op basis van
verkeersanalyse.
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Summary
This thesis presents technological tools for ensuring privacy of communication on
the Internet and in the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT was envisioned decades ago
as a ubiquitous network comprising everyday things that can sense, change, and
process information about their environment. IoT promises to be highly hetero-
geneous in terms of devices and networks. Devices in IoT can be powerful or
lightweight in terms of computation ability and available power; they can also be
stationary or mobile with potentially unstable connections. Networks comprising
IoT can vary from networks of devices located in closest proximity to each other to
networks of devices located at large distances.
Existing IoT solutions di er from those originally envisioned. One of the im-
portant di erences is their heavy reliance on a single network, namely the Internet.
One can argue, it is still not an IoT, but rather an Internet with occasional things con-
nected to it. A typical IoT consumer product nowadays is an appliance or a gadget
connected via the Internet to a backend, usually an IoT cloud. Often an IoT device
can be remotely controlled though another gadget connected to the same cloud.
Without this connection, current IoT devices o er either very limited functionality,
or none at all. For this reason we also consider the Internet when talking about
privacy in the Internet of Things.
In many communication scenarios it is not su cient to protect only the content
of the communication; it is also necessary to protect meta-data, especially meta-
data related to the identity of communicating parties. Communication on the In-
ternet requires information that can be used to reveal the identity of users in order
to perform almost any function. For example, Internet communication protocols
reveal the network addresses of both senders and receivers, making them vulnera-
ble to identi cation and tracking. Transactions that are performed via the Internet
often require identi ers and identifying information about users for a wide range
of functions such as authentication, authorization, and information  ltering. Trans-
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actions linked to the same identi er are traceable, and ultimately also make users
traceable; hence their privacy is threatened.
This thesis explores protocols for providing communication privacy both on the
Internet and in networks of devices located in close proximity to each other. We
consider a range of connected devices, from lightweight in terms of computational
power and available power to computationally powerful ones. For di erent net-
work and device types we improve and design concrete protocols that provide pri-
vacy protection by minimizing the information revealed either by communication
protocols or by applications.
In Chapter 3 we study users’ transactions in the IoT, in particular requests made
from users’ devices to the services to which these users are subscribed. We ap-
ply attribute-based (AB) authentication to provide privacy by ensuring unlinkability
between these transactions. In addition, we demonstrate that the use of AB au-
thentication provides users with control over their personal data and achieves data
minimization and purpose limitation, both important principles in information pri-
vacy.
Chapter 4 considers privacy-friendly protocols that detect matching attributes
between two RFID tags and a reader. These protocols succeed without revealing
attribute values to either RFID reader or another RFID tag. The protocols presented
can perform attribute matching to multiple attributes per tag to broaden the range
of possible applications of the protocols. They are also very e cient in terms of
computation. Speci cally, one of the protocols presented in this chapter only needs
a lightweight hash function implemented on the tags. Two other protocols addition-
ally need asymmetric encryption, which is feasible with more powerful tags.
Chapter 5 examines anonymous communication protocols. In particular, it pro-
poses a solution to the anonymous scheduling problem of the Dining Cryptogra-
phers protocol proposed by Chaum in 1988. This protocol provides strong anonymity
guarantees, however they come at the price of limited performance and scalability
and multiple issues that make deployment complicated in practice. In this chap-
ter we address one of those issues, namely slot reservation. We propose footprint
scheduling as a new technique for participants to negotiate communication slots
without losing anonymity and at the same time hiding the number of actively send-
ing users. Footprint scheduling is at the same time simple and e cient and it yields
excellent results, in particular in very dynamic networks with a frequently changing
set of participants and frequently changing activity rate.
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Chapter 6 introduces a tool called Elligator, which deals with censorship preven-
tion. Elligator hides the fact that communicating parties perform cryptographic key
exchange. This prevents di erentiating and blocking users based on the type of
protocol they use. For example, such blocking can happen to anonymous commu-
nication systems, when they are forbidden or used as a censorship-circumvention
tool. Elligator makes patterns in the information transmitted during key exchange
unrecognizable, in particular elliptic curve points. These points are transmitted dur-
ing a key exchange in elliptic curve cryptography.
Chapter 7 presents a new version of a well-known approach to providing anony-
mous communication. This involves the use of mix-nets, which guarantees strong
protections. The new protocolmakesmix-nets suitable for lightweight devices within
IoT. The core LightMix protocol requires clients to perform public-key operations
only once, during registration. Through precomputation, all real-time public-key op-
erations are eliminated—at the senders, recipients, and mixnodes—thus decreas-
ing cryptographic latency and reducing computational costs for clients. The core
real-time phase performs only a few fast modular multiplications. These prop-
erties make LightMix suitable for low-latency applications on lightweight devices,
while retaining the excellent privacy guarantees of mix-nets, including unlinkability
of senders and receivers, and resistance to many tra c-analysis attacks.
xv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
During a meeting people started to argue about what the worst thing
in the world is. Some named illnesses, some death, some poverty... Many
things were named. Finally, Nasreddin Hodja was asked about his opinion.
Nasreddin answered: ‘It is bad when what you want doesn’t happen’. After a
brief consideration he added: ‘Though it is much worse when what you don’t
want happens’.
- Folklore
Online communication. Online communication has become one of the most sig-
ni cant forms of human communication. Everywhere – at home, in public trans-
port, at a party, even during social dinners in a restaurant – people are sending
messages via SMS, Whatsapp, Signal, Telegram, and Facebook. Online communica-
tion is also an integral part of services that businesses provide. Online shopping has
become so dominant that physical stores are now often referred to as o ine stores.
Crowds in the shopping malls right before Christmas Eve morph into endless lines
in post o ces, where people collect their online purchases. One can perform pay-
ments, play games, watch television, collaborate, order governmental services, and
even  ll out tax forms online. It is impossible to disagree with the statement that
online communication has become a crucial part of everyday life.
The popularity of online communication came hand in hand with the growing
popularity of Big Data. Big data is often used by large companies ?? to understand,
predict and shape behavior, which has made data about people one of the most
important products of modern businesses. Certain companies such as Towerdata
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make a pro t solely by collecting, aggregating and selling demographic information
about people. Interested buyers are those who hope to increase their sales via, for
example, better targeted advertisements, web-site designs or price policies. De-
mographic information is often collected online via tracking and analyzing user’s
websur ng behavior, forum posts and even posted pictures.
The perfect example of how much companies can learn about people based
on seemingly innocent data is shopping in supermarkets. A book by Duhigg [117]
provides a detailed illustration based on an interview with one of the data analysts
working at Target, a large supermarket chain. There he describes how information
is collected when customers use the supermarket’s credit card or a customer card
for purchases. This information can be used to learn details about their private lives
such as whether they have kids, or a backyard. More intimate things can be learned
as well, for example whether they expect a child, the trimester of pregnancy and
even the delivery date within a small time window. Duhigg writes: “when someone
suddenly starts buying lots of scent-free soap and cotton balls, in addition to hand
sanitizers and an astounding number of washcloths, all at once, a few months af-
ter buying lotions and magnesium and zinc, it signals they are getting close to their
delivery date.” A famous scandal that happened several years ago serves as a con-
 rmation. In 2012 it was revealed that Target learned about a teenager’s pregnancy
earlier than her parents did [315]. Life changing events such as a child birth are
valuable for companies, as they are the turning points around which new buying
habits can be implanted [117].
Such a situation is not advantageous from the perspective of one’s privacy. The
popular phrase “privacy is dead” became widely used after the talk “Privacy is dead,
get over it” given by private investigator Steve Rambam [266] in 2006. His main
message is that given the publicly available information and the information col-
lected at semi-private databases, very few information items are enough to completely
identify almost anybody. Seven years earlier, in 1999, at that time Sun Microsystems’
CEO Scott McNealy made another well-known statement: “You have zero privacy
anyway. Get over it..” This was the year when GPS phones just started to appear
in shops [295]. Facebook did not exist back in 1999. There was no YouTube or
Twitter yet, and Google started this year with only eight employees [158]. In 1999
this statement caused raised eyebrows. Today, especially after Edward Snowden’s
revelations, “privacy is dead” is the topic of numerous public debates.
At the same time the bene ts of online communication facilitated by the Inter-
net have in a certain sense become an ideology. Many people seem to agree that
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it improves businesses, people’s productivity, collaboration, and gives easy access
to any information one might need. Artists, writers, scientists, and o ce workers
are strongly encouraged to be present online in LinkedIn, Facebook, Twitter, etc.
or to maintain a blog. A signi cant number of commercial applications started to
push user’s data to a cloud for synchronization purposes or even switched to being
purely web based. More and more free online services such as email servers, task
tracking and collaboration platforms have emerged. Numerous gadgets connected
to the Internet, such as smart watches, are designed to save time, track and support
daily activities for improved productivity and convenience.
The Internet as a part of the Internet of Things. Thanks to connected gadgets
and other things the Internet became a part of a larger network – an Internet of
Things (IoT). IoT was envisioned back in 1999 [321] and promised to provide highly
sophisticated services with the help of numerous objects in everyday life, things,
being interconnected and interoperating. For example, in smart homes a plethora
of things can cooperate to make sure that the house owner sleeps as long as possi-
ble and still be at work on time. For this, an alarm clock can learn today’s weather
conditions and request information about tra c jams. This information can be
combined with the average times required for travel and today’s schedule in order
to decide if the user can sleep half an hour longer. His smart watch can in uence
this decision if it concludes the owner’s diet behavior requires him to exercise a bit
longer this morning. Then the alarm clock can notify the garage to start warming
up the car in time, the co ee maker to start brewing and the fridge to order a fresh
bread roll for breakfast.
Many of such examples have been described by futurists. However, IoT is not
there yet. There are a multitude of IoT products such as smart meters, fridges,
smart watches, and co ee makers connected to the Internet, but they still rarely
interoperate to provide the promised sophisticated services. Additionally, the Inter-
net still plays a major role in IoT, compared to the expected heterogeneity of the
types of networks within IoT – from networks comprised of devices located inside
or on the surface of a person’s body to sensor networks of several farm  elds.
De nitions of IoT given by industry mostly focus on things connected to the In-
ternet [274, p. 40]. This can be explained by the fact that IoT products are currently
supported by online backend systems such as clouds to store user data and to out-
source programmable logic. An Internet connection is also used whenever there is
a need to access remote functionality of devices such as switching power on and
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o  [30, 216]. Without the Internet connection such products will either not function
at all, or have limited functionality.
Privacy threats. In this thesis we are considering two of the major privacy threats
in IoT. The  rst is that there is no control of when and what kind of data is collected.
Data about people is being collected, analyzed and traded on a regular basis. The
second threat is that the technologies that are currently being used facilitate data
collection that identi es users.
Data collection can happen manually, but also automatically by surrounding or
owned devices. For example, anyone can be videotaped in the most unpleasant
moments of their life, and the video uploaded to YouTube to be watched poten-
tially by billions of people. These situations are already ingrained in the culture by
popular songs [290] and cartoons [312]. Gadgets we own have ‘backdoors’ [157, 16]
and are reported to collect and send away information about us. The same goes for
applications and services. Security cameras are ubiquitous and can recognize peo-
ple solely by the way they walk [266]. As discussed earlier, such uncontrolled data
collection coupled with sophisticated data analysis performed by Big Data analysts
can reveal the most intimate details about one’s life, as well as make everyone easy
to trace.
As more and more gadgets are being invented and things are being connected
to the Internet, privacy invasion becomes more and more aggressive. Connected
devices appear in previously intimate spaces such as our homes, they are placed
on our bodies, and can collect sensitive information about our habits and health. If
street cameras and smartphones make it very di cult to relax in public spaces such
as streets and o ces, appliances in smart homes are likely to make it impossible to
have private lives in the very homes we live in [169].
Two major approaches taken in technological solutions support data collection
that identi es individuals. The  rst is the use of centralized architectures, compared
to distributed, mesh and peer-to-peer networks. The second is the use of identify-
ing attributes (see Section 3.5.2) in communication protocols as well as in transac-
tions within applications built on top of communication protocols. Attributes are
qualities or parts of subjects or objects. Identifying attributes are unique for an
individual or an object, for example it can be the manufacturing ID of a phone, or
a passport number of a citizen. A group of combined attributes can become iden-
tifying as well, when it makes it possible to uniquely distinguish a person among
other individuals [299]. Such combined attributes are exactly the “very few infor-
4
mation items [that] are enough to completely identify almost anybody” Rambam
was talking about [266].
Identifying attributes. Use of identifying attributes in communication networks
started at the very time these networks were invented. Communication networks
require addresses (e.g. IP andMAC address) assigned to the nodes in order to route
messages to the intended destination. Networking protocols were not designed to
consider such addresses as sensitive information. As a result, these addresses are
accessible to anyone who can view or intercept communication of users. Knowing
network addresses often makes it possible to learn which transactions belong to
the same user, and to establish links to physical locations, types of devices used for
communication and identities of communicating users.
This way, any action a user is taking when using communication networks is po-
tentially traceable, irrespective of the protocol used for the transaction performed
at the application level. Anybody can learn what messages this user sent, to whom,
when and for what reason. Consider transferring money with the digital cash sys-
tem Bitcoin. Bitcoin supports binding money transfers from addresses that are not
tied to the identity of users. To create such addresses it is enough to generate new
public and private key pairs. Transactions themselves also do not require users to
reveal their identity. However, it is possible for a third party to learn who the origi-
nator of a money transfer is. For this, it is enough to be able to read an IP address in
the messages the user sent during the transaction. An attacker who can oversee a
large enough part of the Bitcoin peer-to-peer network can easily perform this task.
In a centralized architecture this task would be easy even for a local attacker, who
can observe only the incoming and outgoing tra c of a central server.
In order to prevent such an attack, a user has to be able to conceal his IP ad-
dress, a communication level attribute. However, this is not enough to keep him
protected. For example, the user’s real identity is often tied to his addresses by
the wallet or exchange services he uses, despite the protocol not requiring this. In
this case his address can be linked, for example, to his name, a transaction level at-
tribute. Another way his identity can be revealed is when he performs two money
transfers using the same address. Even if his address is not tied to his real name, an
adversary will be able to see that both transactions are originating from the same
user. If one of these transactions was performed with a store that needed his home
address to perform a delivery, this can be used to identify the user in both trans-
actions. Therefore, to protect users’ privacy both communication and transaction
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level attributes need to be anonymized. More elaboration on the attribute levels
considered in this thesis can be found in Section 1.1.
Technological solutions to privacy threats. Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
are technological tools aimed at protecting the privacy of users, while making it pos-
sible to implement useful functionality e ciently. PETs provide users with technical
solutions that help to enforce their control over what information is collected about
them. PETs are usually designed to achieve control by providing con dentiality and
anonymity [160]. Anonymous communication systems are PETs designed to pro-
tect communication level attributes. For example, they make it possible to make
senders and receivers of messages unknown. Other PETs such as attribute-based
credentials (ABCs) anonymize transaction level attributes to protect users’ privacy
in speci c applications.
The positive implication of the Internet dominance within IoT is thatmany proto-
cols used currently on the Internet can be adopted for a wider range of IoT devices,
which includes PETs protocols. For this, one has to consider whether client applica-
tions can be made lightweight to ensure they can be run on resource constrained
small devices. Such devices are limited in the types of computational operations
they can perform, memory size, as well as by the battery life. We consider devices
at least capable of performing symmetric encryption. Another important consider-
ation is clients with an unstable connection, which makes them frequently join and
leave the network. Many such clients are mobile devices such as mobile phones or
wearables that cannot always stay in areas with good network coverage. Some of
such clients are lightweight devices with very restricted battery power, or ones that
are powered externally. These clients are forced to regularly disconnect.
In this thesis we investigate technological means for ensuring the privacy of
communication on the Internet and in the Internet of Things. In particular, we focus
on PETs that prevent disclosure of identifying attributes at both the communication
and transaction levels. We examine several existing tools from the perspective of
adapting them to the Internet of Things as it exists today, with the Internet being
its primary network. When examining existing protocols or designing new ones we
investigate primarily how the clients can be made lightweight and if the protocols
can be adopted for mobile devices with unstable connections.
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1.1 The scope of the thesis
The main research question of this thesis is:
How can PETs be implemented and adopted in IoT as it exists today in order to ensure
privacy of communication by preventing identifying attributes from being revealed?
The intention is to look at the problem from di erent angles in order to examine
its complexity. The de nition of privacy can be found in Section 2.1.
In pursuing our goal we consider two di erent communication networks that
are common to the modern IoT. The  rst group form Local Area Networks (LAN) of
nearby situated devices, often performed via ZigBee or near- eld communication.
This local communication happens when people pay with contactless debit cards,
check in with their transport cards, or exchange information between two smart-
phones positioned next to each other. The second form Wide Area Networks (WAN)
with devices located at large distances between each other, in particular the Inter-
net. We consider several PET protocols that are applicable for use in these types of
network.
We also focus on how the attributes of communicating parties are made avail-
able to various entities in a system. Attributes are commonly de ned as qualities
or parts of subjects or objects. Subjects are active entities such as senders and re-
ceivers, while objects are passive entities such as messages and keys. For example,
an attribute can be the age of a person or his or her role as a student. In digital sys-
tems they serve as identi ers or role identi ers of subjects. This makes attributes
essential for identi cation (establishing identity),  ltering, authentication (proving
identity or a role), authorization and many other essential functions in such sys-
tems.
Table 1.1 shows how the chapters of this thesis  t in described facets: attribute
levels and types of network. Chapter 3 describes “ABC in IoT” intended for devices
designed with services provided over the Internet. Chapter 4 describes “High-speed
dating” that is designed for communication between RFID tags and a reader. Chap-
ter 5 presents “Footprint scheduling” that is proposed for DC-net, an anonymous
communication network well suited for both LAN and WAN communication. Chap-
ter 6 presents Elligator, which can also be applied in both LAN and WAN commu-
nication. Finally, Chapter 7 introduces LightMix which is a variant of a mix-net, an
anonymous communication network that is applicable to WAN communication.
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Table 1.1: Representation of chapters of this thesis.
LAN WAN
Communication level Chapter 4 Chapter 3
Transaction level
Chapter 6 Chapter 6, 7
Chapter 5 Chapter 5
Attributes of communicating parties. For the purposes of this thesis we di er-
entiate between two levels of attributes, namely the communication level and the
transaction level, which are covered in di erent chapters of this thesis. Attributes
that belong to the  rst level are the ones that are inherent to all communicating
parties. These attributes describe di erent roles that communication subjects can
play and relationships between subjects and objects. These attributes include be-
ing:
• A sender or a recipient, which can be an end point or an intermediary;
• A communication partner of a particular entity;
• An originator of a particular protocol or a transaction.
The second level belongs to transactions, which we de ne as instances of com-
munication performed for a particular purpose. Transaction level attributes are
meaningful for this purpose. These attributes support decision making, for exam-
ple whether an anonymous sender is authorized to request certain information or
what kind of response he or she should get. Examples of such attributes are:
• Ownership of a device, an account, a subscription;
• Device manufacturer name;
• User age;
• Region where a user lives;
Without keeping communication level attributes private, the privacy protection
ofmost Internet protocols and applications is questionable. For example, an anony-
mous payment system can be designed to allow participants to perform binding
money transfers without revealing their identity. However, if their location is re-
vealed, the anonymity measures of this payment system cannot protect users from
identi cation.
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Once communication level attributes are kept private, anonymization of the
transaction level attributes helps sustain the privacy of individuals, while at the
same time supporting functionality of many Internet applications and services.
1.2 This thesis at a glance
We focus on di erent levels of attributes in di erent parts of this thesis. In the part
about communication level attributes, we examine systems designed to make such
attributes private, namely anonymous communication systems (see Sections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2 for a general introduction to such systems). The three most popular sys-
tems in the literature are DC-net, mix-net and onion routing. They have all been
extensively studied and are implemented in practical systems. We examine partic-
ular improvements that can be made to these systems. We investigate both DC-net
andmix-net from the perspective of optimizing them for the needs of IoT. For onion
routing we focus on meeting the current needs of Tor1. Tor is the most widely used
implementation of onion routing in particular and anonymous communication sys-
tems in general.
Chapter 3.
Question answered How can one prevent that transactions initiated by IoT de-
vices are linked and tracked using revealed attributes?
Attributes level Transaction level
Type of network LAN
Type of device Powerful, can a ord asymmetric cryptography
Paper This chapter is based on the paper “New Directions in IoT
Privacy Using Attribute-based Authentication.” [7] by Gergely
Alpár, Lejla Batina, Lynn Batten, Veelasha Moonsamy, Antoine
Guellier, Iynkaran Natgunanathan and me.
1https://www.torproject.org
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Contributions I assisted in writing the paper. My contribution to the pa-
per is the idea of the real-world problem which was de-
scribed in the use-case section of the paper and served as
a basis for the framework proposed in the paper. In col-
laboration with Gergely Alpár, I de ned the precise notion
of privacy in IoT that we use throughout the paper and an-
alyzed threats to privacy following this notion. I actively
participated in discussions that led to all other sections of
the paper.
Chapter 4.
Question answered How can lightweight RFID devices discover a match of at-
tributes without revealing them to another RFIDdevice or a
reader? What can be done without asymmetric cryptogra-
phy in such applications, and what can be done with asym-
metric cryptography?
Attributes level Transaction level
Type of network LAN
Type of device Lightweight, can a ord no asymmetric cryptography, or a
few public key encryptions
Paper This chapter is based on the paper “High-speed dating:
Privacy-preserving attribute matching for RFID.” [25] by Lejla
Batina, Jens Hermans, Jaap-Henk Hoepman and me.
Contributions I wrote most of the paper, developed the ideas for the pro-
tocols. The last protocol and security proofs of all proto-
cols I performed in cooperation with my coauthors.
Chapter 5.
Question answered Can anonymous scheduling in DC-net be adjusted to the
frequent joining and leaving of participants that is natural
formobile devices while keeping communication overhead
reasonable and providing the ability to scale well to the
number of participants?
Attributes level Communication level
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Type of network LAN and WAN. DC-net can be organized only by nodes
Type of device Lightweight, can a ord no asymmetric cryptography. Net-
work connection is unstable, but has enough resources to
actively send in the network.
Paper This chapter is based on the paper “Footprint scheduling for
Dining-Cryptographer networks.” [202] by Moritz Neikes, Peter
Schwabe and me.
Contributions I wrote about a half of the paper. I developed the ideas
for the disruption detection protocol. My contributions
include analysis of existing approaches to scheduling in
DC-net, performance evaluation formulas. I actively par-
ticipated in parameter tuning and analysis of footprint
scheduling properties.
Chapter 6.
Question answered Can one prevent an adversary from detecting the initiation
of a key exchange protocol? In particular, can one make
elliptic curve keys indistinguishable from uniform random
strings?
Attributes level Communication level
Type of network LAN and WAN
Type of device Powerful
Paper This chapter is based on the paper “Elligator: Elliptic-curve
points indistinguishable from uniform random strings.” [48]
by Daniel J. Bernstein, Mike Hamburg, Tanja Lange and me.
Contributions I assisted in writing the  st version of the paper. I partici-
pated in working out the proofs that demonstrate that the
map Elligator 1 is a bijection from a large subset of E(Fq)
to a large set S of b-bit strings.
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Chapter 7.
Question answered Can one adjust mix-nets for lightweight clients? In partic-
ular, how to minimize the amount of heavy cryptographic
operations on clients?
Attributes level Communication level
Type of network WAN
Type of device Clients can a ord only limited number of public key oper-
ations, or it is done instead of them once during joining
Paper This chapter is based on the paper “LightMix: Mixing with
Minimal Real-Time Asymmetric Cryptographic Operations.” by
David Chaum, Debajyoti Das, Farid Javani, Aniket Kate, Joeri de
Ruiter and Alan T. Sherman and me.. This paper is currently
in submission.
Contributions I wrote a substantial part of the paper. My contributions
include performing a privacy and security evaluation in co-
operation with Aniket Kate and Debajyoti Das. Protocol
integrity protocols I developed in cooperation with David
Chaum, Aniket Kate and Joeri de Ruiter. Comparison with
other mix-net protocols I did in cooperation with Joeri de
Ruiter. The main inventor of LightMix protocol is David
Chaum.
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Chapter 2
Privacy and privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs)
This chapter introduces preliminary information on topics of privacy and PETs that
are used throughout this thesis. All other preliminary topics are introduced in the
chapter they are directly related to.
2.1 Privacy
De nitions. Privacy is studied in depth in multiple disciplines, including law, phi-
losophy, policy management, and computer science. All these disciplines shape
di erent views on privacy, but one fact is commonly agreed on: privacy is a concept
that is hard to de ne.
There are several famous de nitions of privacy that are often used in the liter-
ature. We will introduce two that are most relevant to this thesis. One of them
is quite commonly referred to in computer science. It was given by Westin [322]
in 1970, who de nes privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.” The popularity of this de nition in computer science can
be explained by the fact that it directly translates to the goals which most Privacy
Enhancing Technologies (PETs) are created to achieve. More elaboration on PETs is
given in Section 2.2.
Many PETs are designed to prevent disclosure and minimize the amount of in-
formation that can be revealed to or collected by third parties. When properly used,
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such technology often provides to a user some degree of control that allows to de-
 ne how his or her identity is represented in a digital system. This is achieved by
de ning circumstances under which some attributes of this person can be revealed,
and which attributes are to be kept con dential. PETs provide such control even
when facing a party that does not intend to respect user’s privacy, or to comply
with the rules of a given system or a protocol. We refer further in this thesis to such
parties as adversaries or attackers interchangeably.
Another popular de nition of privacy is given by Agre and Rottenberg [3]. Agre
and Rottenberg de ned privacy as “the freedom from unreasonable constraints on the
construction of one’s identity.” Hilderbrandt argues in her work [168], that this def-
inition includes an important aspect of privacy, namely the link between freedom
from unwanted access to freedom to construct identity of an individual.
According to Hilderbrandt, a static conception of identity is useful for practical
purposes of identi cation. It is built on de ning the identity of a person by a set
of attributes. Another approach to understanding identity is recognizing its devel-
oping nature that requires both active interaction with the outside world, and the
ability to rebuild and reevaluate without intrusion. Hilderbrandt is referring to this
unconstrained potential of changing as the indeterminacy of an identity. She sums
up as follows: "Privacy empowers the human person of  esh and bones to rebuild
its identity, by protecting its indeterminacy".
If one adopts such a de nition in technology protecting privacy, spectrum of
aims for PETs needs to be expanded to also capture the second privacy aspect,
namely the freedom to construct identity. One of the severe ways this freedom is
currently restricted is manipulation of available information. It includes  lter bub-
bles, which are created as a result of algorithms producing personalized content,
e ectively con rming users’ past experiences and viewpoints [249]. It also includes
restriction to information access (censoring), actively performed by many compa-
nies and governments [238, 177].
Metrics. The privacy of a given system can be measured in two ways. One can ei-
ther de ne it as a binary or as an ordinal variable. The  rst approach considers only
existing or absent privacy. Such an approach is often taken within the cryptographic
community , since it stems from the common cryptographic approach to de ning
security. In this approach one speci es a goal of a cryptographic tool. One also has
to de ne abilities and goals of an adversary, the overall system and assumptions
made. Having all that de ned, one proves that the adversary is incapable of reach-
ing his goal under given circumstances. Thus, if an adversary is capable of achieving
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his goal, the cryptographic tool is considered to fail. Translated to privacy protect-
ing measures, this means that if an attacker is capable of obtaining any information
de ned as sensitive, the protective measure is considered to have failed. Even re-
lease of partial information is often viewed as harmful, since “For most applications
it is unreasonable to assume that the attacker forgets something. Thus, normally
the knowledge of the attacker only increases.” [260]
The second approach aims to distinguish and measure di erent levels of pri-
vacy. This approach makes it possible to decide if a given user or an overall system
has more privacy than another. Quanti cation of privacy degree is common for
data scientists [119, 299]. In anonymous communication networks such metrics
also exist. Simple metrics consider to what degree an attacker can distinguish an
IoI, for example, the given sender from the rest of possible senders [270, 260]. An-
other class of metrics uses entropy to estimate anonymity from the point of view
of a single communication interaction [285, 109]. To estimate the global anonymity
of a system, some studies [121, 147, 24] count the number of sensitive associa-
tions (e.g. between senders and their messages) an attacker has uncovered with
high probability. They then ask: how does this number relate to the number of all
possible associations in a system?
In order to approach viewing privacy as an ordinal variable, one has to make
clear assumptions about what information is available to an attacker both inside
and outside of the system. The measurement is correct only until such assump-
tions hold. Usually it is very hard, if possible at all, to make such assumptions in
great detail about complex systems. It is even harder to verify the validity of such
assumptions. Therefore in this thesis we use only the binary metric.
Terminology. As discussed earlier, privacy is an umbrella term that is covered in
many disciplines. Implementation of a technical system requires terminology that
makes it possible to di erentiate  ne-grained properties. For example, terminol-
ogy devised by Vaudenay di erentiates the privacy properties of a system based
on the type of attacker this system can resist. This terminology is described in Sec-
tion 4.3.1. We will use the terminology proposed by Andreas P tzmann and Marit
Hansen [260] that is commonly accepted in PETs research community terminology.
It is used in order to describe properties of protocols, as well as serves as a basis
for specifying a goal of a cryptographic protocol. Terminology proposed by An-
dreas P tzmann and Marit Hansen considers the properties of a system consisting
of users or subjects, and an attacker who can be one of the users or an external
entity observing and/or modifying information  ows.
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De nition 1. A subject or an object is anonymous if an attacker is not able to identify
him or it from a set of subjects or objects with similar properties.
De nition 2. An anonymity set is the set of subjects or objects with similar properties,
in which individual entities are non-identi able by an attacker.
In an anonymous communication system, one can have a separate sender anonymity
set and recipient anonymity set. The sender anonymity set is the set of all senders
whomight have sent a message at a given time from the perspective of an attacker.
Sender anonymity does not necessarily relates to senders of an application-level
message; this can be an initiation of any network connection. Similarly, the recip-
ient anonymity set is the set of all senders who might have received a message
at a given time from perspective of an attacker. On the Internet it usually means
that a user or a server can be contacted by those who do not know their network
address, and an observer is unable to say which messages they received. Alterna-
tively, this can be achieved if nobody knows what information a particular receiver
is interested in. For example, this can be achieved whenmessages are broadcasted.
De nition 3. An Item of Interest (IoI) for an attacker is an object or a subject which
an attacker targets.
This can be: the sender of a particular message, the receiver of a message, mes-
sage content, the originator of a transaction, all transaction with the same origina-
tor, etc. Normally, a rule of thumb applies when one tries to improve the anonymity
in a system. It states that the larger the anonymity set and the more even the dis-
tribution of probabilities of being an IoI (e.g., of being a sender) within it, the better
the anonymity provided.
De nition 4. Subjects and/or objects have the property unlinkability if an attacker is
not able to identify a relationship between them.
There are multiple examples of relationships that are often kept unlinkable in
PETs. These include the relationship between a sender and a recipient, a sender
and a message, a recipient and a message, two transactions, and a transaction and
its originator. Often, one uses the term untraceability in place of unlinkability (of an
entity and its location, or an entity and its activity). If an entity is anonymous, there
is unlinkability between this entity and all other IoIs related to it. Sender anonymity
implies, that any message sent in a system is unlinkable to this particular sender.
At the same time, recipients of all these messages can be known.
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De nition 5. Relationship anonymity is achieved when there is unlinkability between
both sender and recipient.
If both sender and recipient know each other, but anonymity of both of them
in relation to all other parties is maintained, this is called relationship anonymity.
Note, this property is weaker than sender or recipient anonymity, because commu-
nication partners are not necessarily anonymous to each other.
De nition 6. Undetectability is achieved when an attacker cannot detect if an IoI is
present in a system.
De nition 7. Subjects and/or objects are unobservable if any subject:
• not involved in an IoI is not able to di erentiate if an IoI exists or not (is unde-
tectable);
• involved in an IoI is anonymous for other subjects involved in this IoI.
Unobservability is the strongest property among all those described. Sender
unobservability implies that a sender is anonymous for all users of the system,
including an attacker and a recipient of his message. It also means that the recip-
ient of the message is the only entity able to tell if some sender from the sender
anonymity set has indeed sent a meaningful message at a given time.
2.2 Privacy-enhancing technologies
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) are technological tools designed to support
and provide privacy protection to the users of speci c applications, while at the
same time keeping the functionality, e ciency and usability of these applications
at a desirable level. As mentioned in the previous section, many PETs achieve pri-
vacy by data minimization at the point in time when it is communicated or collected
by third parties. For this PETs often rely on using cryptographic primitives and pro-
tocols.
2.2.1 A brief overview of research areas
There are a multitude of topics within the PETs research literature. In this section
we give an (non-exhaustive) overview of some research areas related to PETs based
on cryptographic techniques. PETs is a diverse area, thus many research topics
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were not covered in this section, for e.g. steganography, location privacy, insurance
pricing.
Anonymous communication. PETs created within this topic were developed to
provide anonymity properties to the communicating parties (see Section 2.1). Mix-
nets [80, 261, 258] usually provide sender anonymity, as well as sender-receiver un-
linkability. Onion routing is a protocol based on the principle of mix-nets, adjusted to
real-time communication with a reduction in the strength of protection [246, 151].
Dining Cryptographers network (DC-net short) [83] was also created by David Chaum.
This PET provides both sender and recipient anonymity. These three anonymous
communication systems are reviewed in greater detail in Section 2.2.2.
Anonymous credentials and e-cash. Anonymous credentialswere invented by Chaum
in 1983 in his work dedicated to anonymous payments [81, 82]. Later on they
were further developed and renamed in the literature to attribute-based creden-
tials (ABC) [73]. ABC makes it possible to reveal a selected number of attributes,
while staying anonymous. An attribute can be any information about the user. For
example, age, place of living, membership in a club, etc. The authenticity of such
attributes is assured by its issuer. In the case of passport data, this can be a govern-
ment, in the case of club membership, the club plays the role of an issuer. ABC also
protects unlinkability between several transactions. A user can reveal the same set
of attributes to the same entity several times, without anybody being able to iden-
tify that the transactions are initiated by same user. Anonymous credentials are
reviewed in greater detail in Sections 3.3.3 and 3.5.1.
Anonymous credentials are used to implement privacy-friendly digital cash sys-
tems by making an attribute a coin, making its value the denomination of the coin,
and then the payment is made by showing the credential. These systems do not
only have to provide the unlinkability property between users and transactions, but
they also prevent double spending of e-cash coins. This problem can be solved by
having a third party verify and approve transactions, such systems are called on-
line e-cash systems, for example [81]. O ine e-cash systems do not require any
third party to perform a transaction, which makes the problem of double-spending
harder to solve. To prevent double spending, o ine e-cash systems make the user
identi able if the attribute is shown twice. This approach was proposed by Chaum,
Fiat, and Naor [84]. Numerous further developments of e-cash have been described
in the literature [61, 34, 72, 180, 283, 170]. E-cash systems dedicated to transporta-
tion can also be based on anonymous credentials [167, 280].
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Not all e-cash systems are based on anonymous credential; a widely used called
Bitcoin [233] is one of them. Bitcoin does not provide anonymity [54]. A number
of papers focus on adding transaction unlinkability to it. ZeroCash [38] maintains
the decentralized property of Bitcoin and the e ciency of ZeroCash is improved
in [102, 143]. The drawback of these systems is that they modify the protocols
used in Bitcoin, which can make adoption problematic [333]. Another approach is
to involve techniques from anonymous communication systems. MixCoin [57], and
CoinParty [333] utilize a mixing server, CoinShu e [279] and SecureCoin [175] uses
mix-net structure, while CoinJoin [223] uses Tor [113].
Private Information Retrieval (PIR). This PET can be viewed as a part of anony-
mous communication, because retrieval can be used to provide receiver anonymity.
PIRmakes it possible to retrieve data from a storage location without anyone know-
ing what was retrieved, including the storage itself. PIR requires the user to know
the exact address of the data item he or she is interested in. An exception to this is
the PIR based on keyword search [195].
PIR was  rst introduced in 1995 [86], and is called information-theoretic, which
means that no server has any information about the data item. Instead, this data
item is distributed over multiple servers and can be retrieved only if data from sev-
eral such servers is collected. The security of this scheme relies on the assumption
that these servers are not colluding. A number of schemes with information theo-
retic property have been reported in the literature [28, 27, 29, 149]. Single server
solutions rely on cryptographically hard problems [204, 71, 225]. A hybrid approach
improves on both types of PIR, the information theoretic one and the one that relies
on cryptographically hard problems [107].
An oblivious transfer [62, 210, 17] can be considered to be a PIR scheme with
stronger guarantees. Like a PIR, it makes it possible to receive information such
that the user receives one out of several transferred data items without the server
knowing which of the data items were received. At the same time the user does
not know the other data items that he or she received. A single-database PIR with
total communication that is less than the size of the data stored can be reduced
into oblivious transfer [108].
Censorship resistance. Censorship-resistant publishing systems are designed so that
theymake it possible to anonymously publish and access sensitive documents with-
out a risk that any of the documents will be blocked within such system. Examples
of such systems are Free Haven [112], Freenet [87, 277], GNUnet [41, 203], and
Anon-Pass [207]. The disadvantage of the censorship-resistant publishing systems
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is that they reveal the whole list of available servers to any user, which makes it
easy to automatically block access to all of these servers [201].
Communications censorship is provided by proxies and anonymous communica-
tion systems [80, 261, 258, 205, 246, 151] can be used to bypass simple blocking
based on IP address of the destination. To avoid more advanced censoring tech-
niques, other protection techniques need to be added. Two major trends exist,
one of which protects the set of servers that forward user’s tra c from being easily
learned by the censor [201, 173, 189, 124, 55]. Another approach is to create shape
tra c to look like another application, for example VoIP [193, 174, 212, 120, 313,
306].
Systems that are speci cally developed for providing censorship resistance of-
ten include a covert channel by design and focus on plausible deniability for their
users. Covert channels are communication methods that are built to let only com-
municating parties to recognize that communication is taking place. For example,
Infranet [131] is a system of forwarding servers that receive requests shaped as
HTTP tra c and send replies via convert channels in images. Telex embeds covert
channel in TLS handshakes [326].
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) and Privacy-Preserving Data Publish-
ing (PPDP).
These types of PETs focus on preventing leakage of sensitive information about
data sources within a dataset. PPDM puts emphasis on a model with any data
being queried, while PPDP is used for sanitizing data for release. However, this
distinction is not strict, and both PPDM and PPDP are often used interchangeably
in the literature [247]. An overview of this  eld can be found in [235, 220, 263, 215].
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) techniques are needed to prevent an attacker
from learning from disclosed datamore information about the data source, or com-
pletely identifying him or her. This is usually referred to as re-identi cation. The
main goal of SDC is to minimize the risk of re-identi cation, without harming the
data utility. To achieve this goal a number of papers suggest masking the original
data. Alternatively one can produce synthetic data such that the statistical proper-
ties of the original data hold [224, 271].
Perturbativemaskingmethodsmodify original data in order to achieve anonymity.
Examples of such an approach include adding random noise to the data [118]
and swapping attributes between data items [132, 289]. Non-perturbative masking
avoids altering original data by partial suppression or reduction of details. Several
techniques have been devised to reduce the uniqueness of the attributes of data
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items, such as generalization and local suppression [299]. These techniques are
used to achieve k-anonymity. A data set has k-anonymity when every attribute value
is represented in at least k data items (e.g. rows in a database table) [299, 308].
Thus, a single data item is indistinguishable from any other k ≠ 1 data items. A
number of studies have introduced improvements [116] to k-anonymity, includ-
ing l-diversity [218, 192], t-closeness [211] and —-likeness [77]. Another notion is
‘-di erential privacy [119, 281], which works by estimating if adding even a single
data item will have any signi cant in uence on the result of a query on this data.
‘-di erential privacy is currently considered to o er a stronger privacy protection
than k-anonymity and its improvements at a price of more limited data utility [282].
A comparison of two families of privacy notions can be found in [89].
Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) ensures that several parties can perform a
collaborative computation without revealing their individual inputs. Within PPDM
MPC is used to perform joint data mining without disclosing the datasets of par-
ticipants [215, 263]. A detailed study of the set of basic operations on data (e.g.
sum, set union, etc.) that can be performed e ciently, as well as their application
to PPDM is discussed in [88]. Homomorphic encryption is one of the popular ways
to construct MPC. This type of encryption can be used to encrypt data such that
it can be mined in its encrypted form. After decryption, the resulting data will be
same as if the mining process was performed on the original data. Partially homo-
morphic encryption has a one of the basic operations such as addition and mul-
tiplication which it supports. Fully homomorphic encryption can sustain arbitrary
operations [145]. Both types of homomorphic encryption are used for collaborative
computations in PPDM [325, 159, 332, 95].
2.2.2 Anonymous communication systems
Distributing trust among several servers or users in an anonymous communication
system is a default approach, making it possible to mitigate many insider, denial of
service, and local tra c-analysis attacks [100]. A large number of state-of-the-art
systems stem from either mix-nets, onion routing or DC-nets. Both mix-nets and
DC-nets resist a global attacker, while onion routing relies on the restriction that an
attacker cannot observe all the links in network. Mix-nets and onion routing require
several central nodes that process messages encrypted in layers. In addition, mix-
net nodes add random permutation of incoming messages and sometimes a delay
before sending a message further. Table 2.1 presents an informal comparison of
original versions of these systems [80, 151, 83]. The anonymity of DC-net is uncondi-
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tional, because it doesn’t rely on computationally hard mathematical problems, un-
like mix-net or onion routing. However, it requires broadcasting to be reliable [316].
The computational load is light in DC-net, because it only requires xor operations.
Both of the other systems use asymmetric cryptography. The network load is ex-
tremely heavy in DC-net because, in order to transmit a single meaningful message
from a user, it requires all other participants to transmit meaningless messages
of the same length. DC-net can have a central server that publishes anonymized
messages, however, it can function as well without [258]. Mix-net or onion rout-
ing requires servers to forward messages of users. Data retention is the storage
of network communication data and meta-data by communication providers. Data
retention row presents an ability to store sensitive data that can be used for fur-
ther deanonymization of users. No information stored on a DC-net server can be
used to deanonymize it’s users, but this is not the case for mix-net or onion routing.
Both DC-net and mix-net can resist a global adversary who is capable of seeing all
the links in the network.
Table 2.1: Comparison of basic DC-net, mix-net and onion routing systems.
PROPERTY DC-NET MIX-NET ONION ROUTING
Anonymity unconditional computational computational
Computation load lightweight moderate moderate
Network load extremely heavy normal normal
Network architecture central or peer-to-peer central servers central servers
Data retention not possible possible possible
Attacker global global not global
Mix Networks
In 1981, Chaum [80] introduced the concept of mix-nets (often referred to as de-
cryption mix-nets) and gave basic cryptographic protocols whereby messages from
a set of users are relayed by a sequence of trusted intermediaries, called mixnodes
or mixes. Before being sent to the  rst mixnode, messages are padded and en-
crypted in several layers. Each layer is encrypted using a public key of the mixnode
through which the message has to travel next. A mixnode is simply a message relay
(or proxy) that accepts a batch of encryptedmessages of equal length, decrypts and
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randomly permutes them, and sends them on their way forward. Figure 2.1 depicts
the mix-net with three mix-nodes, four senders and receivers.
Figure 2.1: Mix-net with tree mixnodes. Figure is taken from [331].
Both decryption and random permutation are used to make sure that it is im-
possible to establish a link between incomingmessages of amixnode and outgoing,
without knowing the secret key and the permutation. Decryption of messages that
have equal length ensures that no recognizable pattern of bits is left when mes-
sages leave mixnode. Random permutation makes sure no link can be established
based on the order of messages.
Due to incoming messages being unlinkable to the outgoing ones, senders also
are unlinkable to messages output of mix-net. Mix-net maintains this unlinkability
against an external attacker if there is at least onemixnode. If an attacker is internal,
there needs to be at minimum one server that is not under control of an attacker.
The sender in a decryption mix-net must perform a number of public-key op-
erations equal to the number of mixnodes. The length of the resulting encrypted
message is proportional to this number, and the length of the plaintext message is
thus restricted for performance reasons.
Hybrid mix-nets allow plaintext messages to have arbitrary length, by combining
asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. First proposed in 1985 by P tzmann and
Waidner [258, 256], hybrid mix-nets share a session key in the header of message,
and then use a stream cipher to encrypt the rest of the message. Various proposals
based on block ciphers followed [242, 183]. The recent system called Ri e [205]
provides both sender and receiver anonymity by using veri able shu es and pri-
vate information retrieval. Veri able shu es [236] allow to perform secretly shu e
a set of messages in such a way, that correctness of this operation can be proven.
Periodically, a client and all servers perform veri able shu es to exchange session
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keys, which are then used for several rounds in a similar manner to that performed
by other hybrid networks.
In 1994, Park et al. [250] introduced re-encryption mix-nets. Taking advantage
of homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryption, each mixnode re-encrypts the
incoming message instead of decrypting it as in the original mix-net. Doing so re-
duces and  xes the size of the ciphertext message traveling through the mix-net.
Universal re-encryption mix-nets [155] do not require mixnodes to know public keys
for re-encryption. Because the sender encrypts each message using the public key
of the receiver, only the receiver is able to read the plaintext. Consequently, the
recipient can trace messages addressed to them directly from the point when they
were sent by senders. Thus, unlike other mix-nets, universal re-encryption mix-
nets provide sender anonymity only against external observers, and not against
message recipients.
Precomputation mix-nets introduce a precomputation phase to decrease latency
during message delivery. Jakobsson [182] introduced precompution to reduce the
cost of node operations in re-encryption mix-nets, though client costs remain the
same. Adida and Wikström [1] considered an o ine/online approach to mixing.
Their protocol still requires several public-key operations in the online phase, and
senders have to perform public-key operations.
Onion Routing
Higher latency of traditional mix-nets can be unsatisfactory for several communi-
cation scenarios, such as web search or instant messaging. Over the past sev-
eral years, a signi cant number of low-latency anonymity networks have been pro-
posed [245, 74, 85, 191, 190, 150, 23, 22], and some have been extensively em-
ployed in practice [304, 113].
Common to many of them is onion routing [246, 151], a technique whereby a
message is wrapped in multiple layers of encryption, forming an onion. A common
realization of an onion-routing system is to arrange a collection of onion routers
(abbreviated ORs, also called hops or nodes) that relay tra c for users of the sys-
tem. Users then randomly choose a path with few edges through the network of
ORs and construct a circuit—a sequence of nodes that will route tra c. After the
OR circuit is constructed, each of the nodes in the circuit shares a symmetric key
with the anonymous user, which key is used to encrypt the layers of future onions.
Upon receiving an onion, each node decrypts one of the layers, and forwards the
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message to the next node. Onion routing as it typically exists can be seen as a form
of three-node mixing.
Low-latency anonymous communication networks based on onion routing [232,
296, 127, 184], such as ToR [304], are susceptible to a variety of tra c-analysis at-
tacks performed by a global attacker [232, 268], and by the one who can observe
only tra c of users [166, 319]. By contrast, the mix-net methodology ensures that
the anonymity set of a user remains the same through the communication route
and makes mix-net resistant to these network-level attacks.
Dining cryptographers
Dining cryptographer networks is another anonymous communication system pro-
posed by David Chaum [83]. Multiple modi cations have been proposed since
then. Herbivore [148] is an implementation of DC-net that organizes the network
into several groups with small anonymity sets. Golle and Juels [156] propose two
new versions of DC-net that substitute xor with public-key encryption, which in turn
makes it possible to verify the correctness of computations with zero-knowledge
proofs. Fully veri able DC-nets are proposed by Franck [138] and in Verdict [94].
Dissent [93] provides provable anonymity. It has an extension aimed at improving
performance at the cost of having to rely on one server to be honest [324] (the
same model is used in Verdict).
To explain how DC-net works, consider an example with three participants ex-
changing 6-bit messages. Figure 2.2 depicts this example. Each participant has a
shared symmetric key with each other participant. Assume that participantAwants
to send amessage. To do so, she xors her message with all the keys she shares with
the other participants. The result is an output that A sends out to every participant
of the DC-net. Note, each key has the same size as the message, and is used only
once, thus the output is essentially a one-time-pad encryption.
The other participants perform the same procedure, but use a zero message
instead of a meaningful one. All outputs from all participants are xored together to
reveal the global sum. The global sum results in the meaningful message from the
participantA, because the keys cancel out (since each symmetric key is used twice).
This process is referred to as superposed sending [258].
Performing a xor of all participant’s outputs and broadcasting the resulting mes-
sage completes a single round of the DC-net, during which one participant can
transfer (broadcast) onemessage; in the next round another participant transmits a
message until all participants are done transmitting. This explains the performance
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User A
Message:
Key A-B:
Key A-C:
0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
Output: 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
⊕
⊕
⊕
⊕
User B
Message:
Key A-B:
Key B-C:
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0
Output: 1 0 1 0 1 1
⊕
⊕
User C
Message:
Key B-C:
Key A-C:
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1
Output: 1 1 1 0 1 1
⊕
⊕
Figure 2.2: DC-net with tree participants and 6-bit messages.
problems of DC-net – in order to let a single participant transmit his or her message,
each other participant has to transmit meaningless output of the same size.
Collisions and scheduling. If two participants send a message in the same round,
their messages collide and become unusable. This can happen accidentally or also
intentionally by amalicious participant who is disrupting communication. This raises
an important question: How does each participant knowwhen it is his or her turn to
send? Note that many standard slot-reservation protocols as used, for example, in
dynamic time-divisionmultiple-access (TDMA) networks are not applicable, because
they would compromise anonymity. The task of slot reservation in DC-net is to agree
on a sending schedule in such a way that each participant knows when to send, but
does not learn who is sending in the other slots.
Generally there are three di erent approaches to solving this problem. The  rst
approach comprises so-called reservation-map methods. These methods employ a
scheduling vector consisting of slots; each slot represents a future roundwith a corre-
sponding index number. To reserve a round, a participant marks the corresponding
slot in the scheduling vector as occupied. The second approach is to use collision-
resolution algorithms. The third approach is to use secure multiparty computation
to obtain a secret permutation that assigns rounds to participants. Section 5.2 pro-
vides a detailed overview of these scheduling methods.
Sender anonymity. Superposed sending ensures sender anonymity, which is proven
to be information-theoretic by Chaum [83]. This holds with at least two honest par-
ticipants sharing a key. Andreas P tzmann extended the protocol from GF(2) to
26
addition in a  nite abelian group G and proves that it also provides information-
theoretic anonymity [259].
Superposed sending in G is performed in the following way. The set of N
participants of the DC-net share secret keys with each other. These keys kij for
i, j œ 1, 2, ..., N are chosen uniformly at random fromG. Since the keys are shared
between participants Pi and Pj , kij and kji are equal.
Assume that participantA plans to transmit a messagem1,m2, ...,mB with each
character mt œ G and t œ {1, ..., B}. To produce an output, the participant A
applies the following equation to all B characters of his message to obtain corre-
sponding characters of the output:
Ot = mt ü
ÿ
{Pi,Pj}
sign(i≠ j)kij , (2.1)
where sign(i≠ j)kij is an inverse of kij if i < j; otherwise it is equal to kij . The
concatenation of resulting characters is the output of participant A. Each character
St of the global sum is calculated from allN corresponding characters of local sums
Ot:
St =
Nÿ
j=1
Oj . (2.2)
Each character of the global sum is equal to the sum of all corresponding mes-
sage characters mt. The keys have no in uence on the  nal result since they were
subtracted after being added. Given that only participant A used non-identity char-
acters in his or her message, the global sum will be equal to that message.
Receiver anonymity. Themessage resulted from superposed sending is broadcast
to all participants, e ectively keeping the receiver anonymous. Instead of broad-
casting, other techniques that provide receiver anonymity can be used, in particu-
lar Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [86]. In the rest of this chapter we consider
DC-net with broadcasting. This broadcast network has to be reliable, that is all mes-
sages sent from honest participants arrive at all other participants unmodi ed; oth-
erwise the active attack on DC-net described in [316] becomes possible. The attack
works as follows. An adversary partitions the anonymity set by sending to one part
the original messagem that resulted in the round, and to the other side some other
message mÕ. In the coming rounds the adversary observes an answer to either m
or mÕ, for example he knows that the message mÕ dictates a certain answer based
on the protocol of communication. Depending on his observations, he can identify
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the set to which one of the communication parters belongs. Given that the partici-
pants communicate over a long period of time, this attack can be repeated further,
leading to complete deanonymization.
Waidner [316] proposed using fail-stop broadcast technique to prevent such at-
tacks. It guarantees that either all participants receive the same broadcast in the
given round, or all the consecutive rounds become jammed. This is achieved by
making the keys of any round depend on the message broadcast in the previous
rounds. Thus, if at least two participants sharing a key receive di erent broadcast,
their keys will desynchronize and will no longer cancel each other out in the global
sum. As a result, the global sum will contain rubbish instead of a meaningful mes-
sage.
There are a number of challenges that arise when fail-stop broadcasting is used.
Firstly, it is hard to distinguish whether a round was disrupted, or was jammed due
to the fail-stop reaction to an inconsistent broadcast. Without special measures, it
is impossible to identify a disruptor without a high chance of false accusations of
honest participants. Even if all the keys for a given round are open and veri ed,
honest participants whose keys are desynchronized due to fail-stop broadcast will
seem to be adversaries. Secondly, fail-stop broadcast enforces a sequential run of
the protocol, preventing precomputation. Without fail-stop broadcast one can pre-
compute outputs or commitments to outputs that prevent an attacker adjusting his
output according to the outputs of other participants he observes [80].
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Chapter 3
New directions in IoT privacy
using attribute-based
authentication
3.1 Internet of things
The term Internet of Things (IoT) became widely used after it was presented by
Kevin Ashton in 1999 [18]. The concept itself appeared earlier in an article by Mark
Weiser [321] under the name ubiquitous computing. Other frequently used names
are pervasive computing [240] and ambient intelligence [162].
In addition to having multiple names, IoT is a fuzzy concept that has a multitude
of de nitions. The IEEE supported an attempt to analyze existing de nitions and
unify them. As a result, the following de nition emerged: “Internet of Things envi-
sions a self-con guring, adaptive, complex network that interconnects ‘things’ to the In-
ternet through the use of standard communication protocols. The interconnected things
have physical or virtual representation in the digital world, sensing/actuation capability,
a programmability feature and are uniquely identi able. The representation contains
information including the thing’s identity, status, location or any other business, social
or privately relevant information. The things o er services, with or without human in-
tervention, through the exploitation of unique identi cation, data capture and commu-
nication, and actuation capability. The service is exploited through the use of intelligent
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interfaces and is made available anywhere, anytime, and for anything taking security
into consideration.” [274].
For a long time IoT was only a vision of a future technology. This is not the case
nowadays. “It’s not science  ction anymore. It’s science fact”, states Boo-Keun Yoon,
president and CEO of Samsung Electronics in 2015 [194]. Estimates made in 2016
show there are 6.4 billion connected things, only slightly less than the total number
of people on earth [12]. By another estimate a digital consumer on average owns
3.64 connected devices [70].
IoT, as it is described by futurists, is attractive. It promises smart resource
management though intelligent monitoring, control and noti cation. For example,
smart energy or water meters in households can automatically track energy con-
sumption and switch devices on or o  as needed. Systems on fruit farms can notify
farmers in time about important conditions such as the emergence of fruit  ies
that are capable of destroying a large portion of the harvest. IoT can help optimize
the production, storage and delivery of products through automation of processes
such as machinery maintenance. IoT can also help optimize daily behavior of peo-
ple with smart metering, noti cations and suggestions on devices such as smart
watches.
There are numerous possible IoT applications. There are also a multitude of
existing IoT products. They di er from predicted IoT products in that they are
usually narrowly focused in terms of applications and are not yet interoperating.
For example, home automation systems such as Belkin WeMo [30] and Logitech
Pop [216] make it possible to remotely control smart wall switches and plugs, LED
light bulbs, motion sensors and lighting devices. Nest [237] produces smart con-
nected thermostats, smoke detectors, cameras and other home security systems.
Smart watches such as Pebble [253] make it possible to track daily activities, calorie
intake, sleep patterns,  tness exercises and much more. Despite existing IoT prod-
ucts being pro table, themain interest in IoT for businesses lies in existing business
models related to Big Data. IoT is primarily valued as a source of a large amount of
new information which companies can collect about their customers [264].
The goal of collecting large amounts of data is supported by the centralized
architecture present in almost all current IoT products. The collected data can-
not be stored on the smallest devices comprising IoT, thus IoT makes extensive
use of backend systems. Lightweight devices connect through a hub to a central
server or a cloud, which holds the data and a large amount of programmed logic.
Some sources even state that cloud technology is what enables IoT [302]. Propos-
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als for clouds aimed at IoT are plentiful: Oracle cloud [91], Google cloud [90], IBM
cloud [179], to name a few. Every single one of them advertises their data analysis
capabilities on Big Data.
IoT is a complex heterogeneous system, comprised of a variety of di erent de-
vices and communication protocols, as well as di erent types of networks. Devices
in IoT are divided into three groups: sensors, actuators and smart devices. Sen-
sors are made to monitor and report certain parameters in the environment. For
example temperature, motion or light. Actuators are devices that can interact with
physical objects in the environment. Smart devices control both sensors and actu-
ators in order to provide services to users.
Devices also di er in terms of how computationally lightweight they are. On
one side of the spectrum are medical nanowire sensors [251] and 0.04 mm2 RFID
chips [172] (see Section 4.2.1 for an introduction to RFID), and on the other side
there are computationally capable devices such as mobile phones. The smallest
devices often do not have their own battery and need to be powered externally,
while others carry their own battery and are limited by its lifetime.
Communication protocols also depend on the type of devices used and include
near- eld communication used by RFID tags and readers, Bluetooth, ZigBee, Z-
Wave, 6LowPAN, Wi  and many others. The same holds for types of network. A
Body Area Network (BAN) is a network consisting of wearable and medical devices
positioned inside or on the surface of the body. A Local Area Network (LAN) consists
of all devices located in close proximity, typically a house. Smart home appliances
can compose a single LAN network. A Wide Area Network (WAN) connects devices
located at large distances. The Internet is a WAN that can be considered as part
of IoT since backends, clouds, and small devices are connected to it. Thus, when
investigating IoT, one has to take into consideration both lightweight and computa-
tionally capable devices. Likewise, one has to consider applications and protocols
designed for local area communication, as well as the those designed for WAN, in-
cluding existing Internet applications and protocols.
The Internet plays – and will likely keep on playing – a major role in IoT. Industry
mostly de nes IoT from the angle of connecting things to the Internet [274, p. 40].
In particular, things often connect via the Internet to backend systems such as cen-
tral servers and clouds. Backend systems allow constrained lightweight devices to
store data and outsource some of the logic. Additionally, they ease the collection
and analysis of Big Data generated by IoT products.
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3.2 Authentication in the IoT
The Internet of Things is becoming a part of our daily lives. Gartner predicts [273]
that within  ve years there will be more than 25 billion devices that take part in the
IoT. Because the IoT delivers services in a fast and convenient manner to users, it is
viewed as a major business opportunity [265].
Most IoT technologies rely on a centralized architecture, in which sensors collect
data from the world, communicate to computers, which in turn send the data to a
central service. This architecture enables e cient operation and full control over
the data processing and dissemination, which makes it an appealing approach for
businesses. However, privacy concerns arise since users cannot control the infor-
mation that is collected about them. Furthermore, organizations may be subject to
legal problems in terms of privacy regulation. In our opinion and that of the authors
of [265], in order for an IoT architecture to be sustainable, it must be decentralized
and user-centric.
When devices communicate in the IoT, they often need to authenticate each
other, so that they know that they talk to the intended counterpart. Typically, au-
thentication (proving that the communication partner is who he or she claims to
be) involves identi cation (claiming of an identity) by means of a unique number
or name and a token (e.g., a password or a cryptographic proof) that proves the
validity of the identi er. On the one hand, identi ers make authentication easy,
provided that the veri er has access to a database of these identi ers. On the
other hand, identi ers make all the transactions carried out by a particular device
linkable. Moreover, in many cases devices are associated with an individual; so, in-
directly people become traceable as well. Based on the increasing amount of user
data, organizations, including advertisers, can build pro les about people. This is
obviously harmful to people’s privacy, and in many countries, the use of data for
tracing and pro ling is contrary to legislation governing the so-called secondary use
of data [292].
With regard to user control, data collection can be e ected in two ways in the
IoT [278]. First, there are devices which the user can control how information is
collected. Examples include wearables and smart home units. Second, there are
devices for which the user has no control over the data collected; these include
sensors and surveillance cameras in public places for instance. This technical dis-
tinction has to be taken into account when de ning privacy and when designing
new IoT technologies.
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IoT applications often rely on data analysis tools which can recognize patterns
and extract further useful information from already collected data. For instance, an-
alyzing energy usage of a neighborhood can help distribute power e ciently within
a city. Such analysis tools are also suitable to discover personal information that
users may want to keep private. An important way to decrease the privacy risk
caused by data analysis is to reduce the amount of data collected, as proposed by
the European Parliament and Council in their data minimisation principle [126].
Research in identity management [11, 267] shows that attribute-based authen-
tication can realize data minimization with possible user control. Attributes, char-
acteristics or quali cations of entities, are embedded in a cryptographic container
which can be used for authentication purposes. Since attributes such as the brand
of a device or the nationality of a person, can be anonymous, authentication can
also be anonymous. In fact, authentication should, and can, be realized by using
the minimum amount of information required to successfully complete a transac-
tion.
3.2.1 Our contribution
We recognize the importance of the right of the individual to have control of their
own data and not to have their transactions linked and tracked within the IoT. On
the other hand, the threat of mass surveillance and of linking users and their de-
vices to transactions is very real within the IoT.
In this research, we present a framework for providing the user with the ability to
avoid linkability and at the same time, maintain control of their data. Our solution
is based on AB authentication instead of identi cation to guarantee authenticity in
the communication among devices in the IoT. We demonstrate the feasibility of our
framework by introducing it into a common use case, in a home environment.
We also argue that AB credentials should be considered in every scheme where
authentication is needed, as it will provide the user with increased privacy and con-
trol with respect to their personal information.
3.3 Related work
In this section, we present some of the recent work related to authentication and
privacy in IoT, and the uses of attributes.
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3.3.1 Authentication and privacy in IoT
Position papers on IoT such as [301] and [146] often include discussion on authen-
tication and privacy. In fact, many such papers point out the authentication and
privacy problems arising from ubiquitous presence of sensors and devices, and the
subsequent analysis of massive amounts of collected data.
As observed by the authors in [4, 222, 2, 334], one of the capabilities of IoT is
to allow sensors to collect information from their surroundings, record and process
it. With an on-going surge in the number of inter-connected devices [273], the ten-
dency of collecting more information than required for the provision of a service is
on the rise.
Conversely, one of the business drivers of the IoT is expressed as “improved
customer retention and more targeted selling” [222]. This makes way for a strong
tension between the need for massive data collection, processing and communi-
cation required for the services of IoT on the one hand, and privacy protection of
individuals on the other [222, 200]. Moreover, multiple studies have shown that
collection of even seemingly innocent data can lead, with very high probability, to
the identi cation of individuals [297, 298, 234].
3.3.2 Identi ers in IoT
While interacting with an IoT architecture, users perform identity management [10]
implicitly. They produce personal information and leave traces mostly bound to
their identity. For instance, adjusting your house’s temperature using a mobile
phone requires that the system knows that the instruction came from a legitimate
party. Typically, a system stores a lot of information about its users. The set of all
this data with respect to a particular individual is her identity in this system. In most
cases at least one of these pieces of information acts as an identi er, that is, a direct
link between the individual and the system.
The most common way to authenticate individuals and devices and authorize
them for services in today’s Internet is by using Federated Identity Management [79].
These solutions involve an Identity Provider and one or more Service Providers. When
a user needs to authenticate to a service, the identity provider intervenes to assert
the user’s identity to the service provider. This allows for  exible authentication and
the decorrelation of identities and services. However, the Identity Provider, being
involved in all transactions, can trace users connecting to services.
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3.3.3 Use of attributes
Authentication protocols often reveal more about the user than necessary. Indeed,
in many cases, only an assertion on the user’s attributes is really needed. For in-
stance the only information that may matter is that the user belongs to a registered
service provider, or has a su cient clearance level. In this sense, identity-based au-
thentication does not comply with the data minimization principle as prescribed by
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament. Existing identity-based authentica-
tions solutions however already admit that attributes are what really matters, since
after obtaining the user’s identity, the SAML standard [244] (in particular) allows the
service provider to request speci c attributes (or claims) about the user [79].
The ABC4Trust project [267] demonstrated that the attribute-based credentials
(ABC) technology is an adaptable means of realizing both  exible and privacy-
preserving authentication. Indeed, the identity provider needs only to be online
when the credential is delivered to the user; this prevents the identity provider
from pro ling users based on their authentication patterns, and from imperson-
ating them. In addition, the user has control over which attributes are used thanks
to the selective disclosuremechanism of the ABC constructions.
The main cryptographic schemes putting ABCs in practice are U-Prove [248] and
Idemix [75]. They have been implemented on smart cards [231, 314] resulting in a
U-Prove authentication processed under 1 second, while that in Idemix is between 1
and 1.5 seconds. These technologies have also been placed into light-weight infras-
tructures in [8, 9, 267]. However, none of the previous research projects proposes
to adopt ABC technologies within the IoT.
3.4 New directions in IoT privacy
3.4.1 Privacy threats
The usual approach in cryptography and security areas is to de ne an adversary by
his goals and capabilities. However, in data collection the initial goals may be set
with the best intentions of a data collector, but possession of the accumulated data
can be transferred rightfully (or not) to a data processor that does not share good
intentions of the original one. Hence, the adversarial goals are rendered irrelevant
during data collection phase but can be of impact during data processing and data
dissemination phases.
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Data over-collection [213] and the always-identify paradigms described in the In-
troduction are other existing privacy threats that become increasingly harder in
IoT. Coupled with linkable transactions, that is transactions the origins of which are
known to be the same [260], these threats enable extensive user pro ling. For in-
stance, service providers can create a  ngerprint of an individual based on the types
of devices he utilises, as presented by van Deursen [310] in the case of RFID tags.
This may give a lot of information about the device owner; moreover, this  nger-
print acts as a new identi er, making it impossible for the user to remain anony-
mous later.
3.4.2 De ning privacy in IoT
We argue that the lack of control is one of the central problems in IoT in terms
of privacy. Individuals become a part of a pervasive computing system, and by
that, they generate a lot of personal information while having only limited oversight
and control over data collection and processing. We adapt the de nitions by Alan
Westin [322] and Ziegeldorf et al. [334] as the former does not address the problem
of data collection and data processing, and the latter places toomuch responsibility
on the data subject.
De nition 8. Privacy is the right of individuals to determine for themselves when, how
and to what extent information about them is collected, processed and communicated;
that includes individuals having
• the right to determine these aspects within their area of control explicitly;
• trust that the right above is respected when control is not possible.
Following taxonomy of privacy by Solove [292], privacy threats are raised during
data collection, data processing and data dissemination activities and intrusions.
Because malicious intrusions form a whole body of work separate from privacy, we
do not discuss them here. Speci c to IoT, data collection is happening on a massive
scale, much of it is collected by sensors without any active initiation from the user,
thus often leaving users unaware of this process. The large amount of data and
the high number of potential data sources increases severity of privacy threats at
data processing and dissemination activities compared to the today’s situation in
the Internet.
In the present, control over data processing and dissemination activities is
largely in the hands of lawyers and policymakers. From the users’ perspective, tech-
nologies providing them meaningful control are virtually non-existent. Although
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some Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs) can provide a solution to this prob-
lem, their use is left at the discretion of companies and agencies, who only employ
them when regulation mandates so.
The control over data collection, on the contrary, is partially in the hands of
users. Indeed, although control is impossible in the presence of sensors (such as
surveillance cameras) that collect user data in a passive manner, possibility to con-
trol appears when the user or any of the devices acting on his behalf (and that are
under his control) are actively engaged in a communication.
Altogether this makes privacy-friendly data collection an important stepping
stone towards achieving privacy in the IoT. First of all, this is the only area in which
it is feasible to implement some level of technological control from the user’s per-
spective. Secondly, the increased amounts of collected data leads to correspond-
ingly increased levels of threats during data processing and dissemination. Thus,
addressing this particular point – data collection – one can provide signi cant in-
crease in the privacy protection level of an individual user.
3.5 Realising IoT using attributes
3.5.1 Attributes and attribute-based credentials
Conceptually, attributes are properties or quali cations of an entity. In practice, an
attribute can be anything that can be described as a bit-string, such as a name,
a date of birth or a cryptographic token. In this respect, attributes generalize the
notions of identi ers and roles.
An ABC [248, 75] is a cryptographic container of attributes. Similar to a tradi-
tional X.509 certi cate, it is issued by a trusted party, and is bound to a speci c en-
tity via this entity’s secret key. That is, the issuer cryptographically signs a token con-
sisting in the concatenation of the attributes and a commitment to the entity’s secret
key. For instance, a service provider may issue to each of its clients a subscription
ABC containing a client number, a speci ed purchase level and the start date of
the subscription. The issuer is trusted for verifying that the attributes in an ABC
authentically belong to the entity. Having an ABC, an entity can show its attributes
and prove that they are signed by the issuer. This is done using (non-interactive)
zero-knowledge proofs to guarantee that no other information (e.g. some leakage
about the secret key) is revealed.
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In addition to the traditional unforgeability property, ABCs come with many
privacy-enhancing mechanisms [5, Chapter 3]. First of all, because the proving of
attributes is performed in zero-knowledge, the veri er does not learn the (com-
mitment on) the secret key of the prover in the process. Even better, some ABCs
scheme have themulti-show unlinkability property that prevents a veri er from link-
ing two showings of the same ABC by the same entity (except if the content of
attributes themselves leak information). Secondly, the selective disclosure function-
ality allows an entity to demonstrate only an arbitrary subset of the attributes con-
tained in its ABC. Continuing the subscription ABC example from above, a client can
choose to show only its purchase level, which may grant discounts and advantages,
but not its client number.
3.5.2 Privacy using attribute-based authentication
Privacy threats can be thwarted thanks to the privacy-friendly properties of ABCs.
First of all, the always identify paradigm can be avoided by making all authorization
decisions depend only on attributes, not identities. In most cases, an assertion on
the user is su cient. ABCs allow a combination of assertions to be made, by simply
showing multiple attributes (e.g. the user paid a subscription, and is an adult). It
should be noted that in cases where the authentication is absolutely necessary, e.g.
when an individual wants to communicate with one speci c entity, ABCs can also
be used. The ABC must simply contain an attribute representing the identity or
public key of its holder. In summary, attributes achieve the same functionality as
identi ers with the same security level and also provide unlinkability.
By design, the selective disclosure functionality of ABCs prevents data over-
collection. Actually, an ABC can be shown (or proved) without disclosing any of the
attributes it contains. Thus, the only leaked information is that the holder of the
ABC was accredited by the trusted issuer. This information is su cient in a sce-
nario where resources can only be accessed by members of some institution, and
that institution is the issuer of ABCs.
The multi-show unlinkability property is designed to prevent linkability of trans-
actions. If an ABC is proved without disclosing any attribute no linking at all is
possible. This is the best case scenario for the user. When showing one or more
attribute(s), a user leaks some information that can be characterized in terms of
k-anonymity [299]. For instance, consider a 30 years old male user that proves his
gender and age to some service provider. From the service provider’s point of view,
who did not have any a priori information, the user could be any individual in the
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Figure 3.1: Data  ow and authentication in the Internet of Things. (The red spots denote
points of possible attribute-based authentication.)
context’s population before the showing of attributes: the anonymity set is maxi-
mal. After learning the gender and age of the user, the service provider can restrict
the potential individuals to 30 years old males in the population: the anonymity
set is much smaller. More generally, when a user shows a set of attributes, it is k-
anonymous among other users that have (and show) the exact same attributes, and
the service provider can not distinguish between two transactions from the same
user or from two users in the anonymity set. In the worst case, if the attribute is
identifying the user uniquely (k = 1), the service provider can link of all transactions.
To model possible information privacy harms, we use Solove’s taxonomy [292,
334] as a starting point. Solove discusses four groups of harmful activities with
regard to privacy, from which three (information collection, processing and dissem-
ination) are related to data  ow while the fourth one is not (invasions).
As a starting point, to identify data  ows where AB authentication is relevant,
we again use Solove’s taxonomy of privacy harms [292] (data collection, processing
and dissemination). This approach is similar the work of Ziegeldorf et al. [334], but
the authors do not address the authentication aspects of the data  ow. Therefore,
we develop their model further. Besides the three groups above, we consider ad-
ditional activities in the IoT. First, the user is surrounded by sensors, which can be
divided in two groups. Some sensors can be controlled by the users, while others
not. Second, processed data is partly used by the data subject within data dissem-
ination. Third, some part of the whole data  ow is a ected by credential providers
that determine information access of and related to the data subject.
In Figure 3.1 the data  ow and possible attribute-based authentication are rep-
resented. First, the data is sensed around the data subject. Second, some of this
information is sent to the service provider. Then, the data processor, after pro-
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cessing (e.g., aggregate, search, analyse) the collected information, disseminates it.
Finally, the access to disseminated information may be restricted to a certain group
of entities (devices or people).
AB authentication can take place at four points in this model – denoted by red
spots:
1. Sensing. User-controlled sensors, such as wearables and smart-home devices,
can communicate with each other locally. In this case, the authentication can
be based on attributes.
2. Collection. Sensors, when communicating with a service (data processor)
should authenticate to the service. Possibly, the authentication can be mu-
tual (i.e. the service also authenticates to the device). In both cases, it can also
be based on attributes.
3. Dissemination. After collection and processing, data processors should com-
municate restricted information (e.g. individuals’ personal information) only
after AB authentication of the receiving party.
4. Issuing. Issuing itself is a part of the AB technology, which provides a new
credential to an entity. Tomake sure that this entity is entitled to the particular
credential, the credential provider has to authenticate the entity. This can be
done with conventional identi cation, or by attribute-based authentication.
The latter is called in [11] a dependent credential.
3.6 Use case scenario
3.6.1 Smart home
Consider a scenario involving a home owner, hereby called user, in possession of
multiple smart devices and home appliances. The user’s devices, all under his con-
trol, are connected to the Internet via a hub (installed within the home). The de-
vices autonomously connect to remote services in order to push data to or pull
data from them. Depending on their business model, some of these services may
require users to get a subscription before consuming the service. Therefore, a form
of authentication is necessary for the service to check if the devices belong to a
valid user (i.e. one that paid for a subscription). In a traditional IoT setup, each
user would have an account on the service’s platform, where all his devices would
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be registered. A service would accept requests only from devices that belong to a
registered user.
3.6.2 Privacy threats
This framework carries several of the security and privacy risks presented in Sec-
tion 3.4, as described in [327]. The most notable potential breach is the tracking
of user among the services ecosystem via his  ngerprint (based on the set of de-
vices he owns). This  ngerprint basically acts as an user identi er of pseudonym
and makes all his transactions linkable, even if he does not disclose his identity.
Moreover, if a user conceals his identity to a particular service S but not to another
service SÕ, S can re-identify the user with the help of SÕ, since both services have
 ngerprint for that user. Together with data over-collection, common for current
practices, allows for extensive user pro ling. In the discussed use case pro ling is
performed within such a sensitive sphere of life as one’s behaviour at home.
3.6.3 Applying ABC
Using ABCs, one can avoid these issues. At the same time, ABCs allow the user to
have full access to the services he paid for. With respect to Figure 3.1, ABCs are
mainly relevant in the issuing and collection phases, for the given use-case. After
an out-of-band authentication, the user and his devices will  rst be issued a set of
ABCs. These credentials permit the devices to authenticate to services on behalf
of the user. Issuers can be various parties, including trusted third parties and the
service providers themselves. ABCs can include attributes describing the model
number of the device or the subscription identi er of the user.
Then, the collection phase here consists of devices making requests to the ser-
vices. Before processing any such request, services require that devices authenti-
cate by proving possession of an AB credential. When authentication succeeds, the
service is assured that the devices proving to have AB credentials are genuine and
belong to a valid user. At the same time neither the user nor the device identity is
revealed. Information collected by the services during authentication and transac-
tion processing includes the nature of the request itself, some meta-data such as
the time and issuer identity, and the attributes disclosed by devices. We assume
that the amount of information revealed by meta-data (e.g. actual IP and MAC ad-
dresses) is reduced using other privacy enhancing technologies, like anonymous
communication systems [80], [103].
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3.6.4 Reduced privacy risks
The attributes disclosed by devices determine howmuch information is revealed to
a service provider. To realize dataminimization, in some cases, no attributes should
be disclosed at all: the simple fact that the device holds an ABC may show that it
belongs to a valid user. However, other providers may supply di erent levels of a
service depending on some additional information in the form of attributes; for ex-
ample, a remote car diagnostic service may require the model or the manufacturer
of the device. If service providers need this information to process requests, this
information leakage cannot be prevented. The only solution would be not to use
these services at all.
Disclosing the minimum set of attributes prevents the linking of a device’s re-
quests. Indeed, the multi-show unlinkability property of ABCs ensures that the only
information that can be collected is that by the revealed attributes. This holds even
in the worst case scenario: If the issuer and the authenticating party collude, or
happen to be the same; the service providers store information about transactions
centrally; and they share all this information with each other.
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Chapter 4
High-speed dating:
Privacy-preserving attribute
matching for RFID
4.1 Introduction
RFID technology is predominantly used for identi cation and authentication of
items and persons. In a typical setup a tag has some secret which it uses in an
identi cation or authentication protocol with a reader. Attribute-matching proto-
cols on the other hand focus on determining whether two or more tags have a set
of attributes that match a speci c relationship. By using an attribute matching pro-
tocol one can also authenticate tags by simply matching them with a tag known
to be genuine. Provided both tags share an attribute (or a key) they will pass the
validation.
As an important application for the tag authentication by matching we envision
preventing counterfeit products. A producer can provide a reference tag to the
veri er, containing the same key as the genuine products. By matching product
tags with the reference one can detect counterfeits, without the key ever leaving
the tags which can be protected on hardware level. Such an approach has major
advantages compared to classical authentication protocols. Symmetric key authen-
tication protocols are very e cient but require storing the secret key on the reader.
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Authentication by matching combines e ciency with a typical property of asym-
metric protocols that do not require the veri er to possess secret (private) keys.
Let us consider the example of a speed-dating party (or rather, with the protocols
presented in this chapter, a high-speed-dating party). The typical setup of a speed-
dating party is that singles try to  nd a partner through many short meetings with
many people. The goal of these short conversations is to  nd out whether the
two people share interests and want to engage in a longer conversation or a date.
High-speed dating replaces these short match-making conversations by scanning
RFID tags as follows: The organizer of the party has collected all relevant attributes
(hobbies, city of residence, kids and pets preferences, etc.) of all participants in
advance. Every participant receives an RFID tag which stores his or her attributes.
When two persons want to decide whether it is worth starting a conversation, they
just have their tags scanned simultaneously by a reader, and the reader determines
whether these persons have overlapping interests and wishes. Thus, the task of a
reader is to detect the fact that two participants havematches in their interests, and
output the number of these matches. No false positives are desirable, since false
positive will steal time of participants. The obvious target group for such a party
are “nerds and geeks”, who typically have very serious concerns about their privacy.
They do not want a reader or another person to learn anything about them, except
for the fact whether they share interests with another person or not. Also, tags’
unlinkability should be preserved, so nobody can trace tags. Last but not least, no
attributes stored on tags shall be disclosed. This application may not sound like the
most serious scenario, but it illustrates very well what the protocol does and what
properties we expect from the protocol.
4.1.1 Our contributions
This chapter presents three private-attribute-matching protocols (or speed-dating
protocols). The  rst protocol uses only symmetric cryptography, the second only
asymmetric cryptography, and the last a combination of both. None of the proto-
cols requires readers to be connected to a central database; they are furthermore
not required to have speci c knowledge about the tags. The  rst two protocols pro-
vide matching for one attribute per tag. The symmetric protocol provides speed
and e ciency at the cost of a lower privacy protection level. The asymmetric ones
provide better privacy at the cost of a single asymmetric encryption step. Hybrid
encryption can be used in the protocol that supports tags with several attributes
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to further increase e ciency. All protocols provide provable security against false
positives and provable privacy protection.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides pre-
liminaries for this chapter. Section 4.3 presents the model of the system and the
adversarial games. Section 4.4 introduces the lightweight symmetric protocol. Sec-
tion 4.5 introduces the two remaining protocols using asymmetric primitives. Re-
lated work is discussed in Section 4.6.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Radio frequency identi cation
Radio Frequency Identi cation (RFID) is the technology that, as its name suggests,
uses electric or magnetic  elds at radio frequencies to communicate identifying
information. In practice though, usage of RFID technology is not restricted only to
identi cation, but is used for access control, payment automation, veri cation of
authenticity, etc. A branch of RFID technology operating at high frequency is Near-
Field Communication (NFC). It takes advantage of a short communication distance,
allowing smartphones to establish a secure wireless communication channel. What
di erentiates NFC from RFID is its ability to perform peer-to-peer communication.
RFID speci es a more strict division of roles. The important parts of RFID are the
hardware components: tags and readers. Tags are small chips connected to an
antenna, used to receive and transmit signals. RFID tags are attached to physical
objects (things) and uniquely identify these objects. Readers are the complementary
devices that are used to communicate with tags.
Tags can be distinguished according to whether or not they have a power source.
A passive tag does not have its own battery and receives energy from the reader.
This makes it impossible for passive tags to initiate communication, but at the same
time does not restrict the lifetime of the tag to the lifetime of its battery. These
types of tags also have an advantage of being the cheapest to produce and are
the smallest, for example, an RFID tag produced by Hitachi is 0.04mm ◊ 0.04mm
in size [172]. Consequently, they are very limited in their power budget that can be
spent on operations and communication, and in the number of available operations
to perform, as well as a very small memory size measured in Bytes. Active tags do
have an internal power source, allowing them to run computations independently
of the presence of a reader, and to initiate communication with it. The memory
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size of these tags is measured in KBytes. Semi-active tags are the ones that use
battery for performing computations, but still require power from the reader to
communicate.
Readers match the type of tag they communicate with: they have to be able to
follow the same protocol, and readers of passive tags emit a stronger signal than
readers of active tags. The usual mode of communication between a reader and a
tag is an exchange of a query, or a command and a response. When communicating
with a simple tag, a reader’s signals turn the tag to an “on” state to communicate
whatever the tag has stored in the memory. Smarter tags distinguish di erent sig-
nals from a reader as di erent commands. Readers could be  xed like the ones
used at the entrance to a supermarket, or mobile and small. Additionally, readers
could perform operations and store all information locally, or they could be con-
nected to an external database. RFID databases are designed to have a secure
connection to a reader, store data related to tags and perform operations instead
of readers.
Applications. Applications of RFID technology are numerous. Identi cation of ob-
jects is used in e-passports, by retailers as an anti-theft measure, in loss-resistant
sport equipment like golf balls, for pets with implanted tags, etc.
Inventory management and tracking is greatly simpli ed with RFID tags, as they
can be read automatically from the distance and in bulk. To track an object, the
system can correlate the position of the reader that recently read the tag with the
location of the tag (and thus the object it is attached to). Examples include inventory
of items in a supermarket, books in a library, livestock on farms, runners during a
race, or goods in a supply chain.
Authenticity proof allows one to verify the origin of an item it is attached to.
This is often used in high-value banknotes, in the pharmaceutical industry to de-
tect counterfeit medicine, on luxury good to detect fakes.
Matching allows to quickly verify relationships between items or people. For
example, in a hospital environment new-born babies are matched to their mothers,
or patients to their medicine to prevent mistakes.
RFID is often used for access control for buildings and rooms, in place of keys for
cars and hotel rooms, and concert tickets.
Fast payment with RFID is widespread in public transportation networks like
trains, trams, buses and subways. It is also used for contactless payments with
credit and debit cards.
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4.2.2 The game-based security model
In this section we brie y introduce the game-based approach to analyzing secu-
rity of protocols. The protocols for RFID matching introduced later in this chapter
will rely on a game-based security model to demonstrate their privacy-preserving
properties.
Reduction. The use of the game-based proof approach started with the landmark
paper by Goldwasser and Micali in 1982 [153]. The paper introduces a de nition
of security of cryptographic protocols by means of reduction. Reduction is done by
proving that the problem on which a protocol is built is equivalent to one of the
well-studied problems in computational complexity theory that are assumed to be
hard. Hardness, in this sense, means that there is no algorithm that would solve the
problem in polynomial time, thus, for a computationally restricted adversary, solving
such a problem is infeasible. A paper by Lenstra et al. [209] proposes the following
intuitive understanding of infeasibility: to break a system with 140-bit security one
would need as much energy as the sun produces in a year.
The goal of the reduction is to demonstrate, that in order to break the proto-
col, an adversary would have to be capable of solving the computationally infea-
sible problem. For example, factoring of large integers is a well-recognized hard
problem, which the best algorithms currently known take sub-exponential time to
solve. The usual approach is to show that if there is an adversary that can break
the scheme, another adversary can use him as a subroutine to solve the hard prob-
lem. Alternatively, one can demonstrate that an adversary would have to be able to
break cryptographic primitives used in the protocol that are already already proven
to be secure in order to be able to break the protocol itself.
Games. The concrete properties (or security notions) that the cryptographic sys-
tem provides are formulated as a game between an adversary and a challenger. For
example, the property usually required of encryption schemes is indistinguishability
(IND), introduced in [153]. Informally, indistinguishability ensures that an attacker is
unable to extract any information about the plaintext of an encryptedmessage [33].
Games have strictly speci ed phases prescribing interaction between players and
possible actions an adversary can perform. Often the phases include: setup, execu-
tion and challenge. During the setup phase, system is initialized and all the required
parameters are generated. The execution phase primarily prescribes the actions an
adversary can perform and the information he can learn. The challenge phase fo-
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cuses on an output by an adversary, which is used to establish whether he won or
not.
Conditions to win. Conditions to win are explicitly stated at the end of the game
description and can be de ned by two di erent approaches: a concrete approach
or an asymptotic approach. The concrete approach speci es the advantage (in other
words, the success probability) for an adversary to break the scheme to be at most
‘ for a speci ed amount of time. Time is often measured in processor cycles or the
number of operations an adversary performs.
The asymptotic approach speci es the advantage of an adversary and his run-
ning time as a function of the security parameter ⁄ chosen during system initializa-
tion. For example, the security parameter of a pseudo-random number generator
could be the length of its seed, and for an encryption scheme it could be the length
of its key. The running time of an adversary is restricted to be polynomial in ⁄, and
his advantage has to be negligible in ⁄. The advantage ‘(⁄) is said to be negligible if
for all c > 0 there existsK > 0 such that ‘(⁄) < n≠c for all n Ø K.
Security notions. To capture the way an adversary can interact with the system
and what information he can receive, one introduces cryptographic oracles. An or-
acle acts as a black-box that receives queries and provides answers according to
its description. Usually the game speci es di erent oracles to which an adversary
has access in di erent phases of the game. The di erence in which kinds of oracles
an adversary can access distinguish di erent types of attacks. Themost well-known
types of attacks are attacks on encryption systems: the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA),
the non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1), and the adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attack (CCA2).
In the CPA game an adversary is provided with access to an encryption oracle (or
a public key in an asymmetric encryption system), that replies with the ciphertext
of the plaintext messages sent from the adversary. During the challenge phase the
adversary submits two plaintexts and gets back an encryption of one of them. His
goal is to output the correct guess as to which of the two plaintexts was encrypted.
In CCA1 attack, the adversary can additionally access the decryption oracle until the
challenge phase starts. CCA2 is equivalent to CCA1, except that it also allows access
to the decryption oracle during the challenge phase, having only one restriction
- the queries to this oracle must not include the challenge ciphertext itself. The
change from CCA1 to CCA2 captures the ability of an adversary to adapt his attack
depending on the challenge ciphertext received.
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Let us depict the game of an IND-CCA2 property. Let the encryption with the
key ke of the message m be denoted by c = Eke(m), decryption with the key kd
correspondingly by m = Dkd(c), and the key generation algorithm be denoted as
G. Let ‘ be negligible with respect to ⁄, and an adversary be denoted as A.
IND-CCA2 notion is de ned as the following game ExpIND≠CCA2A (⁄):
Setup: ke, kd = G(⁄)
Learning: The adversary may perform calls to the decryption oracle to obtain plain-
texts of submitted ciphertexts.
Challenge:
1. The adversary choosesm0,m1 such that they have the same length andm0 ”=
m1.
2. The adversary sendsm0,m1 to the challenger.
3. Let b œR {0, 1}. The challenger returns cb = Eke(mb) to the adversary.
4. The adversary is allowed to perform calls to the decryption oracle with any
c ”= cb.
5. The adversary outputs a guess bit bÕ.
Result: This experiment outputs true if the adversary correctly outputs bÕ = b.
A scheme is IND-CCA2 secure if the advantage of the adversary of winning the
game is negligible:
AdvlinkA (⁄) = |Pr[ExpIND≠CCA2A (⁄) = true]| <
1
2 + ‘ .
The Random Oracle model. So far we described proofs that rely only on one kind
of assumptions - the well-studied problems from computational complexity theory
that are believed to be infeasible to solve in polynomial time. This is called the stan-
dard model, sometimes referred to as the bare or plain model. In some cases one
needs to make more assumptions, such as replacing some cryptographic primitives
with ideal versions in order to be able to perform the proof.
The RandomOracle (RO) model is a well-known example of a non-standardmodel.
It was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [37] who argued for the practicality of
ROs already used in the various previously published papers. They proposed an
approach: to use a publicly accessible RO in place of a certain primitive, usually a
hash function. An RO is an oracle that uses a function chosen uniformly from all
possible functions for each of its outputs, except for repeated queries. When RO
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receives the same input, it repeats its previous output. Because no hash function in
practice is an RO, proof in the ROmodel is consideredweaker than proof in the stan-
dard model. There are also examples of systems secure in the ROmodel, but losing
their security, when the RO is substituted with an existing primitive [76], [31], [239].
Koblitz and Menezes repeatedly point out that these schemes are arti cial exam-
ples made without following “sound cryptographic practice” [199], [198]. Even fur-
ther, in the same papers they argue that the fact that the best researchers were so
far only able to come up with such counterexamples serves as evidence in favor of
using the RO model.
Security guarantees and their limitations. There are several limitations one has
to keep in mind when talking about cryptographic schemes with proven security.
Firstly, reductionist proofs are based on assumptions, and if these assumptions
fail no security can be provided. Secondly, security guarantees are de ned as a
game, the implications of which are sometimes not all immediately obvious and
need close consideration. Thirdly, only a limited number of well-known attacks are
covered in a proof. An example of an attack class not covered in a reductionist proof
is the class of side-channel attacks. These are attacks that rely on the implemen-
tation speci cs of a cryptographic protocol, for example dependencies of the time
spent on operations depending on the values of the key. Finally, one has to sepa-
rately take care of software bugs and incorrect uses of the protocols, for example
the failure to generate a fresh random nonce for signatures by Sony [40].
4.2.3 Cryptographic primitives
One of the important primitives used in speed-dating protocols is a pseudo-random
function (PRF), which cannot be e ciently distinguished from a truly random func-
tion. In the game de nition of a PRF, an adversary submits inputs to the PRF chal-
lenger. The challenger replies with either an output of the PRF, or an output of a
truly random function. The adversary wins if he has a non-negligible advantage to
distinguish these two possible outputs. Let a secure PRF be denoted by Funk (·),
where k is the key of the PRF function.
Note that we can e ciently construct a PRF from a keyed hash function (HMAC),
through the Merkle-Damgård iteration [226], if keyed using the input as described,
for example, in [69, Section 6]. In a similar way, one can construct a PRF by using
keyed modes of lightweight sponge-based hash functions like Quark [19] and Kec-
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cak [254] to construct a PRF function. A cryptographic hash function is denoted by
H (·) further in the text.
It was proven by Bellare et al. [36, 35] that any PRF is a secure message authen-
tication code (MAC). This property is essential for our protocols. Let us introduce
secure MACs in a form of brief game description, for details see [152]. During the
MAC-unforgeability game, an adversary queries the challenger with distinct mes-
sages and obtains MACs for them. He can also submit several message-tag pairs
to the veri cation oracle. An adversary wins, if he succeeds, with a non-negligible
advantage, in outputting a valid message-tag pair, not previously requested from
the challenger.
Both encryption schemes used in the speed-dating protocol are required to
have the IND-CCA2 property. Let a symmetric encryption scheme be denoted
by symENC = (GÕ, EÕ, DÕ) and an asymmetric encryption scheme by pkENC =
(G,E,D).
4.3 Model and notations
LetC be the set of all tags in the system. Each tag aj œ T , i œ {1, 2, . . . , n} is supplied
with attributes. Each attribute is a human-readable string of arbitrary length, the
set of all attributes in the system is denoted by C = {a1, . . . , ap}. Let the security
parameter be ⁄, and the number of attributes and tags be polynomially bounded
in ⁄. Each attribute in the system is related to a secret key stored on a tag in the
following way. An issuer starts with an attribute set C. To setup the system, the tag
issuer generates a set of keys C = {k1, . . . , kp}, which are each associated with an
attribute. Each key kj for j œ {1, . . . , p} is a ⁄-bit string.
Each tag stores a subset of K of cardinality at most m, where 1 Æ m Æ p. For
two tags ti and tj that share an attribute aj the corresponding key for this attribute
is stored on both tags. For simplicity, further in the text we use the term keys and
attributes interchangeably.
The goal of the protocol is to determine the number of attributes on two tags
that match. Let the state Si denote the set of attributes stored on the tag ti. Note,
that if tags ti and tj have the very same attributes assigned to them, their states
are equal Si © Sj . This state is assigned by the issuer during the setup phase: a
function Setup(⁄) is used to assign state Si to the tag ti, with i œ {1, 2, ..., n}, and
generates keys for readers (if necessary). All secret values are generated taking
the security parameter ⁄ into account. Later, during the protocol run, a reader R
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simultaneously scans two tags ti and tj to obtain the result of the functionMatch :
T ◊ T æ N. This function computes the cardinality of the intersection of the states
of two tags: Match(ti, tj) = |Si ﬂ Sj |. Some applications do not require Match to
compute the cardinality of Si ﬂ Sj , but only need to know whether this intersection
is empty or not. For those applications we useMatch : T ◊ T æ {0, 1}.
The functionMatch must ful ll the following properties:
1. Correctness: In the absence of adversaries the output is correct.
2. Unforgeability: False positives are impossible, that is an adversary is unable to
convince a reader that tags match on more attributes than they actually are.
3. Unlinkability: Neither a reader, nor an external adversary is able to decide,
whether in two protocol runs the same tags participated twice or not.
4. Con dentiality: After a protocol run nobody can learn any of the attributes
(corresponding keys) stored on a tag, unless possessing a valid key for an
attribute. The amount of attributes stored on tags is computationally hard to
derive from a protocol run, unless possessing all keys in the system.
The protocols presented in this chapter do not protect against false negatives.
Thus, they are useful for applications that do not require to prevent false negatives.
To summarize, the system has the following functions:
1. Setup(⁄): is used to generate a private key or a public/private key pair for
a reader (if speci ed by the protocol) based on the security parameter ⁄. It
assigns a state Si to all tags ti œ T . The state includes the set of secret keys
ki1, ki2, ..., kim assigned to the tag and the publicly known information (e.g.
public keys of readers).
2. Match(ti, tj): Is a protocol carried out by two tags ti and tj , and a reader R.
The protocol is initiated by the reader. As a result of the protocol, the reader
obtains the cardinality of the intersection of Si and Sj .
4.3.1 Adversary model
The security of our protocols relies on the secrecy of the keys stored on tags. We
thus make the common assumption that those keys are stored in a secure way, and
that computations involving those keys are implemented in a way that does not leak
information about the keys (for example, through side channels). The adversary
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controls all the communication, pretends to be one of the valid tags, but does not
perform relay attacks using a tag outside the proximity of the reader. The reader
is assumed to behave according to the protocol. Thus, it is considered “honest but
curious”.
The type of an adversary A is speci ed by the actions he can perform. Let ﬁ
be a protocol execution entity. The oracles below de ne the whole set of possible
actions. An adversary gets an access to a subset if oracles depending on his type.
Oracles distinguish between the left and the right message denoted bymleft,mright.
This notion is needed to distinguish communication with tag of the left and right
side. The oracles are:
• Launch(mleft,mright)æ ﬁ,m: when this oracle is called, the reader starts a new
protocol execution ﬁ by sending out the message m. The whole execution of
the protocol can then be performed using oracles SendReader and SendTag.
These two oracles can be used to simulate the Execute oracle from the model
de ned by Juels and Weis [188]
• SendReader(mleft,mright,ﬁ) æ (mÕleft,mÕright): sends a message m to a reader
from the left side (right side or both) in the context of protocol execution ﬁ.
The output of the oracle is a response of the reader mÕ sent in any of the
directions according to the description of the protocol.
• SendTag(m, ti)æ mÕ: sends a messagem to a tag ti. The output of the oracle
is a response of the tagmÕ.
• Result(ﬁ)æ x: outputs the result of functionMatch after the protocol execu-
tion ﬁ.
• Corrupt(ti) æ si: returns the internal state of the tag, allowing an adversary
to learn all secret keys stored on this tag.
The model and the privacy game presented in this section are inspired by work
of Juels andWeis [188], Gildas [20], Vaudenay [311] and Hermans et al. [165]. Unfor-
tunately, all these models were designed with the classes of protocols in mind that
are di erent from our protocol. All the models consider the scenario of communi-
cation between a reader and a single tag. We therefore adopt the classi cation by
Vaudenay and modify the Juels and Weis game for unlinkability to  t the needs of
matching protocols1.
1Later we found a model by Gildas Avoine [21] that allows for a reader to communicate with several
tags.
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The classi cation by Vaudenay is faceted in two dimensions. An attacker who
does not have access to theResult oracle is called NARROW. An attacker who does is
calledWIDE. An attacker who cannot corrupt tags is calledWEAK. An attacker without
any restrictions regarding corruption of tags is called STRONG. An attacker who is
not allowed to perform any protocol interactions after he corrupted one tag is called
FORWARD.
4.3.2 Unforgeability
The goal of an adversary is to convince a reader that the number of matching at-
tributes is larger than it actually is. We call a protocol unforgeable if it resists this
attack. Let S be a system and A be an adversary.
Unforgeability is de ned as the following game ExpforgeS, A (⁄):
Setup: Setup(⁄) is used to initialize all readers and tags.
Learning: The adversary may perform calls to the available oracles on the given set
of tags T . The set of available oracles depends on the adversary type. The strongest
adversary gets access to: Launch, SendReader , SendTag, Corrupt. Let the union of
the sets of all corrupted tags be Ct.
Challenge:
1. The adversary chooses a tag ti, to which he did not call a Corrupt oracle.
2. The tag ti is removed from the set T . The challenger returns ti to the adver-
sary.
3. The adversary is not allowed to modify any of the messages sent to or from
the tag ti. The adversary is simulating a tag tj on the other side.
Result: The experiment outputs true if the reader outputs a value lager than |Si ﬂ
(Sj ﬁ Ct)|.
The advantage of adversary of winning the game is de ned as:
AdvforgeS, A (⁄) = Pr[Exp
forge
S, A (⁄) = true] .
We call the system unforgeable if a maximal advantage of all polynomial time
adversaries is negligible in the security parameter ⁄. During the challenge phase
an adversary can only passively eavesdrop messages exchanged between the chal-
lenge tag and a reader. The adversary has to simulate the other tag, which will be
matched by the reader with the challenge tag.
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The model above considers tag corruption by taking into account that the keys
extracted from corrupted tags will trivially allow the adversary to increase thematch
count output. For the protocols presented in this chapter only WEAK adversaries
are considered for unforgeability, and hence Ct = ÿ.
4.3.3 Unlinkability
The goal of the attacker A is to distinguish tags, thus breaking their unlinkability.
In case an attacker is able to obtain the result of the protocol run, an attack on
unlinkability becomes trivial as pointed out in [123]. It is su cient to have one
tag participate in two protocol runs with potentially di erent tags. By comparing
the result (i.e. cardinality of the intersection) one can determine if that tag was
matched against di erent tags or not. That implies that the Result oracle cannot be
used by an attacker. The match protocol by its nature is giving away information
about tags, namely the relationships between them. There are two approaches for
designing the speed dating protocol to tackle this problem. One is tomake sure that
the protocol itself is not providing any evidence of the relationships between tags,
except for the output of the reader. The other is to provide only a Minimal level
of protection. In this minimal model an attacker is unable to recognize the same
tag he was observing before, once he initiates a protocol with only this tag. To
illustrate, assume an attacker was collecting interactions among tags on the speed
dating party. After the party is over, he suddenly sees a person wearing an RFID tag
from this party. An attacker triggers a protocol, having no other valid tag at hand.
He should be unable to learn the identity of the tag even having all the old protocol
run transcripts at hand.
Unlinkability of an attacker A in the system S is de ned as the following game
ExplinkS, A(⁄):
Setup: Setup(1⁄) is used to initialize all readers and tags.
Learning: The adversary may perform calls to the available oracles on the given set
of tags T . The set of available oracles depends on the adversary type: Launch,
SendReader , SendTag, Corrupt.
Challenge:
1. The adversary chooses two tags ti and tj , to which he did not call a Corrupt
oracle.
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2. The challenger assigns tú0 = ti and tú1 = tj . Both tags are removed from the
set T .
3. Let b œR {0, 1}. The challenger returns túb to the adversary.
4. The adversary is allowed to perform calls to the oracles: Launch, SendReader ,
SendTag, having tag túb on one of the sides and any of the tags from the set T
on the other.
5. The adversary outputs a guess bit bÕ.
Result: The experiment outputs true if the adversary correctly outputs bÕ = b.
The advantage of adversary of winning the game is de ned as:
AdvlinkS, A(⁄) = |Pr[ExplinkS, A(⁄) = true]≠
1
2 | .
We call the system unlinkable if the maximal advantage of all polynomial time
adversaries is negligible in the security parameter ⁄.
Minimal privacy is achieved if an attacker during challenge phase gets only one
tag túb to communicate with and he has to simulate a tag on the other side. This
game modi cation is used only against a WEAK adversary, if the adversary has an
access to the Result oracle. Otherwise an attacker could simulate all the tags he
corrupted during the learning phase. Thus there would be no di erence between
two games, since an attacker could use all the broken tags to let them communi-
cate with the challenge tag. This would allow an attacker to use the knowledge of
topology of tag’s relationships to win the game.
4.4 One-key symmetric speed dating
The protocol presented in this section prevents false positives and provides min-
imal privacy. False positives occur when a tag does not possess any attribute
matching with attributes on the other tag. And yet it manages to make a Match
function output that tags have a match. Minimal privacy is the privacy protection
achieved against an adversary that can read output of the protocol runs and thus
build a topology of tag’s relationships. The protocol only requires a few calls to a
(lightweight) hash functions.
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4.4.1 Single attribute per tag
We start with the setting that each user has a single attribute. Assume tags named
(for convenience) by their owners, namely Alice and Bob. Tags Alice and Bob pos-
sess respectively keys kA, kB œ K. These keys are representing attributes of tags.
A reader scans both tags to  gure out whether their attributes match or not. Fig-
ure 4.1 depicts the protocol.
The general idea of the protocol is the following:
1. Commit phase. Tags generate random numbers and exchange commitments
with each other. These commitments later on help a reader to identify replies
of tags and prevent cheating. The exchange is happening with the help of the
reader.
2. Check phase. Tags create pseudo-random values from the challenges by feed-
ing them to a PRF function Fun. These values are exchanged with the help of
a reader. Tags perform a check of the values generated by the other tag using
their secret keys. After this phase tags know whether they have an equal key
or not.
3. Match phase. If there is a match, tags open their commitments towards the
reader, which determines the result of the protocol.
Commit phase
1. The tags generate random values and calculate commitments to these values.
Alice generates: rA œR {0, ..., 2⁄ ≠ 1}, cA = H(rA). Bob generates: rB œR
{0, ..., 2⁄ ≠ 1}, cB = H(rB).
2. The tags send the commitments cA, cB to a reader.
3. The reader checks if cA = cB . If so, the protocol run is terminated with output
‹. The reader forwards cB to Alice and cA to Bob.
4. Each tag concatenates the commitments and puts the value it generated on
the last position. Alice, for example, obtains cB ||cA.
5. Each tag computes the PRF function Fun using their group keys and sends it
to the reader. Alice computes: chA = FunkA(cB ||cA). Bob computes: chB =
FunkB (cA||cB).
57
Tag Alice (kA) Reader Tag Bob (kB)
initΩ≠≠≠≠ init≠≠≠≠æ
rAœR{0,...,2⁄≠1} rBœR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
cA=H(rA)
cA≠≠≠≠æ receive cA, cB cBΩ≠≠≠≠ cB=H(rB)
cA
?=cB
if yes output‹
cBΩ≠≠≠≠ cA≠≠≠≠æ
chA=FunkA (cB ||cA)
chA≠≠≠≠æ chBΩ≠≠≠≠ chB=FunkB (cA||cB)
chB
?=FunkA (cA||cB)
chBΩ≠≠≠≠ chA≠≠≠≠æ chA ?=FunkB (cB ||cA)
If true authA=rA If true authB=rB
Else
authA≠≠≠≠æ authBΩ≠≠≠≠ Else
authAœR{0,...,2⁄≠1} authBœR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
H(authA)
?=cA
H(authB)
?=cB
If not true, output ‹
Else output match
Figure 4.1: One-key symmetric speed dating protocol.
6. The reader forwards chA to Bob, chB to Alice.
Check phase
1. Each tag checks the received commit value. Alice checks chB
?=
FunkA(cA||cB). Bob checks chA ?= FunkB (cB ||cA).
2. If the equality holds, Alice computes: authA = rA. Else, she sends the
response with authA  lled with a random value. Similarly, Bob computes:
authB = rB if equality holds. Else, he sends the response with authB  lled
with a random value.
3. The tags send authA and authB to the reader.
Match phase
1. The reader checks that H (authA) ?= cA and H (authB) ?= cB . If any of these
two values are false, the reader outputs ‹, otherwise it outputs a match.
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Theorem 1. If Fun is a PRF, then AdvforgeS, A (⁄) of a WEAK adversary, that runs in polyno-
mial time, to win the unforgeability game is negligible in the random oracle model.
Proof. Since the protocol is symmetrical, we consider the protocol from the per-
spective of tag Alice without loss of generality. Since any PRF is a secure
MAC [36], [35], we can consider Fun to be a secure MAC function. Assume an
adversary A can break the protocol unforgeability. We show that there exists an
adversary AÕ, that can then win the MAC unforgeability game using adversary A as
an oracle.
The hash function is modeled as a random oracle RO. The adversary AÕ is inter-
acting with a MAC game challenger possessing a key kch. AdversaryAÕ is simulating
the unforgeability game for an adversary A by answering all requests an adversary
Amakes to oracles with a small exception. One particular tag ti (or more) however
is simulated with a help of the MAC challenger. This tag possesses a key kch. Let us
call the corresponding attribute ach. This tag is simulated toA byAÕ in the following
way:
1. First SendTag: AÕ outputs cA = RO(rA) according to the protocol.
2. Second SendTag: AÕ provides cB ||cA as an input to the MAC challenger, and
returns it’s output as chA.
3. Third SendTag: AÕ validates the input value chb. If chb was generated by the
MAC challenger, then AÕ knows the values should match (this can be double-
checked with the help of the MAC veri cation oracle). Otherwise AÕ directly
knows what the result should be, as he is simulating the rest of the tags in the
system. AÕ returns an output, as speci ed by the protocol.
During the learning phase of the adversary A, AÕ gets to see di erent tuples of
messages and corresponding tags: m = (cA||cB), t = MACki(cA||cB), MAC value
generated by a challenger. Since rA and hence cA is selected randomly, there will be
no repeating values with overwhelming probability. Additionally, sinceH is a crypto-
graphic hash function, A cannot win the unforgeability game by  nding preimages
of commitments cA with overwhelming probability.
Assume A selects a tag with key kch as challenge tag. Assume the challenge tag
is Bob and the adversary takes the role of Alice. Note that communication between
the reader and the challenge tag is performed directly by the challenger. If A wins
the unforgeability game, it has to produce a valid chA (otherwise rB will not be sent
to the reader and hence validation will fail). This chA will be the MAC of an input
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cA||cB that was not used previously in the game, since cB is fresh. Hence, chA can
be forwarded to the MAC challenger to win the MAC unforgeability game.
The probability that the adversary selects the tag ti is at least 1n . If the non-
negligible advantage of A to win the game is ‘, and the cardinality of the set of
tags is n, then the advantage of AÕ is Ø ‘n . This value is non-negligible, since n is
polynomially bounded in a security parameter ⁄ (see Section 4.3).
Theorem 2. If Fun is a PRF, then AdvlinkS, A(⁄) of a WEAK adversary, that runs in poly-
nomial time, to win the minimal unlinkability game is negligible in the random oracle
model.
Proof. Since the protocol is symmetrical, we consider the protocol from the per-
spective of tag Alice without loss of generality. We are going to show that an attacker
is unable to distinguish any of the challenge tags from a simulator that is returning
random values, and, thus, is unable to distinguish challenge tags themselves.
The hash function is modeled as a random oracle RO. We now simulate the
SendTag oracle as follows to an adversary, explaining each step of the protocol:
1. A tag generates fresh pseudo-random values rA and returns RO(rA).
2. Upon receiving cB , the simulated tag returns a random value as chA.
3. Upon receiving chB , the simulated tag outputs a random value. Since the
adversary is playing the minimal game, there is no other valid tag to create
the proper chB value. Next, an attacker cannot forge a value output by Fun,
as proven by Thm. 1. Thus, chB can never be accepted as valid.
The above simulated tag is indistinguishable from a real tag. First, the random
chA is indistinguishable from FunkA(cA||cB) since Fun is a PRF, rA is selected ran-
domly and cA is never repeated as an output of RO. Second, when replying to chB
we can rely on the soundness of the protocol, as proven by Theorem 1. This en-
sures that it is impossible for an adversary to forge chB . So either it was sent by a
tag (and hence a match will be found) or it was forged and should be rejected by
the tag. Finally, since the game is minimal, an attacker does not have any possibility
to distinguish between the real tag and the simulator by matching them with other
tags and comparing the output.
Assume the challenge bit b = 0. Tag t0 is indistinguishable from a simulated
tag. The same argument applies to challenge bit b = 1. Hence, an attacker cannot
distinguish between two tags.
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4.5 Match protocol for asymmetric encryption
The protocols presented in this section prevent false positives and provide a higher
privacy level under the following requirement. An adversary must be unable to ob-
tain the output of the protocol runs and, thus, build a topology of tag’s relationships.
The cost of the higher privacy level is the usage of public-key encryption.
4.5.1 One-key asymmetric speed dating protocol
The advantage of the protocol in this section is that it protects con dentiality of the
exchanged messages. Thanks to that, when an adversary corrupts tags and obtains
their secret keys, it will not help him to succeed in identifying tags. This also implies
that any external observer is unable to learn the result of the protocol from the
exchanged messages. Also, the protocol is easily expandable to handle the case of
tags storing multiple attributes.
Assume each user can possess a single attribute as in the previous section. Tags
Alice and Bob posses respectively group keys kA, kB œ K. An asymmetric encryp-
tion system pkENC is used in the protocol. A reader holds a public-private key pair
(pk, sk), all tags are supplied with the public key pk of a reader.
The asymmetric protocol can be obtained from the symmetric one (Section 4.4)
in two steps. The  rst step is to encrypt messages sent between a reader and each
tag. To ensure that ciphertexts of two tags di er, tags append the random number
to theFun value before encrypting. The second step is to provide the same inputs to
theFun function on both tags, since there is no need to produce di erent outputs of
the PRF function. The reason is that messages appended with unique randomness
are sent encrypted. This way the protocol is protected from trivial replay attacks,
and the need for commitments cA, cB and their openings is eliminated. Figure 4.2
illustrates the protocol.
Speed dating protocol:
1. Tags generate random values and send cA, cB to the reader. Alice generates:
cA œR {0, ..., 2⁄ ≠ 1}. Bob generates: cB œR {0, ..., 2⁄ ≠ 1}
2. Reader checks if cA = cB , then protocol run is terminated with output ‹.
Otherwise the reader exchanges random numbers between tags.
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Tag Alice (kA, pk) Reader (sk) Tag Bob (kB , pk)
kA,pk sk kB ,pk
initΩ≠≠≠≠ init≠≠≠≠æ
cAœR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
cA≠≠≠≠æ cBΩ≠≠≠≠ cBœR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
cA
?=cB
if yes output‹
cBΩ≠≠≠≠ cA≠≠≠≠æ
If cA>cB , c=cA||cB If cA>cB , c=cA||cB
Else c=cB ||cA Else c=cB ||cA
funA=FunkA (c) funB=FunkB (c)
eA=Epk(cA||funA)
eA≠≠≠≠æ eBΩ≠≠≠≠ eB=Epk(cB ||funB)
cÕA||funA=Dsk(eA)
cÕB ||funB=Dsk(eB)
cÕA
?=cA
cÕB
?=cB
funA
?=funB
Figure 4.2: One-key asymmetric speed dating protocol.
3. Tags sort random numbers. Assume, that cA > cB . Alice learns that she has
to put cA in the beginning. Bob learns that he has to append cB to the end.
4. Tags compute Fun values using their group keys. Alice computes: funA =
FunkA(cA||cB). Bob computes: funB = FunkB (cA||cB)
5. Tags send Fun values Epk(cA||funA) and Epk(cB ||funB) over secure channel.
6. Reader decrypts received values using his secret key sk.
7. Reader checks if the decrypted messages contain cA and cB values.
8. Reader checks if funA
?= funB . If true reader outputs Match. Otherwise it
outputs ‹.
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Theorem 3. If the encryption scheme pkENC is IND-CCA2 secure, then AdvforgeS, A (⁄)
of a WEAK adversary, that runs in polynomial time, to win the unforgeability game is
negligible in the random oracle model.
Proof. Assume an adversary A can break the protocol unforgeability. We show that
there exists an adversary AÕ, that can then win the IND-CCA2 game using adversary
A as an oracle.
The adversary AÕ is interacting with a IND-CCA2 game challenger possessing a
secret key sk. Adversary AÕ is simulating the unforgeability game for an adversary
A by answering all requests an adversary A makes to oracles. The simulation to A
by AÕ is performed in the following way:
1. All the tags are fully simulated by AÕ, who possesses all the corresponding
keys of tags.
2. AÕ publishes pk of the IND-CCA2 game challenger as a public key of a reader.
This, together with the previous item allows AÕ to answer SendTag queries.
3. Since A is WEAK, no queries to Corrupt oracle are accepted.
4. Consider the case when A initiates a protocol run without having a valid tag
on one of the sides. To answer the Result oracle query, AÕ needs to know the
plaintext message encrypted by an adversary using pk and resulting in the
ciphertext e. For this, AÕ will submit the ciphertext e to the decryption oracle
within the IND-CCA2 game.
After the learning phase of unforgeability game is over, A chooses some tag ti
for the challenge phase according to the game de nition. Let ti be on the side
of Alice. When A initiates the protocol execution, AÕ outputs on behalf of ti a
random value cA according to the protocol and receives cB from A. Further, AÕ
computes the value funA according to the protocol. After that, AÕ computes two
challenge messages for the IND-CCA2 game. The  rst message is constructed as
m0 = cA||funA, the second message is m1 = cA||ran, where value ran is the value
generated at random. As a response, AÕ receives an encryption of eitherm0 orm1,
which he outputs for A as eA in the unforgeability game.
Since A can can perform successful forgeries, he can output such eB that the
reader will output "match". For this eB needs to be decrypted using sk into a mes-
sage cB ||x, where x matches either ran or funA, depending on the plaintext of eA.
Now, AÕ submits eB to the decryption oracle within the IND-CCA2 game. As a result
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he gets either cB ||funB , where funB is equal to funA, or cB ||ran, which helps him to
learn if he received earlier an encryption of m0 or m1. Thus, AÕ is able to win the
IND-CCA2 game.
Theorem 4. If the encryption scheme pkENC is IND-CCA2 secure, then AdvlinkS, A(⁄) of
a (non-minimal) NARROW-STRONG adversary, that runs in polynomial time, to win the
unlinkability game is negligible in the random oracle model.
Proof. Since the protocol is symmetrical, we consider the protocol from perspec-
tive of tag Alice without loss of generality. The goal of the proof is to show that if
an adversary A can break unlinkability of the protocol, the adversary AÕ can win
IND-CCA2 game. The adversary AÕ interacts with the IND-CCA2 game challenger,
possessing a key pair (pk, sk). The adversary AÕ simulates the unlinkability game
for an adversary A by answering all requests A makes to oracles. The reader key
pair in the simulation is the key pair of the IND-CCA2 game challenger.
During the learning phase AÕ answers all the oracle queries from AÕ using his
knowledge of tags’ keys and the value of pk. To get decryptions of the messages
encrypted with pk , AÕ queries the IND-CCA2 oracle. During the challenge phase AÕ
creates messages for both challenge tags cA||funA0 and cB ||funA1. AÕ then submits
both messages to the IND-CCA2 challenger. The received ciphertext Epk(cb||funAb)
is forwarded to A. If A can break unlinkability of the protocol, thats is distinguish
between tags, AÕ will be able to distinguish which message was encrypted.
A NARROW-STRONG adversary cannot get the result of the protocol run, but he
can corrupt tags. Corrupting tags will provide an adversary with secret keys of tags.
However, it does not help him in distinguishing tags and their output. This holds
for the simple reason, all the information related to tags is transferred encrypted
using the asymmetric IND-CCA2 encryption scheme Enc. This implies, encrypted
messages do not provide an adversary with any useful information.
Theorem 5. If Fun is a PRF, then AdvlinkS, A(⁄) of a polynomial-time adversary that pos-
sesses the private key of a valid reader to win the minimal unlinkability game is negligible
in the random oracle model.
Proof. Since the protocol is symmetrical, we consider the protocol from the per-
spective of tag Alice without loss of generality. We are going to show that an attacker
is unable to distinguish any of the challenge tags from a simulator that is returning
random values, and, thus, is unable to distinguish challenge tags themselves.
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We now simulate the SendTag oracle to an adversary as follows:
1. Upon getting initialization request, a fresh random value cA is output.
2. Upon receiving cB , an encryption with pk of a random value cA||x as eA is
output.
The above simulated tag is indistinguishable from a real tag. The  rst output is
generated the same way as in the real tag. After an attacker decrypts the second
output of a simulated tag, he obtains cA||x. The random value x is indistinguish-
able from FunkA(cA||cB) since Fun is a PRF . The value cA is a selected randomly.
Finally, since the game is minimal, an attacker does not have any possibility to dis-
tinguish between the real tag and the simulator by matching them with other tags
and comparing the output.
Assume the challenge bit b = 0. Tag t0 is indistinguishable from a simulated
tag. The same argument applies to challenge bit b = 1. Hence, an attacker cannot
distinguish between two tags.
4.5.2 Many-key asymmetric speed dating protocol
Assume each user can possess at most m attributes. Tags Alice and Bob possess
respectively group keys sA = {kA[i] œ Kﬁ{‹}|i œ {1, . . . ,m}}, sB = {kB [i] œ K|i œ
{1, . . . ,m}}. All tags are supplied with the public key pk and all readers possess the
private key sk.
This protocol can be obtained from the one-key version by handling several at-
tributes instead of one. An important change is required due to the necessity to
hide the amount of attributes on each tag. Tags are generating fA[i] and fB [i] val-
ues using their keys, i œ {1, . . . ,m}. Whenever a tag has less than m attributes,
the f values are  lled with randomness. Tags perform random permutations on f
values before they are sent to a reader. This is done in order to conceal the order
of attributes, otherwise this could expose sensitive information about tags to the
reader.
Upon obtaining and decrypting all of the fA[i] and fB [i] values from two tags, a
reader starts by sorting both sets descending. After that a reader can easily com-
pute an intersection of two sets Int and outputs its cardinality |Int|. Figure 4.3
depicts the protocol.
The e ciency of this protocol can be substantially improved by changing from
using only asymmetric encryption scheme to using a hybrid one. In that case an
65
asymmetric encryption is used to securely transfer key material. A hash function is
applied to it as a key derivation function. The result is used as a key for a semanti-
cally secure encryption system.
Theorem 6. If the encryption scheme pkENC is IND-CCA2 secure, then AdvforgeS, A (⁄)
of a WEAK adversary, that runs in polynomial time, to win the unforgeability game is
negligible in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof is similair to the one in the Theorem 3. It di ers in the following.
AÕ computes two challenge messages for the IND-CCA2 game. The  rst mes-
sage is constructed as m0 = cA||setA, where setA is constructed according to the
protocol. The second message ism1 = cA||setran , where each value of the set is the
value generated at random. As a response, AÕ receives an encryption of either m0
orm1, which he outputs for A as eA in the unforgeability game.
Since A can can perform successful forgeries, he can output such eB that the
reader will output |setA ﬂ setB | bigger than the number of shared keys between
two tags. For this eB needs to be decrypted using sk into a message cB ||setB. This
message setB should contain at least one value equal to a value of either setran or
setA, depending on the plaintext of eA. Now,AÕ submits eB to the decryption oracle
within the IND-CCA2 game. As a result he gets the plaintext of cB ||setB. Now,AÕ has
to check if setB contains at least one value equal to setA, or setran . This helps him
to learn if he received earlier an encryption ofm0 orm1. Thus, AÕ is able to win the
IND-CCA2 game.
Theorem 7. If the encryption scheme pkENC is IND-CCA2 secure, then AdvlinkS, A(⁄) of
a (non-minimal) NARROW-STRONG adversary, that runs in polynomial time, to win the
unlinkability game is negligible in the random oracle model.
Proof. Since the protocol is symmetrical, we consider the protocol from perspective
of tag Alice without loss of generality. The goal of the proof is to show that if an
adversary A can break unlinkability of the protocol, the adversary AÕ can win the
IND-CCA2 game. The adversary AÕ interacts with the IND-CCA2 game challenger,
possessing a key pair (pk, sk). The adversary AÕ simulates the unlinkability game
for an adversary A by answering all requests A makes to oracles. The reader key
pair in the simulation is the key pair of the IND-CCA2 game challenger.
During the learning phase AÕ answers all the oracle queries from AÕ using his
knowledge of tags’ keys and the value of pk. To get decryptions of the messages
encrypted with pk , AÕ queries the IND-CCA2 oracle. During the challenge phase AÕ
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creates messages for both challenge tags cA||setA0 and cB ||setA1, where setA0 and
setA0 are generated according to the protocol. AÕ then submits both messages to
the IND-CCA2 challenger. The received ciphertext Epk(cb||setAb) is forwarded to A.
If A can break unlinkability of the protocol, thats is distinguish between tags, AÕ will
be able to distinguish which message was encrypted.
A NARROW-STRONG adversary cannot get the result of the protocol run, but he
can corrupt tags. Corrupting tags will provide an adversary with secret keys of tags.
However, it does not help him in distinguishing tags and their output. This holds
for the simple reason, all the information related to tags is transferred encrypted
using the asymmetric IND-CCA2 encryption scheme Enc. This implies, encrypted
messages do not provide an adversary with any useful information.
Theorem 8. If Fun is a PRF, then AdvlinkS, A(⁄) of a polynomial-time adversary that pos-
sesses the private key of a valid reader to win the minimal unlinkability game is negligible
in the random oracle model.
Since the protocol is symmetrical, we consider the protocol from the perspective
of tag Alice without loss of generality. We are going to show that an attacker is
unable to distinguish any of the challenge tags from a simulator that is returning
random values, and, thus, is unable to distinguish challenge tags themselves.
We now simulate the SendTag oracle to an adversary as follows:
1. Upon getting initialization request, a fresh random value cA is output.
2. Upon receiving cB , a set of random values setx is generated.
3. The value cA||setx is encrypted with pk as eA.
The above simulated tag is indistinguishable from a real tag. First output is
generated the same way as in the real tag. The second value an attacker treats
as an encrypted value. After he decrypts it, he obtains cA||setx . The set of random
values setx is indistinguishable from a set of randomly permuted PRFs and random
values {fB [i]|i œ {1 . . .m}}. The value cA is a selected randomly. Finally, since the
game is minimal, an attacker does not have any possibility to distinguish between
the real tag and the simulator by matching themwith other tags and comparing the
output.
Assume the challenge bit b = 0. Tag t0 is indistinguishable from a simulated
tag. The same argument applies to challenge bit b = 1. Hence, an attacker cannot
distinguish between two tags.
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4.6 Related work
In 2012, Elkhiyaoui, Blass, and Molva presented a protocol that allows an RFID
reader to determine whether two tags store some attributes that jointly ful ll a
boolean constraint, without violating the privacy of the tags [123]. They motivate
their protocol by considering the transportation of chemicals where safety regula-
tions prohibit the joint transportation of chemicals that might react with each other.
By equipping each container with a tag and scanning for certain boolean constraint
describing reactive combinations the reader can check if the transportation is safe.
Elkhiyaoui et al. also focus extensively on privacy of their protocol, although this
is problematic for their speci c application: legal regulations for the transport of
dangerous goods require a clear labeling which voids any of the privacy a tag might
o er [125].
The speed-dating protocols described in this chapter achieve the same goal with
a di erent trade-o s between privacy and e ciency. Tags in our protocol are more
costly, since they require to be able to perform calculations. The cost of calculations
on tags is fairly low when symmetric encryption is used. Asymmetric encryption on
tags is more expensive, but feasible to be implemented in both secure and e cient
way, as numerous studies demonstrate in theory and practice [141, 208, 63, 163].
As observed by other researches, asymmetric primitives will provide more secure
systems [311, 106]. Currently, many studies proposed protocols for which asym-
metric encryption schemes are essential, [8, 106, 67] to mention a few. One of
these protocols named “Yoking-Proofs” [187] is similar to speed-dating in the sense
that it also considers two simultaneously scanned tags. What is di erent is the goal
of the protocol: they provide a prove of the fact that two particular tags have been
scanned simultaneously.
The advantage of using more costly tags is that the infrastructure of readers
for our speed-dating protocols is more  exible and robust, because readers do not
have to be connected to a central database. Additionally, unlike in the T-Match
protocol presented in [123], readers do not need to perform any homomorphic
encryption operations, or expensive multi-party computations.
The protocol described in Section 4.5.2 furthermore extends the protocol model
to allow multiple attributes per tag. This makes speed-dating a suitable solution for
a broader set of applications.
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4.7 Conclusion
Three protocols to privately match attributes on RFID tags were presented in this
chapter. None of them requires a centralized system with readers constantly con-
nected to a central database. Neither do readers require any knowledge about
attributes stored on tags. This makes the system  exible and easy to use for sev-
eral parties. The  rst protocol protects privacy of users by only utilizing symmetric
encryption, which makes it extremely lightweight. This comes at a cost of a slightly
lower protection level, than the one provided by the other two protocols. Just one
step of asymmetric encryption that is required by both of them (given hybrid en-
cryption is used), quite noticeably changes anonymity protection.
There is a restriction in all of the presented protocols. All possible applications
are limited to the ones, which are sensitive to false positives. That is, the proto-
col protects against matching tags with no matching attributes. These applications
should not be sensitive to false negatives. The interesting future work is to see how
protocol can be improved to add detection of false negatives.
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Tag Alice (kA, pk) Reader (sk) Tag Bob (kB , pk)
kA,pk sk kB ,pk
initΩ≠≠≠≠ init≠≠≠≠æ
cAœR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
cA≠≠≠≠æ cBΩ≠≠≠≠ cBœR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
cA
?=cB
if yes output‹
If cA>cB , c=cA||cB If cA>cB , c=cA||cB
Else c=cB ||cA Else c=cB ||cA
cBΩ≠≠≠≠ cA≠≠≠≠æ
For iœ{1,...,m} For iœ{1,...,m}
If kA[i]=‹ If kB [i]=‹
fA[i]œR{0,...,2⁄≠1} fB [i]œR{0,...,2⁄≠1}
Else fA[i]=FunkA[i](c) Else fB [i]=FunkB [i](c)
Randomly permutate fA[i] Randomly permutate fB [i]
setA= setB=
{fA[i]|iœ{1...m}} {fB [i]|iœ{1...m}}
eA=Epk(cA||setA)
eA≠≠≠≠æ eBΩ≠≠≠≠ eB=Epk(cB ||setB)
cÕA||setA=Dsk(eA)
cÕB ||setB=Dsk(eB)
cÕA
?=cA
cÕB
?=cB
|setAﬂsetB |
Figure 4.3: Many-keys asymmetric speed dating protocol.
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Chapter 5
Footprint scheduling for
Dining-Cryptographer
networks
5.1 Introduction
“We kill people based on metadata” – this statement by former CIA and NSA director
Michael Hayden demonstrates more than clearly that cryptographically protecting
only the content of communication is insu cient; secure communication also has
to protect the identities of the communicating parties. Various protocols and tech-
niques have been proposed to enable anonymous communication. All of these
techniques have to choose a trade-o  between e ciency in terms of throughput,
latency, and scalability on the one hand and security guarantees on the other hand.
For example, anonymous proxies provide low latency and potentially very good
throughput and scalability, but all participants’ identities are compromised if one
trusted node, the proxy, is compromised. Stronger guarantees are o ered by a
cascade of proxies in onion-routing networks like Tor [303], which were originally
proposed by Syverson, Goldschlag, and Reed in [269]. However, onion-routing net-
works are susceptible to attacks that correlate tra c entering and leaving the net-
work. See, for example, [232]. Mix-nets, proposed already in 1981 by Chaum in [80]
do not have this problem; however, they su er from increased latency.
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The anonymity protocol that o ers the strongest guarantees is the Dining-
Cryptographers protocol, also known as Dining-Cryptographers network or short DC-
net, which was introduced by Chaum in [83]. Interestingly, DC are also initials of
the author of this protocol, as Andreas P tzman pointed out [259]. The protocol
provides unconditional communication anonymity for senders and recipients. Ad-
ditionally, it protects against data retention and anonymity “revocation”: even if a
central server is used and it is malicious, this server cannot reveal any information
about messages and communication partners of participants. However, protection
comes at the cost of low throughput and high latency, in particular when scaling to
many participants.
Notation.We write 0B for the string that consists of B zeros. All logarithms in this
chapter are to the base 2.
Organization of this chapter. Section 5.2 reviews the state of the art in scheduling
for DC-net. Section 5.3 introduces footprint scheduling and Section 5.4 describes
how to tune the parameters of footprint scheduling and compares its performance
to previous approaches. Section 5.5 describes a protection mechanism against dis-
ruption. Section 5.6 summarizes the key strengths of footprint scheduling.
5.1.1 Our contributions
This paper presents a novel approach that belongs to the class of reservation-map
methods. The general problem of this class of methods is that they essentially
defer the problem of undetected collisions from the communication phase to a slot-
reservation phase. One way to solve this problem is to use many more slots than
participants, to keep the probability of collisions low. However, this leaves many
communication slots unused and drastically reduces the throughput of the DC-net.
We present footprint scheduling as a simple and e cient way to implement the slot-
reservation phase without the loss of throughput. Footprint scheduling is the  rst
scheduling algorithm to combine reasonable communication overhead that scales
logarithmic in the number of participants, absence of computation overhead, and
naturally handling participants joining and leaving the network.
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5.2 Existing scheduling methods
In this section we describe the previous approaches to scheduling in DC-net. As
listed in the previous section, we group the algorithms into three categories: reser-
vation maps, collision resolution, and secure multi-party computation (MPC).
5.2.1 Overview of methods
Reservationmaps. Reservationmapswere already introduced as one possible way
to handle scheduling in the original DC-net chapter by Chaum [83]. The idea is to
perform a separate scheduling phase to assign rounds to particular participants
to avoid collisions. During this phase participants can reserve a round of DC-net
by setting a bit of a scheduling message at the position corresponding to the round
number. Note that also scheduling messages are sent through the anonymous DC-
net channel; i.e., they are xored with all the shared keys of the other participants.
Disruptions of the schedulingmessage can be detected with a certain probability by
checking if the Hamming weight of the message is smaller or equal than the num-
ber of participants. The downside of this approach is that, because of the birthday
paradox, the number of bits in the scheduling message must be quadratic in the
number of participants to avoid collisions with high probability. Reservation maps
are used by Herbivore, an implementation of DC-net presented by Goel, Robson,
Polte, and Sirer in [148]. Herbivore optimizes the size of the scheduling message
by allowing some collisions during message cycle depending on the message size
(collisions for smaller messages are more likely). For performance comparison in
Section 5.4 we also performed such an optimization, however we decided for op-
timization that does not depend on the size of the message (See Section 5.2.3 for
details).
The length of the scheduling message can be reduced if instead of bits repre-
senting rounds, one would use elements of the additive group of integers modulo
m [257]. After all the scheduling messages of participants are added up, elements
of value 0 indicate an unreserved round, elements of value 1 indicate a reserved
round, all other values indicate collisions.
Collision resolution. The second approach proposed by Chaum in [83] is to use a
contention algorithm with discrete time slots and resolve collisions by retransmit-
ting themessages. A common example of such an algorithm is slotted ALOHA [275].
In Slotted ALOHA participants pick a time slot for transmission at will. Whenever a
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collision happens, participants wait for a random amount of time before they pick
a new time slot for retransmission. The simplicity of the protocol is countered by
the limitation of the transmission capacity of the network due to collisions.
One way to improve transmission capacity in collision resolution is through a
technique called superposed receiving. The idea is to derive the retransmission
schedule for collided messages from the result of a collision. New transmissions
have to wait until a collision has been resolved. In [259, Sec. 3.1.2.3.2], A. P tzmann
presents such an algorithm, which is an improvement of the tree algorithm that
was independently proposed by Capetanakis in [78] and by Tsybakov and Mikhailov
in [309]. P tzmann calls this algorithm tree-like collision resolution with superposed
receiving; in the following, we refer to this algorithm as P tzmann’s algorithm. Let
the number of messages that collided be s, then the protocol guarantees that the
collision will be resolved in exactly s retransmission steps. Additionally, this pro-
tocol guarantees fair usage of the channel for all sending participants. Note that
this algorithm requires DC-net to be modi ed to work on integers modulo m > 2
instead of simple xors. This makes it possible to compute the “average” of the col-
lided messages (treated as an integer). Participants that sent a message smaller
than the average retransmit; participants that sent a larger message wait. As soon
as only two messages collided, only one participant retransmits; the other message
is recomputed locally. A more detailed description of the algorithm can be found in
[316] and [138, Sec 3.2.2].
Another algorithm, using a similar approach, was presented in [58] by Bos and
Boer. It also computes a retransmission schedule for collided messages and re-
quires s retransmissions after s messages collided. However, it has a larger over-
head in header messages and is computationally more expensive than P tzmann’s
algorithm.
Note that these superposed-receiving techniques can also be applied to slot
reservation as proposed by Waidner in [316]. P tzmann’s algorithm is then used to
resolve collisions of reservation messages. Each reservation message contains the
number of the round in which a participant wants to send. With this approach the
tra c load does not depend on the length of the messages transmitted through
DC-net as in the original P tzmann’s algorithm.
The  rst protectivemeasure against disruption during the scheduling phase was
presented by Waidner and B. P tzmann in [317, 318]. The idea is to investigate the
reservation phase in case of impossible results of the speci c scheduling algorithm
used. For example, in P tzmann’s algorithm, the number of initially collided mes-
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sages should be not more than the prede ned maximum. To enable investigation,
all the outputs during the scheduling phase are protected by output commitments.
In the special phase called palaver phase any participant can start an investigation
of the scheduling phase in order to detect disrupters.
Secure multi-party computation. In [156], Golle and Juels propose two new ver-
sions of DC-net that allow detection and identi cation of disrupters with high prob-
ability by using zero-knowledge proofs. They do not consider the problem of col-
lisions (and thus reservation of rounds) in their solution; they comment that “the
problem can be avoided through techniques like secure multi-party computation of
a secretly distributed permutation of slots among players, but this is impractical”.
Studholme and Blake propose in [294] a way to implement such a multi-party
computation called secret shu e by organizing a Mix-net with participants (e.g. of
DC-net) serving as nodes. Encrypted round-reservation requests are transmitted
through this Mix-net to obtain a secretly permuted vector of re-encrypted requests.
Re-encryption is performed such that a participant can recognize his own request
only after the permutation is completed. His reserved round number can be de-
rived from the position of the request in the vector.
This idea is used in the Master’s thesis of Franck [138], in which he derives a
fully veri able variant of DC-net. Later, veri able DC-net was rediscovered in [94]
and implemented under the name Verdict. The advantage of Verdict is that it allows
switching between traditional DC-net and veri able DC-net, depending on the pres-
ence of disruption. For scheduling, Verdict uses a similar approach as [294, 138]
and the same as in another implementation of DC-net by the same group, Dis-
sent [93, 324].
In [139], Franck proposes a scheduling for DC-net based on the collision-
resolution protocol SICTA. This scheduling protocol is very similar to P tzmann’s col-
lision resolution algorithm, the only di erence being that it operates with multipli-
cation of ciphertexts instead of addition. The author proposes to use this algorithm
to produce a secret shu e of public keys of participants to establish a schedule.
The protocol is non-deterministic; it achieves a maximum stable throughput (MST)
of 0.924 messages per round. Disruption in the scheduling phase in this protocol is
prevented by using zero-knowledge proofs.
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5.2.2 P tzmann’s algorithm
We describe tree-like collision resolution with superposed receiving algorithm in
more detail. The whole algorithm is performed though superposed sending of DC-
net to ensure anonymity. This superposed sending is using additive group of Zm,
the integers modulom > 2. Reservation phase consists of the number of transmis-
sion steps equal to the number of participants N . A reservation message sent by
each participant consists of two values. The  rst value is a number, which repre-
sents a sequential number of a slot a participant is trying to reserve. The second
value is a one, which is used to count number of simultaneously sent and thus col-
lided messages. To ensure that there is no over ow, ideally m > NmÕ, where mÕ is
the maximum number participants can choose as a slot number.
We will informally introduce the protocol by describing steps in this  gure. Dur-
ing the  rst step of reservation all participants send their messages, superposed
sending results in a collision of all of them. After this an average Â?Ê is calculated.
In the next step only those participants resend their messages, whose slot number
is less or equal to the resulted average. Thus, the whole set is divided into two
groups - the one that resends and the one that does not. On the  gure resending
participants are 3, 4 and 5.
Same procedure repeats and in the third step only one participant sends his
message. Now only two messages are left to resolve. However, instead of making
these two messages to be resend, all participants locally perform step 4. For this,
they subtract from the global sum of step 2, the global sum of step 3 and compute
Â?Ê = 4. Now, only a participant with slot number greater or equal to 4 resends in
step 5. In case both participants sent again or nobody sends, both of them chose
the same slot number and none of them is thus successful in reservation. In the
 gure however, participant 3 resends. In step 6 participants locally calculate the
slot number of the not resend message, by subtracting from the global sum of step
4 global sum of step 5.
Now the stations whose slot numbers were less than average in the  rst step
resolve their collision. In step 7 deduce collision of their messages using informa-
tion from the previous steps and calculate average. Steps 8 and 9 happen in the
similar way as previous steps. In result, one needed 9 steps, out which only 5 steps
included transmission of messages.
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Figure 5.1: The average scheduling overhead produced by P tzmann’s algorithm for di erent
numbers of slots per participant.
5.2.3 Optimization of P tzmann’s algorithm and Chaum’s reser-
vation map
When Chaum’s or P tzmann’s algorithm is used for scheduling, the number of avail-
able slots has to be chosen appropriate to the size of the network. This section
brie y explains how we optimized the ratio between the number of participants
and the number of slots.
Assuming that participants choose random slots in the schedule, the collision
probability in both algorithms underlies the birthday paradox. However, collisions
do not need to be avoided at all costs: P tzmann’s scheduling algorithm is capable
of detecting them, and Chaum’s algorithm should tolerate some collisions in order
to limit the scheduling overhead.
Therefore the number of slots does not need to be quadratic in the number of
participants. In fact, our simulations showed that it is su cient if there is a linear
relationship between the number of slots and the number of participants. Let i be
the ratio between the number of slots S and the number of participants P , so that
S = i · P . Figure 5.1 shows the scheduling overhead for P tzmann’s algorithm with
di erent values of i. P tzmann’s algorithm achieves minimal overhead for i = 32
across various network sizes. Based on these results, the simulations shown in
Section 5.4 were executed using i = 32.
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Figure 5.2: The fraction of participants that will experience a collision in Chaum’s reservation
map algorithm, for di erent ratios between the network size and the number of slots.
Chaum’s algorithm cannot detect collisions and therefore needs to minimize
the chance of collisions to occur. Figure 5.2 shows the fraction of participants that
will experience a collision in their reservation attempt, given di erent values of i.
We aimed for a con guration where no more than one in 20 reservation attempts
would fail, which requires about 32 slots per participant.
The results for Chaum’s algorithm shown in Section 5.4 were achieved with i =
32. If a higher success rate is desired, then the number of slots must be increased
more.
5.3 Footprint scheduling
In this section, we introduce footprint scheduling. Footprint scheduling is similar
to the map-reservation algorithm described by Chaum [83]; however, it requires
signi cantly shorter reservation vectors and drastically decreases the likelihood of
(undetected) collisions in these vectors.
In the map-reservation algorithm, the A active participants (i.e., participants
who want to send a message in the next round) of a DC-net with a total of N users
can reserve one out of S slots by inverting the corresponding bit in a reservation
vector of S bits. The reservation vector is then transmitted through DC-net, and the
resulting reservation vector, i.e., the xor of all the individual reservations, is broad-
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cast to all participants. See also Section 5.2. An undetected collision occurs in this
vector as soon as an odd number of participants attempts to reserve the same slot.
This event is obviously undesirable, since it leads to collisions of messages during
the sending phase. To decrease the probability of such an event, the original pa-
per [83] suggests to choose the length of the reservation vector to be quadratic in
the number of participants.
Footprints instead of bits. The  rst idea of footprint scheduling is to use B > 1
bits in the reservation vector to represent each slot of the schedule. The reservation
vector is thus extended to a length of B · S bits. A participant attempts to reserve
a speci c slot by changing the corresponding B bits of the reservation vector to
a random value f œ {0, 1}B \ {0}B . This value is called his footprint. Table 5.1a
demonstrates an example of a reservation vector with 3-bit footprints. DC-net will
broadcast the xor of all individual reservation vectors to the participants, just as for
plain map reservation. If the reservation vector contains the footprint of a partic-
ipant, it is likely that no other participant tried to reserve that slot. If instead the
participant  nds a di erent value, this indicates that at least one other participant
tried to reserve the same slot. In Table 5.1a one can see that participants C, D and F
try to reserve the same slot. All three of them can recognize the collision since their
original footprint s are not in the result of this round.
Table 5.1: The result of two scheduling rounds in footprint scheduling.
(a) One scheduling round of footprint
scheduling with 3-bit footprints.
A 000 000 000 000 000 000 110 000
B 000 000 000 101 000 000 000 000
C 000 011 000 000 000 000 000 000
D 000 100 000 000 000 000 000 000
E 000 000 000 000 001 000 000 000
F 000 010 000 000 000 000 000 000
R 000 101 000 101 001 000 110 000
(b) The state of the reservation vector after
the second scheduling round.
A 000 000 000 000 000 000 011 000
B 000 000 000 101 000 000 000 000
C 000 100 000 000 000 000 000 000
D 101 000 000 000 000 000 000 000
E 000 000 000 000 010 000 000 000
F 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 011
R 101 100 000 101 010 000 011 011
Scheduling cycles and message cycles. Using B bits per slot in the reservation
vector alone would simply blow up the reservation vector by a factor of B. This
is where footprint scheduling applies a second modi cation to reservation maps,
which allows to drastically reduce the size of S (for example, to S = 32 for up to
10, 000 participants). The idea is to iterate slot reservation through a scheduling cycle
consisting of R scheduling rounds. In the  rst round, each participant just attempts
to reserve a slot as described above. In each subsequent round, the behavior de-
pends on whether the participant detected a collision in “his” slot in the previous
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round. If not, he will reserve the same slot again with a fresh random footprint.
If the participant detected a collision, he  ips a coin to choose between two pos-
sible actions. If the coin is 1, the participant backs o  and does not continue to
attempt to reserve any slot during this scheduling cycle. If the coin is 0, he tosses
another coin1. If that second coin is 1, he stays in his slot and reserves it again with
a fresh random footprint. Otherwise he randomly picks one of the slots that were
left empty in the previous round (i.e., the ones that produced a zero xor of all foot-
prints) and places a fresh random footprint in the corresponding slot. If no such
empty slot exists, he backs o  for the rest of the scheduling cycle.
In the last round of a cycle, all participants that detected a collision in their slot
in the second but last round, back o  and do not attempt to reserve a slot in the
last round. This leaves the corresponding slots empty in the very last round. When
the schedule is then executed, all empty slots can be skipped as in plain reservation
maps.
Let us return to the example. After the  rst round, participants A, B and E have
successfully reserved slots 7, 4 and 5, respectively. Participants C, D and F know that
their reservation collided with reservation attempts by other participants. Slots 1, 3,
5 and 8 appear empty after the  rst round. Table 5.1b demonstrates the reservation
vector after the second round. Participants D and F have moved away from slot 2
to one of the empty slots, while participant C stayed in the  rst slot. Note that
participants A, B and E placed a fresh footprint in the slots they successfully reserved
during the  rst round. They will continue to generate new footprints each round to
reveal undetected collisions in case they occurred in the previous rounds.
By the end of the scheduling cycle several users hold reservations of slots in the
following message cycle. The actual transfer of user messages in DC-net happens
during this cycle. A message cycle has a maximum of S rounds, the maximum
amount of slots users could reserve during the scheduling cycle.
Combining scheduling cycles andmessage cycles. The short length of a schedul-
ing vector is advantageous since scheduling cycles and message cycles can now be
combined to reduce latency in DC-net. For this, one has to have the number of
scheduling rounds R be equal to (or smaller than) the number of slots S in the
scheduling vector. Then the scheduling vector can be attached as a header to a
1Note that tweaking the bias of these coin tosses is necessary to reach peak performance in large
networks. The pseudocode description of the algorithm in Section 5.3 shows optimal probabilities for
cases where users are allowed to reserve multiple slots.
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message in the message cycle to agree on the schedule of the upcoming message
cycle.
Multiple reservations. The activity rate of the network participants (i.e. the per-
centage of users who want to send data) will depend on the application for which
a DC-net is used; for an anonymous  le sharing application, the activity rate might
hit 100% regularly, while a chat application might have a much lower activity rate
on average. The algorithm that we described up to this point is not well-suited for
networks with a very low activity rate. If there are less than S active participants,
and each of them is allowed to reserve exactly one slot, then the remaining slots
will be unused. This has two disadvantages: On the one hand, it limits the potential
throughput of small, inactive networks. On the other hand, this leaks information
about the number of actively sending participants in the network. If only 4 out of
16 slots are reserved at the end of a scheduling cycle, then it is very likely that there
are exactly 4 actively sending participants.
Both disadvantages can be solved by allowing all participants to reserve up to
S slots. Thus, at the beginning of a scheduling cycle, each participant picks up to
S slots at random, and tries to individually reserve each of them, just as described
above. It is important to note that di erent footprints have to be used for each slot.
Pseudocode description of footprint scheduling.
Pseudocode description of footprint scheduling in Alg. 5.1 and 5.2 shows the ad-
ditional steps that have to be taken in order to allow participants to reservemultiple
slots.
Algorithm 5.2 Procedure for a slot-reservation attempt in footprint scheduling.
procedure SLOTRESERVE(D,F )
VA Ω {{0}B}s
for i from 0 to s≠ 1 do
ifD[i] = 1 then VA[i]Ω F [i]
Broadcast VA through DC-net
Receive V (xor of all individual scheduling vectors) from DC-net
return V
Availability of results. To maximize re-usability of our results, we made the soft-
ware used to produce simulation results publicly available at https://github.com
/25A0/DCnet-simulator.
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5.4 Benchmarks and comparison
This section shows how to optimize the con guration of footprint scheduling, and
compares its performance to the performance of other scheduling algorithms. In
the  rst part of this section, we will very brie y inspect the performance of footprint
scheduling for di erent con gurations in order to  nd optimal parameters. After
that, we will compare its performance to the performance of P tzmann’s scheduling
algorithm and to Chaum’s map-reservation scheduling algorithm.
Choice of parameters. There are three parameters that can be tweaked to mini-
mize scheduling overhead: B, the number of bits per slot, S, the number of slots,
andR, the number of scheduling rounds per scheduling cycle. The scheduling over-
head is measured in terms of the amount of scheduling data that each participant
has to send for each successful reservation that the network achieves. During one
scheduling cycle, each participant will send B · S · R bits of scheduling data. At the
end of the cycle, there will be Sˆ successful reservations. Ideally, all S slots were
successfully reserved, so that Sˆ = S. But Sˆ might also be smaller than S if there
were undiscovered collisions or unused slots in the schedule. Thus, the overhead
O can be measured by
O = S ·R ·B
Sˆ
. (5.1)
Our optimization is mostly based on this formula, and we use simulations to
test how di erent con gurations perform. Schedule convergence is an important
metric for this optimization. A messaging slot has converged if there is at most one
participant who tries to reserve this slot. A schedule has converged if all S slots
have converged. If a slot did not converge by the end of a scheduling cycle, then
no participant can successfully send a message in that slot once the schedule is
executed. It is thus crucial for the throughput of the algorithm that most of the
slots converge.
We will start by minimizingR ·B. Figure 5.3 shows howmany scheduling rounds
are necessary to reach schedule convergence2 for di erent values of B. Increasing
B leads to a decrease in R, but it is easy to see that B · R is minimal for B =
2, regardless of the choice of S. Changing the network size does not a ect this
outcome.
In the previous simulation, the number of participants was  xed. But in order to
determine an optimal value for R in general, we will now look at networks of vari-
2Note that, while it is easy to detect in a simulation whether all collisions have been resolved, it is not
trivial to detect this in practice.
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Figure 5.3: The number of rounds that are necessary to resolve all collisions, for 5000 partic-
ipants and di erent values of B and S.
ous sizes. Figure 5.4 shows the number of scheduling rounds that are necessary to
resolve all collisions forB = 2 bits and various values of S. The number of required
rounds is clearly in uenced by both, the network size and the number of slots. Al-
though schedules converge faster on average when the number of slots is small, it
is not recommended to choose S < R: Similar to P tzmann’s scheduling algorithm,
each message in footprint scheduling depends on the content of the previous mes-
sage. Therefore, the scheduling data needs to be sent in individual packages. For
B = 2, S = 16, these packages will only hold 32 bits of data. When this data is
sent over the Internet, then the TCP-IP header of at least 32 Byte will add a massive
overhead. But if S Ø R, then the current message cycle and the scheduling cycle
for the following schedule can be interleaved as described in Section 5.3. This will
decrease the relative overhead of the TCP-IP header and network delay. For this
reason, we choose S = 32, which requires far less than 32 scheduling rounds, so
that scheduling and message data can be interleaved.
Next, we will inspect the relation between the network size and the number of
scheduling rounds. The dashed blue line in Figure 5.4 shows log(N), with N being
the number of participants in the network. For S = 32, nomore than log(N) rounds
are necessary on average for the schedule to converge. Thus, rather than having
one  xed value forR, we can dynamically determineR based on the current size of
the network.
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Figure 5.4: The number of rounds that are necessary to resolve all collisions for various
numbers of slots and networks of di erent sizes. These results were produced with 2 bit
footprints.
Theoretical comparison.
We provide a comparison Table 5.2 that compares 3 main scheduling methods
discussed in this chapter with footprint scheduling. Let J˜ be an amount of bits the
ciphertext of length J increases after public-key encryptions. Some explanations of
the compared properties:
• Guaranteed sending - indicates if a user is guaranteed to have a slot reserved
after one run of scheduling protocol with no adversaries present.
• Equal throughput - indicates if all users are assigned the same amount of re-
served slots or not. Note, that P tzmann’s algorithm used for collision resolu-
tion provides equal throughput for all sending users. However, as a reserva-
tion method it does not due to possibility of several users choosing the same
slot number to reserve.
• Adopts to load change - indicates if the protocol can adopt to changing number
of active users between two protocol runs to avoid too many empty slots or
too many unsuccessful reservation attempts.
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• Disconnected users - shows if the protocol can handle users disconnecting dur-
ing run of the scheduling protocol. For example, P tzmann’s algorithm would
have to completely restart after a user is dropped out.
• Collisions - describes how collisions during run of the scheduling protocol are
handled.
• Scheduling overhead - demonstrates how much data a single user has to send
in order to reserve a single slot. To simplify estimations, given formulas are
calculated under assumption that there are no collisions and no adversaries
present. In footprint scheduling a user sends BRS amount of data (over R
rounds), that leads to S slot reservation in the ideal case. Thus, for a single
slot reservation, a user has to send BR data. Note, that it di ers from the
formula (5.1) in the assumption that reservation protocol leads to S successful
reservations. According to our performance estimations, one can useR equal
to log(N). In Chaum’s algorithm a user sends once N2 amount data, leading
toA slot reservations in ideal case. Thus, the single slot reservation requires¥
N2
A . After optimization described in Section 5.2.3 the formula becomes¥ 32NA .
Note, optimization comes at the cost of tolerating collisions during message
cycle. In P tzmann’s algorithm each can choose a slot with a number up to
N , however one has to choose a larger modulom = N2 to avoid undetected
collisions when adding up choices of all users. Thus one needs log(N2) bits
to represent each slot number. To avoid choosing same slot number, one has
to multiply N2 with 32 (See Section 5.2.3). In addition to that, each schedule
message is appended with log(N) bits for counting the number of collided
messages. For Dissent protocol we provide simpli ed formula that counts
only large messages sent through the network.
• Hides number of active users - indicates if the protocol allows an external ob-
server to estimate from the scheduling cycle how many users are going to
send in the DC-net.
85
Algorithm 5.1 Footprint scheduling from the perspective of one participant A.
Parameters: Number of footprint bits B, number of participants N , number of
slots S per message cycle
Output: A vector D œ {0, 1}S , indicating for each slot whether it can be used for
sending.
RΩ log(N)
D Ω {1}S Û Vector indicating which slots can be used for sending
f Ω {0, 1}B \ {0}B Û Set of possible footprints
F ΩR fS Û Vector holding footprints for each slot
V Ω SLOTRESERVE(D,F ) Û First round of the scheduling cycle
for i from 1 to R≠ 2 do Û Rounds 1 to R≠ 2
for j from 0 to s≠ 1 do
ifD[j] = 0 then
continue
if V [j] ”= F [j] then Û Reservation attempt failed
c1 ΩR [0, 1) Û Biased coin toss
if c1 < 0.7 then
D[j]Ω 0 Û Back o 
else
c2 ΩR {0, 1}
if c2 = 1 then Û Try same slot again
else Û Empty slot available?
I Ω {sÕ|D[sÕ] = 0 and V [sÕ] = 0}
D[j]Ω 0
if I ”= ÿ then Û Pick empty slot
sÕ ΩR I
D[sÕ]Ω 1
Û Generate new footprints
F ΩR fS
V Ω SLOTRESERVE(D,F )
for j from 0 to s≠ 1 do Û Last round
if V [j] ”= F [j] then
D[j]Ω 0
F ΩR fS
SLOTRESERVE(D,F )
returnD
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Performance comparison.With this con guration, S = 32, R = log(N), B = 2, we
will now show how footprint scheduling performs compared to other scheduling
algorithms. For this, we will show benchmark results for three scenarios: One with
a very high activity rate, as it may occur for torrent downloads and video streaming,
one with a very low activity rate, which could simulate instant-messaging, as well as
two scenarios with intermediate activity rates.
We will compare the performance of footprint scheduling to the performance of
Chaum’s reservationmap, as well as to the performance of P tzmann’s collision res-
olution algorithm. We optimized the ratio between the number of participants and
the number of slots for both algorithms using a series of simulations. We should
note that the scheduling overhead of Chaum’s reservation map depends heavily on
the presence or absence of an estimation of the current activity rate. An abstract
description of an algorithm that can be used to predict the activity rate is given
in [148, pp. 10-11]. But especially in large networks where message cycles can
take multiple minutes, the number of users might change drastically between two
subsequent rounds. This makes it particularly di cult to predict the activity rate
of the following cycle correctly. In our simulation, we measure the performance
of Chaum’s algorithm for the case that there is no estimation of the activity rate.
Note that footprint scheduling is only con gured based on the size of the network;
it does not require an estimate of the number of active users. More details on the
optimization process can be found in Section 5.2.3.
Performance is measured in terms of scheduling overhead, as de ned in the be-
ginning of this section. Note that the size of the message itself is not taken into
account in our simulations because the absolute overhead to reserve a slot is not
a ected by the message size. Also, while P tzmann’s algorithm could be used to
resolve collisions between actual messages, we implement it for the scheduling
purposes, which is in general more e cient for reasonable message sizes.
Before presenting results of simulation, we demonstrate in Table 5.3 theoretical
estimations of scheduling overhead according to the formulas given in Table 5.2 in
Section 5.4. These formulas are valid in case of no collisions, whichmeans that after
completion of the scheduling protocol all slots are reserved successfully. In such
conditions footprint scheduling is advantageous in all considered network sizes.
However, results of simulations show somewhat di erent picture, which we discuss
below.
In our simulations we do not consider the number of participants in the network
to be larger than 10, 000. Signi cantly larger networks are almost always impractical
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Table 5.3: Average scheduling overhead in Bytes (Based on the formulas given in Table 5.2).
Participants
Algorithm 100 200 500 1000 2000 5000 10,000
Footprint (B = 2) 13.29 15.29 17.93 19.93 21.93 24.58 26.58
P tzmann 24.93 27.93 31.9 34.9 37.9 41.86 44.86
Herbivore/Chaum (A = 1%) 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200 3200
Herbivore/Chaum (A = 10%) 320 320 320 320 320 320 320
Herbivore/Chaum (A = 50%) 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Herbivore/Chaum (A = 100%) 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
because the amount of message data that is produced by the entire network grows
quadratically with the number of participants.
Figure 5.5 shows the performance of the three scheduling algorithms in net-
works with di erent activity rates. The scheduling overhead of both, P tzmann’s
algorithm and footprint scheduling, scale with the activity rate of the network. The
overhead of Chaum’s reservation maps increases with a decrease in the network’s
activity rate, since the available slots cannot be used as e ciently. Chaum’s algo-
rithm does, however, o er the lowest scheduling overhead for large networks. In
theory, P tzmann’s algorithm o ers a scheduling overhead in large, active networks
that is similar to what Chaum’s reservation maps achieves, but we will address in
Section 5.6 why P tzmann’s algorithm is not practical in large networks.
In a network where the activity rate and the network size do not change drasti-
cally, the scheduling overhead can be minimized by choosing either Chaum’s reser-
vation maps or P tzmann’s algorithm, depending on the exact characteristics of the
network.
However, in a dynamic network where network size and activity rate change
over time, footprint scheduling gives a better overall performance: While the ac-
tivity rate is low, the network can bene t from the reduced scheduling overhead
that footprint scheduling o ers. In large networks and in networks with a very high
activity rate, footprint scheduling still adds a slight increase in the scheduling over-
head, compared to Chaum’s reservation maps.
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Figure 5.5: The overhead of all three scheduling algorithm in networks with di erent activity
rates.
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5.5 Disruptions and footprint scheduling
Recall that disruptions are collisions that are intentionally induced by a denial-of-
service attacker or a participant who attempts to increase his transmission band-
width on the cost of the bandwidth of other participants. In this section we brie y
describe a possible protection against an attacker who attempts to disrupt the
scheduling phase of footprint scheduling.
The literature describes two approaches to cope with disruption in DC-net. The
 rst approach is to open up messages of participants after (suspected) disrup-
tion [83, 58, 318] and thus reveal which participants did not behave according to the
protocol. The second approach is to use zero-knowledge proofs [156, 93, 94, 139].
Our technique follows the  rst approach since it does not require any of the
two computationally-secure variants of DC-net introduced in [156]. Additionally,
scheduling messages can be opened without compromising anonymity of partici-
pants. This holds if the opened schedule is afterwards discarded and if the sending
rates are constant, so sending wishes of a particular participant cannot be learned.
The idea is to use a PRNG with a secret seed for all randomness that is required
for footprint scheduling (i.e., slot positions, footprints and random choice to stay in
a slot or back o ). To prevent cheating, users are obliged to commit to the seed.
Note that this is an obvious choice also for e ciency reasons. To protect against
disrupters, each participant uses a new random seed for every scheduling cycle
and commits to this seed before scheduling.
Whenever the decision is made to open a scheduling cycle, each participant
publishes the seed used for this cycle. These seeds are checked against the com-
mitments and then the scheduling vectors of each round are recomputed and com-
pared with the scheduling vectors that were previously obtained from the DC-net
output. Note, keys and messages output by each individual participant are not
opened and veri ed at this stage. If these recomputed scheduling vectors match,
all participants followed the rules. If not, at least one of the participants did not
follow the protocol. In order to  nd the disrupter, all participants reveal their keys
used in the scheduling phase. To prevent disrupters from wrongly accusing honest
participants by revealing an incorrect key, one can enforce that participants also
commit to those shared keys in advance.
Such a technique provides performance improvements when the scheduling al-
gorithm has a certain chance of undetected collisions (Footprint, Herbivore) for the
following reason. Undetected collisions during the scheduling cycle lead to colli-
sions during the message cycle. How can one e ciently distinguish an honest colli-
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sion of messages due to such a problem and a disruption? Traps (non-meaningful
messages that can be opened with no harm to anonymity) will not be helpful to
answer this question for every single case of messages colliding. Opening of keys
and rounds is too costly for such a check, ideally one would want to apply heavy
methods only if it is known that there is a disrupter. Our method allows to perform
a quick and e cient check if there was a disruption or not by opening only seeds
used for generating footprints, and only after that decide if to open the scheduling
cycle, which involves opening keys shared between users and verifying if individual
outputs were made correctly.
5.6 Conclusion. Advantages of footprint scheduling
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the main advantages of the
footprint algorithm.
As mentioned earlier, footprint scheduling inherits from the reservation-map al-
gorithm. In particular, footprint scheduling involves no computational overhead for
participants. The algorithm improves on reservation maps by reducing the proba-
bility of undetected collisions in the reservation vector. In networks with very high
activity rate the cost for this improvement can be a very slight increase in schedul-
ing overhead, depending on how many undetected collisions the reservation-map
algorithm accepts. If message collisions are prohibitive or if the network does not
have a very high activity rate, footprint scheduling noticeably reduces the scheduling
overhead compared to reservation maps. For details see Section 5.4.
Further, unlike superposed receiving andMPC-based scheduling protocols, foot-
print scheduling naturally handles events of participants joining or leaving the DC-
net during the schedule negotiation. When a participant disconnects, his reserva-
tion slot will appear free in the next round. Any participant that is in the process
of resolving a collision can now move to this slot. Thus, footprint scheduling re-
allocates slots that become available, even in the middle of a schedule cycle. At
the same time footprint keeps scheduling and message cycles short, which permits
fast joining to the network. That in turn improves anonymity, allowing potentially a
bigger anonymity set in the new cycle.
When using Chaum’s reservation map, a good estimate of the network’s activity
rate is necessary in order to optimize the scheduling overhead (for details, see Sec-
tion 5.4). With footprint scheduling, the success chance of a reservation attempt
automatically increases if fewer participants bid for a slot in the next message cy-
92
cle. Senders will be able to reserve a slot in fewer attempts if the activity of other
participants goes down, and it will take more attempts if other participants become
more active. This makes it unnecessary to estimate the activity rate.
Just like P tzmann’s scheduling algorithm, footprint scheduling is an interactive
protocol, in the sense that each message in the protocol depends on the content
of the previous one. For P tzmann’s algorithm, the protocol is completed after
A successive messages, where A is the number of active network participants. In
the case of footprint scheduling, the protocol is completed after S successive mes-
sages, where S π A for large networks, as we showed in Section 5.4. In practice,
network latency alone can be a major obstacle to complete a protocol of A mes-
sages in a large network. The following example shows a best-case scenario for a
network with 10, 000 active participants: Assume that all participants live in major
US cities. In this case, the average latency between them will be about 33ms on
average at the time of this writing8. Thus, there will be a delay of at least 66ms be-
tween each message. With 10, 000 active participants, this means that the protocol
is completed after 10, 000 · 66ms = 660s = 11min.
Recall that P tzmann’s scheduling protocol cannot be completed if a participant
leaves before the protocol is completed. It is impractical to demand that not a
single participant must leave the network over a period of 11 minutes, especially
when some participants are connected via personalmobile devices like a phone or a
laptop. Footprint scheduling does not su er from this problem since each protocol
run is completed much faster, but also since the protocol can be completed even if
users disconnect from the network.
Footprint scheduling is also advantageous due to the fact that it hides the num-
ber of actively sending users in the network from an eavesdropping adversary. Such
information can serve as a marker of upcoming social events; for example, the Tor
network showed largely increased activity just before the Arab Spring9.
One of the advantages of DC-net over Mix-nets (and onion routing) is that it
hides the number of actively sending users due to the fact that all the users have to
contribute to the network in order to facilitate anonymous sending. Unfortunately,
previous e cient scheduling protocols either allow to estimate the number of ac-
tive users by counting the number of empty slots in the scheduling messages, or
they require to know the number of active users to operate.
Footprint scheduling disguises the number of active users as long as each user
is allowed to reserve multiple slots. Even very small networks, the number of free
8http://ipnetwork.bgtmo.ip.att.net/pws/network_delay.html
9http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=816
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slots does not give away the number of active users. An internal observer can gain
a rough estimate of the number of active users over a longer period, based on the
number of collisions that they experience. However, for an external observer, it
is impossible to determine reliably whether there is a collision in any of the slots,
since footprints change with every round. Further, for an external observer it is
impossible to estimate if there were collisions in any of the slots since footprints
change from round to round even if there were no collisions. In footprint scheduling
the number of slots as well as discussion rounds does not change with the number
of active users. Altogether, this prevents estimation of actively sending participants
if footprint scheduling is used.
Last but not least, footprint scheduling has an advantage over other map reser-
vation protocols due to fast and e cient method of verifying if a collision in mes-
sage cycle was caused by an undetected collision in scheduling cycle or by a disrup-
tion. For details, see Section 5.5.
94
Chapter 6
Elligator: Elliptic-curve points
indistinguishable from
uniform random strings
6.1 Introduction
The motto of the German colonial empire of 19th century “Wissen ist Macht, ge-
ographisches Wissen ist Weltmacht” (Knowledge is power, geographical knowl-
edge is world power) can be transformed to an up-to-date version: “Knowledge
is power, restricting knowledge is world power”. A recent study shows, that out of
74 countries 39 perform some degree of censoring of Internet access [177]. The
study is performed by the OpenNet Initiative that collected data in the period be-
tween 2007 and 2012 (years of data collection di er by country). News of the last
years [323], [221], [219], [26] indicate, that the situation likely became only worse.
Censoring is not performed solely by governments. Companies and public or-
ganizations widely adopt content-control software to restrict access to information
that goes beyond what is requested by government [252], [164], [307]. Especially
dangerous, when it is used by search engines [238].
Censorship circumvention tools.Non-surprisingly the current situation lead to an
active use of censorship circumvention tools. For example, as statistics collected by
GlobalWebIndex [329] demonstrates, 1 in 4 of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) users
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in 2016 access this kind of service to bypass censoring. Another popular tool is the
widely used anonymous communication system called Tor1 [113].
Censorship circumvention is the very useful “side-e ect” of Tor and other anony-
mous communication systems. They help bypassing a censor who is maintaining a
blacklist of forbidden IP addresses and denies all requests to them. When a user is
sending a message to such an IP address through the anonymous communication
system, the censor does not observe the IP address from the blacklist, but an IP
address of one of the nodes of the anonymous communication system itself. This
prevents  ltering out user requests by their destination addresses.
The quality of communication freedom protection by anonymous communica-
tion systems can be judged by the fact that a large number of countries are either
discussing [230] or have already decided to block usage of anonymous communi-
cation systems, in particular Tor [305].
Authorities come up withmore andmore ways to block popular bypassing tools,
and Tor is no exception. Its users base is estimated to be larger than 2 million users
each single day2. During social events the active number of users can signi cantly
grow, as it happened just before the Arab Spring [330]. This starts a non-stopping
arms-race: new ways to block anonymous communication are invented, new ways
to bypass restrictions are presented as a response. The cycle goes on [13].
Encryption is helpful against  ltering based on the keywords performed using
inspection of the content of the network messages using deep-packet inspection
(DPI) hardware. It prevents packets to be suppressed based on their content alone.
Another approach to  ltering using DPI is blocking of speci c protocols: authorities
distinguish characteristic patterns in the tra c and correlate it with typical patterns
of undesired protocols.
In response to that scienti c and activists communities come up with more and
more elaborate ways to keep usage of Tor undetected (so called “pluggable trans-
port” [306]). Pluggable transport reshapes tra c to match some allowed protocol,
for example Skype. For this to work, one adds another layer of encryption (superen-
crypt), which itself can be detected if protocol to mimic is using di erent type of en-
cryption or no encryption at all. One has to note, that encrypted tra c itself already
has been a target to blocking by governments [68], [284] and organizations [307].
Elliptic-curve cryptography and censorship circumvention. Elliptic-curve cryp-
tography (ECC) is arguably the most important tool in modern public-key cryptog-
1https://www.torproject.org
2https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html
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raphy. It provides public-key encryption, signatures, non-interactive key exchange,
and many higher-level security features. It o ers an attractive combination of high
security, high speed, and (often critical for deployment) small space consumption.
However, for applications in censorship circumvention, ECC has a security prob-
lem. ECC protocols naturally send elliptic-curve points in the clear as long-term pub-
lic keys, ephemeral public keys, ciphertext pre xes, challenges, etc. These points,
even in compressed form, are obvious: they are easy to distinguish from uniform
random strings.
There have been some ad-hoc workarounds for this problem, notably for ElGa-
mal ciphertext pre xes, using a curve-or-twist technique introduced by Möller (see
Section 6.3.2). But each new ECC-based protocol faces the same problem. Protocol
designers unaware of the issue continue building protocols that are trivially visible
to attackers. Designers requiring keys and ciphertexts to be indistinguishable from
uniform are forced to modify those protocols, hoping that the modi cations do not
compromise other forms of security.
The main goal of this work is to eliminate this problem. The solution presented
here works for a wide range of elliptic-curve protocols, essentially every protocol in
which the transmitted curve points are generated at random. There is no longer
any need for, e.g., ad-hoc handling of ciphertext pre xes; this chapter’s technique
works for all of the types of elliptic-curve points mentioned above.
6.2 Preliminaries
Elliptic curves (EC) were introduced to cryptography independently by Miller [227]
and Koblitz [196] and since then became widespread. The main advantage gained
by using ECC in public-key cryptography is the drastically smaller size of a key com-
pared to public-key systems based on arithmetic in  nite- eld groups. The di er-
ence of the key sizes according to recommendations of Ecrypt II Yearly Report on
Algorithms and Keysizes for 2011-2012 [291] is the following. An EC key of 256-bit
size corresponds to 3248-bit RSA key, both having 128-bit security, whichmeans that
the best known attack to recover plain text will have complexity 2128.
Elliptic curves in Weierstrass form. An elliptic curve E(Fq) de ned over a  nite
 eld Fq is a group of points (x, y) described by an equation of a form
E(Fq) : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6 , (6.1)
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where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 œ Fq and (x, y) œ Fq ◊ Fq , the discriminant   ”= 0, and
an additional point at in nity O. This curve is said to be in Weierstrass form. It is
smooth, which means it has no points at which two or more distinct tangent line
exist thanks to the condition  ”= 0. The discriminant is calculated as follows:Y_________]_________[
  = ≠d22d8 ≠ 8d34 ≠ 27d26 + 9d2d4d6
d2 = a21 + 4a2
d4 = 2a4 + a1a3
d6 = a23 + 4a6
d8 = a21a6 + 4a2a6 ≠ a1a3a4 + a2a23 ≠ a24 .
(6.2)
The short Weierstrass equation is capable of describing all ECs de ned over large
prime  elds [96]. In fact, this curve form is often used to de ne standardized curves,
for example NIST curves [241] or Brainpool curves [60]. An elliptic curve de ned
over a  eld Fq has the following short Weierstrass equation:
y2 = x3 + ax+ b , (6.3)
where a, b œ Fq and (x, y) œ Fq ◊ Fq , the characteristic of the  eld Fq char(Fq) ”=
2, 3 and the curve is smooth, that is,  = 4a3 + 27b2 ”= 0.
The set of points on an EC together with a point at in nity i.e. E = {(x, y) : y2 =
x3 + ax+ b} ﬁ {O} has an abelian group structure with the following group law:
1. The point at in nity O is the identity element.
2. The inverse of a point P = (x, y) œ E(Fq) is the point≠P = (x, ≠y) œ E(Fq).
3. Adding points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), where P ”= ±Q, gives a point
that is on the curve P +Q = (x3, y3) calculated as
⁄ = y1 ≠ y2
x1 ≠ x2
x3 = (⁄)2 ≠ x1 ≠ x2 and y3 = ⁄(x1 ≠ x3)≠ y1 .
4. Doubling a point P = (x1, y1) gives a point that is on the curve and is calcu-
lated as
⁄ = 3x
2
1 + a
2y1
x3 = (⁄)2 ≠ 2x1 and y3 = ⁄(x1 ≠ x3)≠ y1 .
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The presented addition formula is not complete, because it has exceptional
points, that have to be handled di erently. The new complete addition formulas
for prime order elliptic curves can be found in [272].
Montgomery curves. Montgomery form of elliptic curves was introduced in [229]
to speed up the Pollard and Elliptic Curve Methods of integer factorization. Mont-
gomery form of elliptic curves over a  eld Fq with char(Fq) ”= 2 is:
E(Fq) : by2 = x3 + ax2 + x , (6.4)
where b(a2 ≠ 4) ”= 0, a, b œ Fq and (x, y) œ Fq ◊ Fq .
The group law of a Montgomery curve is de ned as follows:
1. The point at in nity O is the identity element.
2. The inverse of a point P = (x, y) œ E(Fq) is the point≠P = (x, ≠y) œ E(Fq) .
3. Adding points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), where P ”= ±Q, gives a point
that is on the curve P +Q = (x3, y3) calculated as
⁄ = y2 ≠ y1
x2 ≠ x1
x3 = b⁄2 ≠ a≠ x1 ≠ x2 and y3 = ⁄(x1 ≠ x3)≠ y1 .
.
4. Doubling a point P = (x1, y1) gives a point that is on the curve and is calcu-
lated as
⁄ = 3x
2
1 + 2ax1 + 1
2by1
x3 = b⁄2 ≠ a≠ 2x1 and y3 = ⁄(x1 ≠ x3)≠ y1 .
.
Elliptic curves in Edwards form. The Edwards form of elliptic curve was introduced
in 2007 by Edwards [122], and proposed for ECC by Bernstein and Lange [49]. This
form facilitates fast implementations of curves interesting for cryptographic appli-
cations due to fewer multiplications required for their group operation than the
other popular curve forms [46], [49].
The equation for an Edwards curve currently used in cryptography and pre-
sented below (see (6.5)) is due to Bernstein and Lange [49]. An Edwards curve is
de ned over a  eld Fq with char(Fq) ”= 2 by the equation:
E(Fq) : y2 + x2 = 1 + dx2y2 , (6.5)
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where d œ Fq\{0, 1}, (x, y) œ Fq ◊ Fq .
The group law of Edwards curves is strongly uni ed, which enables resistance
to some simple side-channel attacks. Strongly uni ed means that addition law also
handles point doubling, making two operations hard to distinguish. If d is a non-
square in Fq , then the addition law is complete and the curve is called complete
Edwards curve [49, Theorem 3.3], which means that there are no exceptional points.
The group law is de ned as follows:
1. The identity element is the point (0, 1).
2. The inverse of a point P = (x, y) œ E(Fq) is the point≠P = (≠x, y) œ E(Fq) .
3. Adding points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) gives a point that is on the curve
P +Q = (x3, y3) calculated as
P +Q = ( x1y2 + y1x21 + dx1x2y1y2
,
y1y2 ≠ x1x2
1≠ dx1x2y1y2 ) . (6.6)
Group order. The group order of an elliptic curve group de ned over Fq is the
number of Fq-rational points on this curve. Fq-rational points are points with coor-
dinates in Fq. Further in the text they are refereed to as points for simplicity. An
estimate of the number of points on an elliptic curve over a  nite  eld Fq is given
by the Hasse’s theorem on elliptic curves. Let the number of points on a curve be
denoted as#E(Fq). Then the Hasse’s theorem states:
#E(Fq) = q + 1≠ t, where |t| Æ 2Ôq . (6.7)
Alternatively, the number of points on E(Fq) is within the interval q+1≠2Ôq Æ
#E(Fq) Æ q + 1 + 2Ôq. Because 2Ôq is very small relative to q,#E(Fq) ¥ q.
If char(Fq) divides t, then the curve is called supersingular, otherwise the curve is
called ordinary or non-supersingular. Supersingular curves are used in pairing-based
cryptography [197], otherwise one choses non-supersingular curve to prevent pair-
ing attacks and still can maintain e cient arithmetic [105, p. 169], [92, p. 289, p.
530].
Twists. An elliptic curve E de ned over Fq has an associated twist EÕ when EÕ is
isomorphic to E over the algebraic closure of Fq. If EÕ is isomorphic to E over a
quadratic extension of Fq , it is called a quadratic twist.
Quadratic twists of Weierstrass curves have an equation:
y2 = x3 + ar2x+ br3 , (6.8)
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where r œ Fq is a quadratic non-residue. This means that there is no integer x œ
(0, q) such that the equation x2 = r(mod q) has a solution.
Quadratic twist of Montgomery curves has the following equation:
b
r
y2 = x3 + ax2 + x , (6.9)
where r œ Fq is a quadratic non-residue.
Quadratic twist of Edwards curves have the following equation [45]:
y2 + ax2 = 1 + dx2y2 , (6.10)
where a œ Fq\{0} .
Decisional Di e-Hellman assumption. The decisional Di e-Hellman (DDH) prob-
lem is one of the three problems often used for proving security of EC cryptosys-
tems, the other two are the computational Di e-Hellman problem and gap Di e-
Hellman problem.
Let cyclic group G have prime order q and generator P . Let a, b and c be chosen
randomly and uniformly from the set {1, . . . , q ≠ 1}. The DDH problem requires
to decide if cP = abP or not. The cryptosystem is said to be DDH secure if these
is no such probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A for G that for a  xed security
parameter ⁄ and su ciently large n has the following advantage:
|Pr[A(P, aP, bP, abP ) = “true”]≠ Pr[A(P, aP, bP, cP ) = “true”]| > 1
n⁄
.
6.3 De ning the problem
6.3.1 Distinguishers
We use the standard NIST P-256 elliptic curve as an example to illustrate the di cul-
ties. A public key on the NIST P-256 elliptic curve is a pair (x, y) of integers satisfying
the equation y2 = x3 ≠ 3x+ bmodulo the prime 2256 ≠ 2224 +2192 +296 ≠ 1, where
b is a standard constant. There are at least three obvious ways for an attacker to
distinguish this public key from a uniform random string:
• Least severe: Normally x and y are represented as integers between 0 and
2256≠2224+2192+296≠2 inclusive, encoded as 256-bit strings. If the attacker
sees a 256-bit string representing an integer larger than 2256 ≠ 2224 + 2192 +
296 ≠ 2 then the attacker knows that the string is not a valid value of x or of y.
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If the attacker sees a user sending a series of (e.g.) 235 256-bit strings, and the
largest string is close to 2256 ≠ 2224, then the attacker is reasonably con dent
that the user is sending curve points. See Section 6.4.6 for details.
One can dismiss this attack as being too slow to be of interest, but we prefer
more robust cryptographic primitives that maintain security with heavy use.
The user can cover all integers between 0 and 2256 ≠ 1 by randomizing the
representations of small integers x and y, but this adds very little security:
the attacker easily collects statistics showing that some integers appear half
as often as others.
A secure solution is to randomly represent x and y as integers between 0 and,
e.g., 2320 ≠ 1. Another secure solution, with smaller keys, is to switch to an
elliptic curve using a prime much closer to a power of 2, such as NIST P-224
(prime 2224≠296+1, lower security level) or Bernstein’s Curve25519 from [43]
(prime 2255 ≠ 19).
• More severe: The attacker simply checks the curve equation. If a 512-bit string
has the form (x, y)where y2 = x3≠3x+bmodulo this prime then the attacker
is con dent that the user is sending a public key.
Many ECC systems save space by compressing y to one (random-looking) bit:
the sign in ±Ôx3 ≠ 3x+ b. Some ECC systems save space by eliminating y
entirely. The cost for the legitimate user of computing a square root is almost
always outweighed by the bene t of reducing keys to half size. Both of these
mechanisms have the side e ect of stopping this attack.
• Most severe: The attacker checks whether x3≠ 3x+ b is a square modulo this
prime. This has chance 1/2 of occurring for a uniform random string, but if
it occurs repeatedly then the attacker is reasonably con dent that the user is
sending public keys.
The third attack is di cult to stop. Our solution requires a quite drastic change in
how curve points are represented as strings; this representation is the main topic
of this work.
Our solution is not limited to public keys: it also protects other randomly gen-
erated elliptic-curve points, such as the points appearing in ciphertexts in elliptic-
curve versions of the ElGamal encryption system and points appearing in signature
systems. See Section 6.4.
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6.3.2 Previous work
Several years ago, in [228], Möller proposed a variant of the ElGamal encryption
system that provides indistinguishability for ciphertexts as follows:
• Alice’s public key is a pair (aP, aÕP Õ) where a and aÕ are secret integers, P is a
standard base point on an elliptic curve E(F2n) over some binary  eld F2n ,
and P Õ is a standard base point on a nontrivial quadratic twist EÕ(F2n) of the
same curve.
• To encrypt a message m using public key (aP, aÕP Õ), Bob chooses a random
integer b, chooses randomly between aP and aÕP Õ, sends the x-coordinate of
bP or bP Õ respectively, hashes b(aP ) or b(aÕP Õ) respectively to obtain a secret
key, and sends an encryption ofm using this secret key.
• Alice recovers bP or bP Õ from the x-coordinate. Alice multiplies bP or bP Õ
by a or aÕ to obtain abP or aÕbP Õ, hashes it to obtain the same secret key,
and decrypts the message. Möller requires Alice to perform tests to decide
whether the input is on E or on EÕ and to recover the whole point bP or bP Õ.
We comment that the “Montgomery ladder” handles both cases together if
aÕ is chosen as a. (For Montgomery-ladder background see [229], [66], and,
for the binary case, [217].) This eliminates the need for such tests and o ers
e cient curve arithmetic.
The idea in Möller’s proposal is that each element of F2n is a valid x-coordinate on
E or its twist. The x-coordinate sent here can therefore be any element of F2n , and
in fact the distribution of the x-coordinates is indistinguishable from the uniform
distribution of n-bit strings. Möller slightly adjusts the choices so that the distribu-
tion is exactly uniform.
Young and Yung present in [328] a modi ed version of Möller’s twist idea to
achieve DDH security in the standard model. In their version Alice’s public key con-
sists ofM points on each curve; Bob picks one of the curves and computes shared
secrets with allM points on that curve. The shared key of lengthM is derived taking
just one bit per DH shared secret.
Our approach encodes points on a single curve as strings indistinguishable from
uniform random strings. This has several obvious advantages over Möller’s sys-
tem. We obtain indistinguishability not just for ciphertexts but also for public keys.
Möller’s system has double-length public keys, while our public keys have minimal
length. Möller’s approach is limited to ElGamal encryption, while our approach han-
dles a much wider range of ECC systems; see Section 6.4. Möller needs crypto-
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graphic security not just for E but also for EÕ; in our system twist security - a re-
quirement of having a large prime dividing the number of points on the quadratic
twist of the curve - is not required. We still suggest it as a desirable feature (see Sec-
tion 6.6). Since our proposal does not need to work with twists, achieving solutions
in the standard model can be done simply using the standard methods.
6.3.3 Application context
Möller’s curve-or-twist approach is used in StegoTorus [320]. StegoTorus is an ex-
tension to Tor [113] for censorship circumvention. It makes Tor tra c resemble
Skype, general HTTPS tra c, etc. and relies on secure communication with a Ste-
goTorus server. Establishing a link with this server requires deriving temporary key
material using the public key of the server. This keymaterial is used to encrypt com-
munication of a subsequent ephemeral DH key exchange. StegoTorus uses Möller’s
example parameters over F2163 .
For comparison, typical ECC protocols carry out a DH key exchange in the clear;
see, e.g., the ntor example below. StegoTorus needs to encrypt its key exchange
because the points sent in the key exchange are easily distinguishable from uni-
form random data. This encryption adds the outer Möller layer, doubling the space
used for the initial communication. This also slows down the client, slows down the
server, doubles the size of server public keys (one point on the curve, one point on
the twist), and requires implementations to handle computations on two curves.
We eliminate all of these issues by solving the underlying problem, namely the
point distinguishability. The points that we send in a DH key exchange are indistin-
guishable from uniform random strings. See Sections 6.4, 6.5, and 6.7.
Telex [326] is another censorship-circumvention tool. Telex messages pose as
regular TLS messages to random uncensored sites; the only di erence is that the
nonce  eld contains a cryptographic value instead of a random value. The public
key of the Telex server is a pair of points (aP, aP Õ), with P on an elliptic curveE(Fq)
and P Õ on a nontrivial quadratic twist. Telex servers use deep-packet inspection on
all tra c passing through them and identify Telex messages by checking whether
the nonce  eld interpreted as –||— satis es the following conditions. Interpret –
as the x-coordinate of a point R on E or EÕ and compute aR on the appropriate
curve. Identify the message as a Telex message if — matches a salted hash of aR,
and route it according to some other, encrypted information.
The use of curves in Telex follows Möller’s proposal except for the choice of
 nite  eld and the choice of equal secrets. The proposed parameters have q =
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2168≠ 28≠ 1 so that the distribution of values in Fq is indistinguishable from that of
length-168 strings. The attempted decryption performs a complete point recovery
from x and uses standard Weierstrass-curve arithmetic to compute the scalar mul-
tiplications. We emphasize again that the “Montgomery ladder” is more e cient,
handling both cases together. We also comment that the system could use some-
what larger  nite  elds, gaining security, without reducing the 56-bit hash size and
without going beyond the standard TLS 224-bit nonce size: servers would allow only
points R with a  xed number of implicit trailing zeros, and clients would repeatedly
generate points until meeting that condition.
This chapter’s solution to the point-distinguishability problem would not save
bandwidth for Telex connections but would still simplify implementations, removing
any need to handle the twist, and would reduce public keys to half size, potentially
a useful feature for small clients keeping track of many di erent Telex servers.
As a third protocol we consider ntor [150], a handshake protocol proposed for
Tor achieving anonymity and one-way authentication with forward secrecy. This
protocol assumes that Tor relays have public keys on an elliptic curve. The following
is a simpli ed version of the ntor protocol, skipping certi cates and saved session
states, but presenting all parts relevant to the choice of curve group and representa-
tion. To extend a Tor circuit to a relay with public keyB = bP a client picks a random
value x, computes X = xP , and sends X to the server. The server picks a random
y, computes Y = yP , computes two secret keys as kÕ||k = H(yX, bX,B,X, Y ) for
some hash functionH , computes tB = MACkÕ(B,X, Y ) (an authenticator under key
kÕ), and sends Y ||tB to the client. The client computes k¯Õ||k¯ = H(xY, xB,B,X, Y )
and veri es that tB = MACk¯Õ(B,X, Y ). If the veri cation is successful, the client
is convinced that it is communicating with the correct server: nobody other than
the client and the relay could compute xB = bX . Both sides can use k = k¯ for
transmitting encrypted messages.
Tor currently uses SSL links to superencrypt its tra c. However, one can easily
imagine ntor being steganographically encoded inside a covert channel, with the
goal of circumventing censorship, on top of the original goals of anonymity, one-
way authentication, and forward secrecy. This raises the question of how the curve
points can be hidden. Using a pair of points xP, xP Õ in place of X does not work:
it is even easier to distinguish from uniform than a single point. Möller’s curve-or-
twist approach, using a pair of points in place of the server’s long-term key B, also
does not work: the client is free to pick X on the curve or the twist, but the server
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is then forced to pick Y on the same curve as X , and this is something visible to a
censor.
Our solution applies straightforwardly to this protocol. It does not need twists;
it ensures that the encodings of points on a single curve are uniformly distributed.
More generally, our solution can be used to encode as many points as desired dur-
ing one session or across sessions.
Our solution is also useful for several earlier applications: password-
authenticated key exchange [59], ID-based encryption [56], pseudorandom-number
generation [185, 186], and kleptography [328]. Note that [328] includes a treatment
of covert channels and steganography, predating both StegoTorus and Telex.
6.3.4 Mapping strings to elliptic-curve points
Shallue and van de Woestijne at ANTS 2006 [288] gave a positive answer to the fol-
lowing question in pure algorithmic number theory: there is, provably, a (very easy)
probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that, given any elliptic curve E over any suf-
 ciently large  nite  eld Fq , constructs a nonzero element of the group E(Fq); is
there, provably, a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for the same task? Shal-
lue and van de Woestijne did more than construct a single point: they built a func-
tion „ : Fq æ E(Fq) such that each element of E(Fq) has at most C preimages,
for a particular constant C; and they built a deterministic polynomial-time algo-
rithm that computes „(t) given q, E, and t. Trying C + 1 elements of Fq produces a
nonzero element of E(Fq).
Some cryptographic protocols rely on hashing strings to curve points. For exam-
ple, in the Boneh–Franklin identity-based encryption scheme [56], public keys are
points on pairing-friendly curves, and a user with identity i has public key H(i).
Boneh and Franklin constructed a suitable function H for certain supersingular
curves. Icart at Crypto 2009 [176] pointed out that the Shallue–van de Woestijne
function „ produced suitable functionsH for any elliptic curve, allowing the Boneh–
Franklin system to be adapted to much more e cient non-supersingular (but still
pairing-friendly) curves. Icart and subsequent authors explored various replace-
ments „ for the Shallue–van de Woestijne function; see [176], [65], [136], [135],
[128], [137], [133], and [129].
The reader should be wondering why one cannot simply de ne „(t) by trying
consecutive  eld elements x starting from t (for example, trying x = t, x = t +
1, x = t + 2, etc. in the prime- eld case) until  nding a curve point (x, y). The
answer for Shallue and van deWoestijne is that this is not proven to take polynomial
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time. On the other hand, there is overwhelming evidence for the conjecture that
this takes polynomial time, and in cryptography there is no harm in making such
a conjecture; cryptography is built on a foundation of conjectures that are much
easier to question, such as the conjecture that there is no fast ECDL algorithm.
This simple function from Fq to E(Fq) is exactly what is used in many papers on
identity-based cryptography.
The real objection to this algorithm is that it does not take constant time. In
many applications the time leaks secret information. One can compute the same
function for almost all inputs in constant time by choosing an upper bound C on
the number of consecutive  eld elements required with very high probability, say
C = 100, and then always testing exactly C values of x; but testing C times for
squares turns out to be a performance bottleneck.
It should be obvious that any of the functions „mentioned above allows a public
key „(t) œ E(Fq) to be represented as an element t œ Fq , using a computation of
Q ‘æ {t : „(t) = Q} to encode a point and a computation of t ‘æ „(t) to decode a
point. However, this approach raises several important performance issues for key
generation:
• The usual key-generation method produces a uniform random curve point
by scalar multiplication, but there is no reason to think that this curve point
can be expressed in the form „(t). If it cannot then the user must try again,
generating a new key.
• Even worse, to generate a uniform distribution of elements t œ Fq the
user must generate a uniform random curve point Q, compute the num-
ber k = #{t : „(t) = Q} of preimages of the point, restart with probability
1 ≠ k/C , and  nally select a uniform random preimage of the point. (This is
what statisticians call “rejection sampling”; more advanced sampling methods
are inapplicable since there is no way to generate a uniform random curve
point with a speci ed value of k.) The average number of points generated
is then C#E(Fq)/q ¥ C. Applications that need real-time guarantees must
budget for even more than C.
• Each of these C points takes time for not just a computation of Q but also
a computation of {t : „(t) = Q}. This is the main bottleneck if „ is slow to
invert.
In many protocols, ephemeral ECC keys are generated for every protocol run, and
these computations can easily dominate the overall protocol performance. Of
107
course, even in protocols where key generation is rare, each use of t incurs the
cost of computing „(t).
6.3.5 Our contributions
We propose two ways to minimize these performance problems: Elligator 1 and El-
ligator 2. Elligator 1 takes an encoding function „ that is implicit in the paper [133]
by Fouque, Joux, and Tibouchi. This function, in the cases we consider, maps
{0, 1, 2, 3, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2} injectively to E(Fq); see Theorem 11. Since the number of
points on E over Fq is about q we have to try only about 2 points on average before
 nding a point of the form „(t), and we do not need to randomize the preimage t.
Not every elliptic curve is suitable for this function, but the curve requirements for
Elligator 1 are compatible with state-of-the-art criteria for curve security and curve
performance.
Fouque, Joux, and Tibouchi suggested that injectivity would be useful for a
naive form of ElGamal encryption in which a message m is encoded injectively
as an elliptic-curve point and then simply added to abP . We highlight the new
anti-censorship application, namely encoding points as strings rather than encod-
ing strings as points; we drastically simplify the de nition of this function, while
accelerating its forward and inverse computation; and we introduce a high-security
high-speed elliptic curve that supports the function. See Section 6.6 for the curve,
Section 6.5 for the function, and Section 6.4 for the cryptographic applications.
Elligator 2 introduces a new injective map Â to elliptic curves. Elligator 2 has
similar performance characteristics to Elligator 1. The main advantage of Elligator 2
is that it applies to more curves: in fact, every odd-characteristic elliptic curve that
has a point of order 2, except for curves of j-invariant 1728. See Section 6.7 for this
new map.
6.4 Elliptic-curve protocols
This section presents various elliptic-curve protocols in which public keys, cipher-
texts, etc. are indistinguishable from uniform random strings. These protocols in-
clude all of the fundamental ECC constructions: static and ephemeral key exchange,
encryption, and signatures.
The prerequisite for all of these protocols is an injective map ÿ from a set of
strings S ™ {0, 1}b to an elliptic-curve group E(Fq). We require#S to be very close
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to 2b, so that a uniform random element of S is indistinguishable from a uniform
random b-bit string; see Section 6.4.6. We have two di erent methods to construct
ÿ and S, as mentioned above; see Sections 6.5 and 6.7.
The idea, as explained in Section 6.1, is for each string · œ S to represent the
curve point ÿ(·), i.e., for the point ÿ(·) to be encoded as the string · . A uniform
random element of ÿ(S), encoded in this way, is indistinguishable from a uniform
random b-bit string. We do not require ÿ(S) to be all of E(Fq); our protocols com-
pensate for this by repeatedly generating curve points until  nding elements of
ÿ(S). For our constructions #ÿ(S) is about (1/2)#E(Fq), requiring only about 2
repetitions on average, as mentioned in Section 6.1.
Our primary objective in this section is to illustrate how easily ÿ can be used to
systematically hide elliptic-curve points in a wide range of protocols. We do not
mean to suggest that all of these protocols are being used in contexts where they
need to be hidden from censors; but there is no obvious dividing line between
protocols that would be useful for those contexts and protocols that would not.
Consider, for example, static ECDH public keys. A static public key might be
distributed openly, as part of a cryptographic software package, in which case it
does not add any new risk of censorship; changing the encoding of the public key
does nothing to hide the package from a censor. On the other hand, if a client
already has all necessary cryptographic software, and a server broadcasts a series
of static public keys by encoding those keys inside otherwise innocent web pages or
other cover tra c, then indistinguishability from uniform is exactly the tool needed
to defend those public keys against a censor with an accurate model of the cover
tra c. A censored Tor client should be able to see frequent updates of public keys
for Tor bridges, for example; see [13] for a detailed discussion of the speed at which
various governments detect and suppress access to Tor bridges.
6.4.1 Notation and domain parameters
To simplify the protocol statements we assume that the elliptic-curve group E(Fq)
is cyclic: speci cally, that it is generated by a standard base point P of order n. In
the case that n is not prime (for example, n is 4 times a prime in Section 6.6) we
do not restrict points to a prime-order subgroup: any proper subgroup is trivially
distinguishable from the full group. For non-cyclic groups the protocols would have
to be modi ed to handle multiple generators.
Let H denote a hash function, and let || denote concatenation of strings. Sym-
metric authenticated encryption of a messageM using a secret key k is denoted as
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c = Enck(m), decryption asm = Deck(c). A standard security requirement for sym-
metric encryption is that the ciphertexts are indistinguishable from uniform (see,
e.g., [32]); one can, for example, safely use AES in counter mode. For authenti-
cation there is a split in the literature between authenticators aiming at the “PRF”
property, which guarantees indistinguishability, and authenticators aiming merely
at the “MAC” property, which guarantees unforgeability but does not guarantee in-
distinguishability; we require the PRF property. See [276] for a uni ed security no-
tion for authenticated encryption that guarantees indistinguishability from uniform
random bit strings.
6.4.2 Long-term Di e–Hellman keys
Each user U sets up a public key:
1. U generates a random integer u.
2. U computes PU = uP . If PU /œ ÿ(S) then U repeats from step 1.
3. U publishes ÿ≠1(PU ) = ·U and keeps u secret.
The encoding ·U of the public key is a string which can be broadcast; it is indistin-
guishable from a random string.
Without further communication users Alice and Bob can compute a shared se-
cret from their public strings ·A and ·B . Alice can compute this key as follows and
then use it to authenticate and encrypt a message to Bob:
1. Alice computes ÿ(·B) = PB .
2. Alice computes k = H(uAPB).
Upon receiving an encrypted message from Alice, Bob can likewise compute the
same shared secret and then decrypt the message and verify the authenticator:
1. Bob computes ÿ(·A) = PA.
2. Bob computes k = H(uBPA).
6.4.3 ElGamal encryption
Assume uB and PB = uBP is a static key pair of Bob and that Bob has published
·B = ÿ≠1(PB). Alice wants to send Bob a messageM . To encrypt the message she
performs the following steps:
1. She generates a random integer r.
2. She computes the point R = rP . If R /œ ÿ(S) she repeats from step 1.
3. She computes ÿ≠1(R) = ·R.
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4. She computes PB = ÿ(·B).
5. She computes the shared key value k = H(rPB).
6. She encrypts messagem using key k: c = Enck(m).
7. She sends the tuple (·R, c) as an encryption ofm.
To decrypt the received message, Bob:
1. computes ÿ(·R) = R,
2. computes the same shared key value: k = H(uBR), and
3. decrypts the message: m = Deck(c).
ElGamal encryption also appears in [133] as an application of an injective map
between strings and curve points, but our application is completely di erent from
the application in [133]. There is a critical di erence in the underlying encryption
methods: we use symmetric cryptography to encrypt the message m using a key
derived from rPB , whereas [133] adds rPB to a curve point M that represents m.
This is exactly where [133] uses an injectivemap, namely to encode the stringm as a
curve pointM . Note, however, that this also (1) prevents [133] from encrypting long
messages and (2) allows malleability, in violation of the basic security standards for
public-key encryption. We instead use the standard “KEM/DEM” structure [98] to
provide secure public-key encryption, and as a consequence do not need to encode
strings as curve points. We use an injective map for a completely di erent reason:
we encode curve points as strings, preventing those points from being recognized
by censors.
6.4.4 Short-term Di e–Hellman keys
In this protocol, Alice and Bob agree on a shared secret without using long-term
keys. This protocol is important as a way to provide forward secrecy. Of course,
this provides no authentication, but authentication can be added as a subsequent
layer.
1. Alice and Bob generate short-term keys as follows:
(a) Generate a random integer r.
(b) Compute point R = rP . If R /œ ÿ(S) repeat from step 1a.
2. Alice sends µA = ÿ≠1(RA) to Bob; Bob sends µB = ÿ≠1(RB) to Alice.
3. Alice decodes RB = ÿ(µB); Bob decodes RA = ÿ(µA).
4. Alice computes the shared key value k = H(rARB); Bob computes the same
k asH(rBRA).
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6.4.5 Schnorr signatures
Assume that uB and PB = uBP are respectively private and public keys of Bob,
where PB œ ÿ(S) and Bob has published ·B = ÿ≠1(PB). To sign a message m, Bob
performs the following steps:
1. Choose a random integer r.
2. Compute R = rP . If R /œ ÿ(S), repeat from step 1.
3. Compute · = ÿ≠1(R).
4. Compute h = H(· ||·B ||m).
5. Compute s = r + huB (mod n).
6. The signature is the tuple Â = (·, s).
The integer smust be encoded so as to be indistinguishable from uniform; see
Section 6.4.6.
To verify the signature (·, s), Alice performs the following steps:
1. Compute PB = ÿ(·B).
2. Compute R = ÿ(·).
3. Compute h = H(· ||·B ||m).
4. Compare R+ hPB and sP . If they are equal, accept. Otherwise, reject.
Schnorr’s original signature system actually sent (h, s). We follow “EdDSA” from
[47] in sending an encoding of (R, s); security is the same, since one can reconstruct
(h, s) from (R, s) and vice versa. The advantage of (R, s) is that it allows batching,
making signature veri cation about twice as fast, as explained in [47]. Our use of ÿ
makes this signature indistinguishable from a uniform random string.
We also follow EdDSA in including the public key ·B in the hash. Robert Ransom
has pointed out that if the public key is omitted from the hash then an attacker
who does not know it can calculate it by  rst computing h and then computing
(sP≠R)/h, and as a consequence can see that two signatures come from the same
public key. Ransom has also suggested a di erent way of hiding signatures from
someone who does not know ·B : namely, encrypting the signatures with a secret-
key cipher keyed by a hash of ·B . Of course, indistinguishability is unachievable
against an attacker who does know ·B : the attacker can simply verify the signature.
The second argument for including the public key ·B in the hash is that it pro-
vides security against attacks focused on breaking several public keys instead of
one. Recent paper by Bernstein [44] points out an error in the proof in [142] show-
ing no decrease in security in classical Schnorr scheme if attacker focuses on keys
of several users. Instead, a new proof is presented in [44] demonstrating that the
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security of Schnorr scheme in multi-key scenario with a public key inserted into the
hash (key-pre xed variant of the Schnorr’s signature) is close to the security of the
classical Schnorr scheme with only one targeted public key.
We encode R as · both for transmission and for input to H . We could safely
switch to a di erent encoding for input to H . In particular, we could use the same
encoding used in EdDSA. This would make our signatures compatible with EdDSA
signatures: anyone could convert an EdDSA signature into a signature of our form
and vice versa.
6.4.6 Detecting di erences from uniform
These protocols transmit uniform random elements of S. Usually S is not the set of
all b-bit strings, so uniform random elements of S are not exactly uniform random
b-bit strings. This is not a security problem if#S is very close to 2b; we now analyze
quantitatively what “very close” means.
Consider a channel that normally sends k independent uniform random b-bit
strings. A user modi es the channel to instead transmit k independent uniform
random elements of S. The censor’s goal is to take action against the modi ed
channel without taking action against the original channel.
The obvious strategy for the censor is to take action if and only if all of the
b-bit strings are elements of S. This has no false negatives, but it produces a
false positive whenever k independent uniform random b-bit strings happen to all
be elements of S. If #S = 2b ≠ ” then a false positive occurs with probability
(#S/2b)k = (1 ≠ ”/2b)k ¥ exp(≠k”/2b). This strategy maximizes the di erence in
action probability between the original and modi ed channels; hence Sk is indistin-
guishable from ({0, 1}b)k when k”/2b is small.
Consider, for example, the NIST P-256 set S =)
0, 1, 2, . . . , 2256 ≠ 2224 + 2192 + 296 ≠ 2*, with b = 256. Here ” ¥ 2224. If the
censor sees k = 235 sessions then k”/2b ¥ 8 so the censor will take action for the
original channel with probability only about exp(≠8) ¥ 0.000335. This may be an
acceptable level of collateral damage.
As a second example illustrating the importance of the ratio k”/2b, consider a
set S of size 2256≠ ” where ” Æ 2160. This time a censor seeing k Æ 264 sessions has
k”/2b Æ 2≠32 so the probability is larger than 0.99999999; i.e., the censor will take
action against practically every channel.
The encodings that we consider for elements of E(Fq) typically have#S = (q+
1)/2. In each of our recommended examples, #S is between 2b ≠ 2b/2 and 2b,
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so k”/2b Æ k/2b/2. The probability di erence is therefore negligible until k, the
number of strings transmitted, grows to a noticeable fraction of 2b/2. This cannot
be a concern when E(Fq) is chosen to resist standard discrete-logarithm attacks:
those attacks take time only about 2b/2.
We also encode integers modulo n = #E(Fq) as strings in Section 6.4.5. By
Hasse’s theorem, n is within 2Ôq of q + 1, so if q is very close to 2b+1 then n is also
forced to be very close to 2b+1. Note that taking q slightly below 2b+1 does not force
n to be below 2b+1; for n > 2b+1 we still use a (b + 1)-bit encoding, restarting the
protocol in Section 6.4.5 in the extremely unlikely case that an integer is 2b+1 or
larger.
6.4.7 Active attacks
Censors can try replacing random-looking strings by other strings (possibly strings
outside S) to see whether this has any visible e ect. Presumably this replacement
will disrupt communication, but protocol designers and implementors must take
care to ensure that this replacement does not allow the censor to detect communi-
cation.
We brie y point out an attack against the password-authenticated key-exchange
protocol of [59]; this attack is not in the censorship context, but it illustrates both the
value of avoiding twists and the di culty of protecting against active attacks. In the
protocol of [59], Alice sends an encryption (using a shared password as a secret key)
of either a point on a curve or a point on the twist of the curve; indistinguishability is
important here for the ciphertext to avoid leaking information. Bob sends back two
points, one on the curve and one on the twist; information is carried by the point
on the same curve used by Alice, while the other point is random. Our attack is to
actively rerandomize one of the two points sent by Bob. If this point is on the same
curve then Alice aborts; if this point is not on the same curve then Alice does not
notice and communication continues. This information leak allows the attacker to
exclude half of all possible passwords, and repeating the attack allows the attacker
to quickly  nd the right password.
6.5 Elligator 1: The injective map
Section 6.4 needs an injective map ÿ from a large set S of strings to E(Fq). Elligator
1 is one choice of ÿ; Elligator 2, introduced in Section 6.7, is another choice of ÿ. This
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section presents the mathematical details of Elligator 1: the construction of ÿ, how
to compute ÿ, how to test whether a curve point is in the image of ÿ, and how to
invert ÿ on curve points in the image. To help the reader visualize the mathematical
structure of ÿ we include a picture as Figure 6.1.
We impose certain requirements on q and E for Elligator 1: we consider only
primes q; we require q to be congruent to 3 modulo 4; we require E to be a com-
plete Edwards curve; and we impose an extra algebraic requirement (c = 2/s2 in
Theorem 9) that allows only half of all complete Edwards curves. Approximately
1/16 of all isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over all  nite  elds satisfy these
requirements. (Asymptotically 100% of all  nite  elds, ordered by size, are prime
 elds; 50% of those primes are congruent to 3modulo 4; 25% of elliptic curves over
those  elds are complete Edwards curves; 50% of those satisfy the extra algebraic
requirement.) See Section 6.6 for speci c choices of q and E.
The heart of ÿ is a function „ : Fq æ E(Fq) de ned in Theorem 9 and Def-
inition 9. This function satis es „(t) = „(≠t) for each t œ Fq but has no other
collisions (see Theorem 10), so its restriction to {0, 1, 2, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2} is injective.
Theorem 11 simply de nes S as {0, 1, 2, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2} represented in little-endian
form as b-bit strings, where b = Âlog2 qÊ, and de nes ÿ as the corresponding rep-
resentation of „. For indistinguishability we add the requirement that (q + 1)/2 be
extremely close to 2b.
Asmentioned in Section 6.1, this function „was introduced by Fouque, Joux, and
Tibouchi in [133]. Our main contributions in this section are a much more concise
de nition of „; much more direct proofs of the relevant properties of „; a simple
method to invert „; and a simple test for whether a curve point is in the image of „.
The function ≠„ has the same useful properties as „. Our choice of sign is not
the same as the choice in [133]: in the notation below, the ratio is ‰(c), i.e., ‰(2).
This choice of sign slightly simpli es our formulas for the forward and inversemaps,
although it is not the main simpli cation compared to [133]. We also comment that
„(t) = ≠„(1/t) for t ”= 0.
Computing ÿ in a sensible way is almost as fast as traditional point decom-
pression, not a serious bottleneck compared to scalar multiplication. Inverting ÿ
is slightly slower, but testing whether a curve point is in the image of ÿ is very fast.
See Section 6.5.5 for further performance analysis.
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Figure 6.1: The structure of our encoding function ÿ≠1, a bijection from a large subset of
E(Fq) to a large set S of b-bit strings. The elliptic curve E is required to be a complete
Edwards curve, shown on the left together with a sample element P = (x, y) of E(Fq). A
sample b-bit output is shown on the right. See Theorems 9, 10, and 11 and De nition 9 for
further details regarding the function in the middle.
6.5.1 Squares, square roots, and ‰
Fix a prime power q © 3 (mod 4). In de ning ÿ we consider only primes q for sim-
plicity (so that 0, 1, 2, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2 are distinct  eld elements) but our „ theorems
also apply to prime powers.
De ne ‰ : Fq æ Fq by ‰(a) = a(q≠1)/2. If a is a non-zero square then ‰(a) =
1; if a is a non-square then ‰(a) = ≠1; if a = 0 then ‰(a) = 0. Note that (q ≠
1)/2 is odd since q © 3 (mod 4), so ‰(≠1) = ≠1, so ≠1 is not a square. More
generally, ‰(‰(a)) = ‰(a). There are several easy ways to manipulate ‰ arguments:
for example, ‰(ab) = ‰(a)‰(b), ‰(1/a) = ‰(a) = 1/‰(a) if a ”= 0, and ‰(a2) = 1 if
a ”= 0.
If a is a square then a(q+1)/4 is a square root of a: its square is a(q+1)/2 = ‰(a)a =
a. More precisely, a(q+1)/4 is the principal square root of a: the unique square root
that is a square. Any square root b of a satis es b = ‰(b)a(q+1)/4.
The function ‰ is called a quadratic character. See [214] for further back-
ground on  nite  elds.
6.5.2 The map
Theorem 9. Let q be a prime power congruent to 3 modulo 4. Let s be a nonzero
element of Fq with (s2 ≠ 2)(s2 + 2) ”= 0. De ne c = 2/s2. Then c(c≠ 1)(c+ 1) ”= 0.
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De ne r = c+ 1/c and d = ≠(c+ 1)2/(c≠ 1)2. Then r ”= 0, and d is not a square.
The following elements of Fq are de ned for each t œ Fq \ {±1}:
u = (1≠ t)/(1 + t),
v = u5 + (r2 ≠ 2)u3 + u,
X = ‰(v)u,
Y = (‰(v)v)(q+1)/4‰(v)‰
!
u2 + 1/c2
"
,
x = (c≠ 1)sX(1 +X)/Y,
y = (rX ≠ (1 +X)2)/(rX + (1 +X)2) .
Furthermore x2+y2 = 1+dx2y2; uvXY x(y+1) ”= 0; and Y 2 = X5+(r2≠2)X3+X .
Proof. c(c ≠ 1)(c + 1) ”= 0: By de nition c = 2/s2 so c ”= 0. By hypothesis s2 ”= 2
and s2 ”= ≠2 so c ”= 1 and c ”= ≠1.
r ”= 0: If r = 0 then c = ≠1/c so c2 = ≠1, contradiction.
d is not a square: Otherwise ≠1 = d(c≠ 1)2/(c+1)2 is a square, contradiction.
u is de ned and u ”= 0: By hypothesis 1 + t ”= 0 and 1≠ t ”= 0.
v ”= 0: r2 ≠ 2 = c2 + 1/c2 so v = u(u2 + c2)(u2 + 1/c2). If v = 0 then there are
three possibilities: u = 0, contradiction; or u2+c2 = 0 so≠1 = (u/c)2, contradiction;
or u2 + 1/c2 = 0 so ≠1 = (uc)2, contradiction.
XY ”= 0, so x is de ned: As above u2 + 1/c2 ”= 0 so all factors inX and Y are
nonzero.
1+X ”= 0, so x ”= 0: IfX = ≠1 then u = ≠‰(v) so v = ≠‰(v)(1+ r2≠2+1) =
≠‰(v)r2 so ‰(v) = ≠‰(v), contradiction.
(X,Y ) satis es Y 2 = X5+(r2≠2)X3+X: X = ‰(v)u soX5+(r2≠2)X3+
X = ‰(v)(u5 + (r2 ≠ 2)u3 + u) = ‰(v)v. Also ‰(v)v is a square so (‰(v)v)(q+1)/2 =
‰(v)v so Y 2 = ‰(v)v.
rX + (1 +X)2 ”= 0, so y is de ned: If rX = ≠(1 +X)2 then (r2 + 4r)X2 =
X4 ≠ 2X2 + 1 so
Y 2 = X(X4 + (r2 ≠ 2)X2 + 1) = X3(2r2 + 4r)
= rX ·X2(2r + 4) = ≠(1 +X)2X2(s+ 2/s)2
so ≠1 is a square, contradiction.
y+1 ”= 0: If y = ≠1 then (rX≠(1+X)2)/(rX+(1+X)2) = ≠1 so rX≠(1+X)2 =
≠(rX + (1 +X)2) so rX = 0, contradiction.
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x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2: First (c≠ 1)2s2 = (c≠ 1)2(2/c) = 2(r ≠ 2) so
Y 2(1≠ x2) = Y 2 ≠ (c≠ 1)2s2X2(1 +X)2
= X5 + (r2 ≠ 2)X3 +X ≠ 2(r ≠ 2)X2(1 +X)2
= X(rX ≠ (1 +X)2)2.
Similarly≠d = (c+2+1/c)/(c≠2+1/c) = (r+2)/(r≠2) so≠d(c≠1)2s2 = 2(r+2)
so
Y 2(1≠ dx2) = Y 2 ≠ d(c≠ 1)2s2X2(1 +X)2
= X5 + (r2 ≠ 2)X3 +X + 2(r + 2)X2(1 +X)2
= X(rX + (1 +X)2)2.
Note that Y 2(1≠dx2) ”= 0, and divide: (1≠x2)/(1≠dx2) = (rX≠ (1+X)2)2/(rX+
(1 +X)2)2 = y2; i.e., x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2.
De nition 9. In the situation of Theorem 9, the decoding function for the complete
Edwards curve E : x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 is the function „ : Fq æ E(Fq) de ned as
follows: „(±1) = (0, 1); if t /œ {±1} then „(t) = (x, y).
6.5.3 Inverting the map
Theorem 10. In the situation of De nition 9:
1. If t œ Fq then the set of preimages of „(t) under „ is {t,≠t}.
2. „(Fq) is the set of (x, y) œ E(Fq) such that
• y + 1 ”= 0;
• (1 + ÷r)2 ≠ 1 is a square, where ÷ = y ≠ 12(y + 1) ; and
• if ÷r = ≠2 then x = 2s(c≠ 1)‰(c)/r.
3. If (x, y) œ „(Fq) then the following elements X¯, z, u¯, t¯ of Fq are de ned and
„(t¯) = (x, y):
X¯ = ≠(1 + ÷r) + ((1 + ÷r)2 ≠ 1)(q+1)/4,
z = ‰
!
(c≠ 1)sX¯(1 + X¯)x(X¯2 + 1/c2)",
u¯ = zX¯,
t¯ = (1≠ u¯)/(1 + u¯) .
Proof. Statement 1 of the theorem has two parts: a forward statement „(t) =
„(≠t), and a reverse statement that there are no other preimages. Statement 2
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also has two parts: a forward statement that any (x, y) œ „(Fq) satis es certain
conditions, and a reverse statement that any element of E(Fq) satisfying those
conditions is in „(Fq). We organize the proof as (A) forward 1; (B) 3, forward 2, and
reverse 1; (C) reverse 2.
A. Fix t œ Fq. We now show that „(t) = „(≠t). This is the forward part of
statement 1 in the theorem.
If t œ {±1} then „(t) = (0, 1) = „(≠t) by de nition. Assume from now on that
t /œ {±1}.
De ne u, v,X, Y, x, y from t as in Theorem 9. Then „(t) = (x, y) by de nition.
Put tÕ = ≠t, and de ne uÕ, vÕ, X Õ, Y Õ, xÕ, yÕ the same way from tÕ. Then „(tÕ) =
(xÕ, yÕ). The proof strategy is to compare successively uÕ to u, vÕ to v, etc., concluding
that xÕ = x and yÕ = y.
uÕ = (1≠ tÕ)/(1 + tÕ) = (1 + t)/(1≠ t) = 1/u.
vÕ = uÕ5+(r2≠2)uÕ3+uÕ = 1u5 +(r2≠2) 1u3 + 1u , so vÕu6 = u+(r2≠2)u3+u5 = v;
i.e., vÕ = v/u6. Note that ‰(vÕ) = ‰(v) since ‰(u6) = 1.
XÕ = ‰(vÕ)uÕ = ‰(v)/u = 1/(‰(v)u) = 1/X since ‰(v) = 1/‰(v).
yÕ = rX
Õ≠(1+X Õ)2
rX Õ+(1+X Õ)2 =
r 1X≠(1+ 1X )2
r 1X+(1+ 1X )2
= rX≠(X+1)
2
rX+(X+1)2 = y.
Y Õ = (‰(vÕ)vÕ)(q+1)/4‰(vÕ)‰
!
uÕ2 + 1/c2
"
. This takes the most work; the  rst and
third factors each need careful analyses. The second factor is easy: ‰(vÕ) = ‰(v) as
above.
First factor: ‰(vÕ)vÕ = ‰(v)v/u6. Note that the product ‰(u)u3 is a square
and is therefore the principal square root of u6; i.e., (u6)(q+1)/4 = ‰(u)u3. Hence
(‰(vÕ)vÕ)(q+1)/4 = (‰(v)v/u6)(q+1)/4 = (‰(v)v)(q+1)/4‰(u)/u3.
Third factor: Recall that v = u(u2+ c2)(u2+1/c2) and that ‰(a) = ‰(ab2) for any
b ”= 0. Thus
‰
!
uÕ2 + 1/c2
"
= ‰
!
c2u4(uÕ2 + 1/c2)(u2 + 1/c2)2
"
= ‰
!
u2(c2 + u2)(u2 + 1/c2)2
"
= ‰
!
uv(u2 + 1/c2)
"
.
Now multiply to obtain Y Õ = Y ‰(u)‰(uv)/u3 = Y/(‰(v)u)3 = Y/X3. Finally
xÕ = (c≠ 1)sX Õ(1 +X Õ)/Y Õ = (c≠ 1)s 1
X
3
1 + 1
X
4?
Y
X3
= (c≠ 1)sX(1 +X)/Y = x.
Hence „(≠t) = (xÕ, yÕ) = (x, y) = „(t) as claimed.
B. Fix t œ Fq , and de ne (x, y) = „(t). We show that X¯, z, u¯, t¯ in the theorem
are de ned and that t¯ œ {t,≠t}, so „(t¯) = (x, y); this is statement 3 in the theorem.
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We also show the forward part of statement 2: namely, y + 1 ”= 0; (1 + ÷r)2 ≠ 1 is
a square, where ÷ = (y ≠ 1)/(2(y + 1)); and if ÷r = ≠2 then x = 2s(c ≠ 1)‰(c)/r.
We also show the reverse part of statement 1: there are no preimages of „(t) other
than t and ≠t.
The de nition of „ has two cases: if t œ {1,≠1} then (x, y) = (0, 1); if t /œ {1,≠1}
then u, v,X, Y, x, y are de ned in Theorem 9. Note that in the second case x ”= 0 by
Theorem 9, so in particular t is not a preimage of (0, 1).
In the  rst case y + 1 = 2 ”= 0; ÷ = 0; (1 + ÷r)2 ≠ 1 = 0 is a square; X¯ = ≠1;
z = 0; u¯ = 0; and t¯ = 1 œ {t,≠t}. As noted above, 1 and ≠1 are the only preimages
of (0, 1).
What remains is the second case. Here y + 1 ”= 0 by Theorem 9. The equation
y = (rX≠(1+X)2)/(rX+(1+X)2) impliesX2+(2+r(y≠1)/(y+1))X+1 = 0, i.e.,
X2+2(1+÷r)X+1 = 0. Note that this forces the discriminant 4(1+÷r)2≠4 to be a
square; i.e., (1+÷r)2≠1 is a square. Divide byX to see thatX+1/X = ≠2(1+÷r).
If ÷r = ≠2 then (X ≠ 1)2 = 0 so X = 1 so u œ {±1}; the case u = ≠1 forces
1≠t = ≠(1+t), contradiction, so u = 1 and t = 0; so v = r2, so Y = (r2)(q+1)/4‰(1+
1/c2) = ‰(r)r‰(r/c) = r‰(c), so x = 2(c≠1)s‰(c)/r as claimed; also note for future
reference that y = (r ≠ 4)/(r + 4), i.e., „(0) = (2(c≠ 1)s‰(c)/r, (r ≠ 4)/(r + 4)).
De ne tÕ = ≠t, and de ne uÕ, vÕ, X Õ, Y Õ, xÕ, yÕ as in Part A of this proof. Then
X Õ = 1/X , soX +X Õ = ≠2(1 + ÷r).
By construction 1+÷r+X¯ is a square root of (1+÷r)2≠1; i.e., X¯2+2(1+÷r)X¯+
1 = 0. Now (X¯≠X)(X¯≠X Õ) = X¯2≠ (X+X Õ)X¯+XX Õ = X¯2+2(1+÷r)X¯+1 = 0
so X¯ = X or X¯ = X Õ. This forces u¯ = u or u¯ = uÕ, since the de nition of z turns out
to match ‰(v) and ‰(vÕ):
• If X¯ = X then (c ≠ 1)sX¯(1 + X¯) = xY so z = ‰!x2Y (X2 + 1/c2)" =
‰(Y )‰
!
X2 + 1/c2
"
. Note that (‰(v)v)(q+1)/4 is a square and ‰
!
u2 + 1/c2
"
=
‰
!
X2 + 1/c2
"
, so ‰(Y ) = ‰(v)‰(X2 + 1/c2), so z = ‰(v), so u¯ = ‰(v)X = u,
so t¯ = t.
• If X¯ = X Õ then similarly z = ‰(vÕ), u¯ = uÕ, and t¯ = tÕ = ≠t.
To summarize, t¯ œ {t,≠t}, so „(t¯) = (x, y).
The same logic also shows that there are no preimages p of (x, y) except for t
and ≠t. Indeed, if (x, y) = „(p) then substituting p for t in the same proof shows
that t¯ œ {p,≠p}, so p œ )t¯,≠t¯* = {t,≠t}.
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C. Fix (x, y) œ E(Fq). Assume that y+1 ”= 0; that (1+÷r)2≠1 is a square, where
÷ = (y ≠ 1)/(2(y + 1)); and that if ÷r = ≠2 then x = 2s(c≠ 1)‰(c)/r. We now show
that (x, y) œ „(Fq). This is the reverse part of statement 2 of the theorem.
If x = 0 then (x, y) = (0,±1) from the curve equation; but y + 1 ”= 0, so (x, y) =
(0, 1) = „(1) œ „(Fq) as claimed. Assume from now on that x ”= 0.
If y = 1 then x = 0 from the curve equation, contradiction. Hence y ”= 1; i.e.,
÷ ”= 0.
De neX = ≠(1 + ÷r) + ((1 + ÷r)2 ≠ 1)(q+1)/4. As above 1 + ÷r +X is a square
root of (1+÷r)2≠1, soX2+2(1+÷r)X+1 = 0. This quadratic equation has several
consequences. First, X ”= 0. Second, rX + (1 +X)2 ”= 0: otherwise subtract to see
that (1 ≠ 2÷)rX = 0, so 1 = 2÷, so y ≠ 1 = y + 1, contradiction. Third, X ”= ≠1:
otherwise ÷ = 0, contradiction. Fourth, y = (rX ≠ (1 +X)2)/(rX + (1 +X)2).
If X = 1 then y = (r ≠ 4)/(r + 4); also ÷r = ≠2 so by assumption x = 2s(c ≠
1)‰(c)/r so (x, y) = „(0) œ „(Fq). Assume from now on thatX ”= 1.
Observe that
(rX + (1 +X)2)2(1≠ y2)
= (rX + (1 +X)2)2 ≠ (rX ≠ (1 +X)2)2
= 4rX(1 +X)2.
Recall that ≠d = (r + 2)/(r ≠ 2) and similarly observe that
(rX + (1 +X)2)2(1≠ dy2)
= (rX + (1 +X)2)2 + r + 2
r ≠ 2(rX ≠ (1 +X)
2)2
= (2r/(r ≠ 2))(X4 + (r2 ≠ 2)X2 + 1).
Note that 1≠ dy2 ”= 0 since d is not a square. Divide:
x2 = 1≠ y
2
1≠ dy2 =
2(r ≠ 2)X2(1 +X)2
X5 + (r2 ≠ 2)X3 +X .
De ne Y = (c≠ 1)sX(1 +X)/x. Then
Y 2 = (c≠ 1)2s2X2(1 +X)2/x2
= 2(r ≠ 2)X2(1 +X)2/x2
= X5 + (r2 ≠ 2)X3 +X.
De ne z = ‰
!
Y (X2 + 1/c2)
"
. Both Y andX2 + 1/c2 are nonzero, so z œ {±1}.
De ne u = zX . Then u œ {±X}. Note that u ”= ≠1, sinceX /œ {±1}.
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De ne v = u5 + (r2 ≠ 2)u3 + u. Then v = z(X5 + (r2 ≠ 2)X3 + X) = zY 2,
so ‰(v) = ‰(z) = z. Hence X = ‰(v)u and Y 2 = ‰(v)v. Furthermore ‰(v) =
z = ‰
!
Y (X2 + 1/c2)
"
= ‰
!
Y (u2 + 1/c2)
"
, so ‰(Y ) = ‰(v)‰
!
u2 + 1/c2
"
, so Y =
(‰(v)v)(q+1)/4‰(v)‰
!
u2 + 1/c2
"
.
Finally de ne t = (1 ≠ u)/(1 + u). Then t /œ {±1} and u = (1 ≠ t)/(1 + t). The
formulas for u, v,X, Y, x, y in Theorem 9 are all satis ed, so (x, y) = „(t) œ „(Fq)
as claimed.
6.5.4 Encoding as strings
Theorem 11. In the situation of De nition 9, assume that q is prime, and de ne
b = Âlog2 qÊ. De ne ‡ : {0, 1}b æ Fq by ‡(·0, ·1, . . . , ·b≠1) =
q
i ·i2i. De ne
S = ‡≠1({0, 1, 2, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2}). De ne ÿ : S æ E(Fq) as follows: ÿ(·) = „(‡(·)).
Then#S = (q + 1)/2; ÿ is an injective map from S to E(Fq); and ÿ(S) = „(Fq).
Proof. First 2b Æ q so the integers 0, 1, . . . , 2b ≠ 1 are distinct in Fq; hence ‡ is injec-
tive. Furthermore 2b > q/2 so {0, 1, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2} is a subset of )0, 1, . . . , 2b ≠ 1*;
hence each of 0, 1, . . . , (q≠1)/2 has a preimage under ‡, and S has exactly (q+1)/2
elements.
If ÿ(·) = ÿ(· Õ) then „(‡(·)) = „(‡(· Õ)), so ‡(·) = ±‡(· Õ) by Theorem 10; but
‡(·) and ‡(· Õ) are both in {0, 1, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2}, so ‡(·) = ‡(· Õ), so · = · Õ. Hence ÿ
is injective.
Each element of ÿ(S) has the form „(‡(·)) and is therefore in „(Fq). Conversely,
if P œ „(Fq) then P = „(t) for some t œ Fq , so also P = „(≠t) by Theorem 10. At
least one of t,≠t is in {0, 1, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2}, i.e., in ‡(S), so P is in „(‡(S)) = ÿ(S).
6.5.5 Performance analysis
The de nitions of u, v,X, Y, x, y in Theorem 9 involve divisions by 1 + t, c, Y , and
rX + (1 + X)2. The reciprocal of c is trivially precomputed, and the other divi-
sions are easily replaced by a few multiplications: one simply stores  eld elements
as fractions, i.e., works in projective coordinates. There are several easy ways to
reduce the number of multiplications: for example, factor u5 + (r2 ≠ 2)u3 + u as
u(u2 + c2)(u2 + 1/c2), and reuse u2 + 1/c2 in computing Y .
The main bottlenecks are then the following exponentiations: computing ‰(v)
(used repeatedly); computing ‰
!
u2 + 1/c2
"
; computing (‰(v)v)(q+1)/4, the principal
square root of ‰(v)v; and computing a  nal division if the output (x, y) is needed in
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a ne coordinates instead of projective coordinates. The only essential exponenti-
ation is for the square-root computation: the ‰ computations and division can use
Euclid’s algorithm (blinded to protect against timing attacks) rather than exponenti-
ation.
Similar comments apply to inverting „ (or ÿ). There is one essential exponentia-
tion, the square-root computation to obtain X¯ in Theorem 10. There are also two
exponentiations that can be replaced by Euclidean computations: one ‰ computa-
tion to obtain z, and one division to obtain the  nal output t¯. Fractions eliminate
the initial division by 2(y+1), but fractions cannot be used for t¯, since the goal is to
obtain the unique string representing t¯.
It is easier to test, given (x, y) œ Fq ◊ Fq , whether (x, y) œ „(Fq) (i.e., whether
(x, y) œ ÿ(S)) without inverting „. One  rst checks x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2 to verify
(x, y) œ E(Fq), if this is not already known. Then, by Theorem 10, (x, y) œ „(Fq) if
and only if the following three conditions are satis ed:
• y + 1 ”= 0;
• (1+ ÷r)2≠ 1 is a square, where ÷ = (y≠ 1)/(2(y+1)); i.e., r(y≠ 1)(r(y≠ 1)+
4(y + 1)) is a square;
• if ÷r = ≠2 (equivalently, if r(y ≠ 1) = ≠4(y + 1)) then x = 2s(c≠ 1)‰(c)/r.
This requires a few multiplications and one ‰ computation.
6.6 Construction of a suitable elliptic curve for Elliga-
tor 1
This section introduces a new high-security high-speed elliptic curve, called
Curve1174, that supports the injective map presented in Section 6.5. In partic-
ular, this section speci es Curve1174; presents the criteria that we used to con-
struct Curve1174; and analyzes the extent to which various previous curves meet
the same criteria.
Curve1174 illustrates state-of-the-art criteria for choosing elliptic curves. It is
compatible with Elligator 1, and is also compatible with the new map Elligator 2 in-
troduced in the next section. It is even more concisely expressible than the existing
Curve25519 [43] curve.
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We do not mean to suggest that users of Curve25519 are required to switch to
Curve1174 to take advantage of this paper. Curve25519 is fully compatible with
Elligator 2.
6.6.1 The curve
Curve1174 is the Edwards curve x2 + y2 = 1 ≠ 1174x2y2 over the  eld Fq , where
q is the prime number 2251 ≠ 9. The coe cient ≠1174 is a non-square in Fq , so
Curve1174 is a complete Edwards curve by [49, Theorem 3.3]: the sum of any two
points (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) in Curve1174(Fq) is3
x1y2 + y1x2
1≠ 1174x1x2y1y2 ,
y1y2 ≠ x1x2
1 + 1174x1x2y1y2
4
,
with no divisions by 0 and no exceptional cases. The neutral element of the curve
is (0, 1).
To see that we have the desired injective map, note that q is congruent to 3
modulo 4; de ne s as the element
18064941211227179925228040535007972296
48438766985538871240722010849934886421
ofFq (split onto two lines here for readability); de ne c = 2/s2; and de ne d = ≠(c+
1)2/(c ≠ 1)2. Then d = ≠1174. The Edwards curve in Theorem 9 and De nition 9,
for this choice of (q, s), is exactly Curve1174.
Curve1174 is birationally equivalent to the Montgomery curve (4/1175)V 2 =
U3 + (4/1175 ≠ 2)U2 + U by [49, Theorem 3.2]. The leading coe cient 4/1175 is a
non-square in Fq , so V 2 = U3 + (4/1175 ≠ 2)U2 + U is a nontrivial quadratic twist
of this curve.
The number of points on the twist is thus q + 1 + t, and the number of points
on Curve1174 is q + 1 ≠ t, where t = 45330879683285730139092453152713398836.
These integers q + 1 + t, q + 1 ≠ t have the form 4p0, 4p1 respectively, where p0
and p1 are primes close to 2249. Generic methods to compute a discrete logarithm
on Curve1174 or its twist take approximately
Ô
ﬁ2247 ¥ 2124.3 group operations on
average.
The point (U, V ) = (4, 192257776421116702304087124422
05514783403012708409058383774613284963344096) on the Montgomery curve
(4/1175)V 2 = U3 + (4/1175 ≠ 2)U2 + U has order 4p1. The corresponding point
on Curve1174 is (x, y) = (4/V, 3/5).
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Curve1174 and its twist do not have any structure allowing fast pairings or other
special approaches to computing discrete logarithms. The primes p0 and p1 do not
equal the  eld characteristic q. The order of qmodulo p0 is not small: it is (p0≠1)/2.
The order of q modulo p1 is not small: it is p1 ≠ 1. The endomorphism ring of
Curve1174 has a large discriminant: up to squares this discriminant equals t2 ≠ 4q,
which is divisible once by the prime 161567415114024992333870349255799, so
the discriminant must be a multiple of this prime.
6.6.2 Design criteria
We consider only prime  elds. Bernstein, citing sub eld attacks from [140] and
[110], wrote in [43] that prime  elds “have the virtue of minimizing the number of
security concerns for elliptic-curve cryptography”; see [130] and [255] for recent de-
velopments of the attack strategy from [110]. Similarly, the Brainpool standard [60]
and NSA’s Suite B standards [206] require prime  elds. There is general agreement
that prime  elds are the safe, conservative choice for ECC. Prime  elds also per-
form very well across a wide range of processors; the current ECC speed records on
high-end Intel processors take advantage of special Intel support for binary  elds
(see [243]), but most CPUs do not have any comparable support.
We consider only primes q congruent to 3 modulo 4. This is required for the
injective map „. These primes also have the well-known bene t of allowing very
simple square-root computations; most other primes allow square-root computa-
tions at similar speed but with more complicated methods.
We consider only complete Edwards curves, i.e., curves x2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2
where d is not a square. This is required for the injective map. About 25% of all
elliptic curves over Fq are expressible as complete Edwards curves, as mentioned
in [49, Abstract] and experimentally veri ed in [45, Section 4]. Complete Edwards
curves also have the advantages of being extremely fast and of allowing a single
addition formula with no exceptions. Complete Edwards curves are also express-
ible as Montgomery curves supporting very fast and uniform Montgomery-ladder
computations.
To protect against generic discrete-logarithm algorithms we impose the stan-
dard requirement of a large prime dividing the number of curve points. This forces
q to be even larger, where the gap accounts for the cofactor: the number of curve
points divided by this prime. To minimize the performance problems of a large q
we consider only Edwards curves with minimal cofactor, namely 4. The number of
125
curve points is 4 times a prime for slightly below 1% of all choices of d, for the size
of q that we consider below.
We also impose the requirement of “twist security”: a large prime dividing the
number of points on the quadratic twist of the curve. This prevents “twist attacks”
against protocols that use the “Montgomery ladder”without checking that incoming
points are on the curve; this defense was proposed by Bernstein in [42]. For q © 3
(mod 4) roughly 1/10000 of all choices of d have the number of points on the curve
and the number of points on the twist each being 4 times a prime.
We require d to have the form ≠(c+ 1)2/(c≠ 1)2 with c = 2/s2. This is required
for the injective map, and covers about half of all non-squares d for q © 3 (mod 4).
For standard performance reasons we take q very close to, but not above, a
power of 2. The primes q © 3 (mod 4) within 32 of 2e for 200 Æ e Æ 300 are 2206≠ 5,
2212≠ 29, 2226≠ 5, 2243≠ 9, 2251≠ 9, and 2285≠ 9. Note that these  elds ensure that
‡≠1 covers nearly all of
)
0, 1, . . . , 2b ≠ 1* giving a very close to uniform distribution
of the encoding function. We focus on the last two of these primes as providing
quantitatively safe security levels, and choose 2251 ≠ 9 as being obviously faster.
Some curve operations involve multiplications by d. To speed up these multi-
plications we take the smallest possible d in absolute value, subject to the other
requirements. The choice d = ≠1174 for q = 2251 ≠ 9 is smaller than expected.
6.6.3 Previous curves over prime  elds
There is a long history of speci c elliptic curves being designed to meet various
security and performance criteria. For example, almost  fteen years ago the IEEE
P1363 standard [178, Sections A.9–A.12]
• speci ed curves y2 = x3 ≠ 3x+ b to “provide the fastest arithmetic on elliptic
curves”;
• imposed various further conditions upon these curves, with the security goal
of making discrete logarithms di cult to compute; and
• speci ed a procedure to generate “veri ably pseudo-random” curves meeting
these conditions.
NIST’s standard curves P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 were generated as
follows:  ve particular prime  elds were chosen with the goal of maximizing per-
formance; the IEEE P1363 procedure was used to generate one curve over each of
those  elds.
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Subsequent research developed new security and performance criteria for
curves over prime  elds: twist security, Montgomery compatibility, Edwards com-
patibility, and completeness. The NIST curves, unsurprisingly,  unk these criteria:
choosing cofactor 1 for y2 = x3≠3x+ b is incompatible with both Montgomery and
Edwards, and one cannot expect twist security if it is not demanded in advance.
Newer curves meet all of these criteria: for example, Curve25519 was explicitly de-
signed for twist security and Montgomery compatibility, and was shown in [49] to
also be expressible as a complete Edwards curve.
These extra criteria do not improve discrete-logarithm security, but they do im-
prove real-world security. They allow the simplest implementations to be correct im-
plementations, whereas for other curves the simplest implementations that seem
to work actually have hidden  aws that compromise security. See, e.g., [53, Section
4.1], [181], and [134].
We are imposing a new security condition to support censorship circumvention:
namely, an e cient way to encode a large fraction of all curve points as strings in-
distinguishable from uniform random strings. The generality of Elligator 1 makes it
easy to imagine how this security condition could be accidentally met by previously
generated curves:
• The advantages of complete Edwards curves have been well known for  ve
years.
• The advantages of Montgomery curves have been well known for even longer.
A random Montgomery curve has a good chance of being expressible as a
complete Edwards curve; see [45, Section 4].
• All complete Edwards curves overFq for q © 3 (mod 4)meet the new security
condition. Half of these curves are within the streamlined case expressed by
Theorem 9.
Given the amount of speed optimization of Curve25519 (see [43], [144], [97], [47],
and [50]) and the wide deployment of Curve25519 in several applications (see, e.g.,
[14]) one of our initial goals for this paper was to show that Curve25519 meets
this security condition. However, Elligator 1 is clearly limited to q © 3 (mod 4),
while Curve25519 is de ned over Fq with q © 1 (mod 4). We provide two di erent
solutions for this problem: Elligator 2 (see Section 6.7) and Curve1174.
We would expect serious implementations of Curve1174 to be competitive in
speedwith Curve25519. Curve1174 has some small advantages: for example, 2251≠
9 is closer to a power of 2 than 2255≠19 is; 1174 is considerably smaller than 486662;
127
and square rootsmodulo 2251≠9 are slightly easier than square rootsmodulo 2255≠
19. On the other hand, Curve25519 also has a small advantage: it is expressible in
“≠1-twisted Edwards form”, allowing the speedup explained in [171]. Obviously
applications already using Curve25519 should not switch away from it, but for new
applications it is not clear which curve is better.
6.7 Elligator 2: handling generic curves with a point
of order 2
This section introduces a new injective map Â to any elliptic curve of the form y2 =
x3 + Ax2 + Bx with AB(A2 ≠ 4B) ”= 0 over any odd  nite  eld, i.e., any  nite  eld
of odd characteristic. We emphasize that the characteristic is not required to be 3
modulo 4. This curve shape includes all Montgomery curves y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
except y2 = x3 + x, and in particular it includes Curve25519.
Any curve of this form has a point (0, 0) of order 2. Conversely, over any odd
 nite  eld, almost every elliptic curve having a point of order 2 can be written in
this form. Which means this map has better support of standardized curves.
Indeed, an elliptic curve over an odd  nite  eld can always be written as y2 =
u3+a2u2+a4u+a6; a point of order 2 on this curve must have the form (r, 0)where
r3+a2r2+a4r+a6 = 0; substituting u = x+r produces the curve y2 = x3+Ax2+Bx
where A = a2 + 3r and B = a4 + 2a2r+ 3r2. This curve must have B(A2 ≠ 4B) ”= 0
since it is elliptic. The only exceptional case is A = 0, i.e., curves whose j-invariant
equals 1728; this section assumes A ”= 0.
6.7.1 Squares
Fix an odd prime power q. As in Section 6.5.1 we de ne ‰ : Fq æ Fq by ‰(a) =
a(q≠1)/2, and we have ‰(a) equal to 1, ≠1, or 0 when a is, respectively, a non-zero
square, a non-square, or zero.
The de nition of Elligator 2 is parametrized by a square-root function for Fq: a
function
Ô
: F2q æ Fq such that
Ô
a2 œ {a,≠a} for each a œ Fq , where F2q means)
a2 : a œ Fq
*
. Note that a square-root function
Ô
is completely described by its
image
Ò
F2q .
For q © 3 (mod 4) one can take the principal square root as a square-root func-
tion, i.e., take
Ò
F2q = F2q , as in Section 6.5.1; but the concept of principal square
roots does not generalize to q © 1 (mod 4). For any odd prime q one can take
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Ò
F2q = {0, 1, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2}. Other choices sometimes have computational bene-
 ts.
The de nition of Elligator 2 is also parametrized by a non-square u œ Fq. If
q © 3 (mod 4) then one can take u = ≠1. If q © 5 (mod 8) then one can take
u = 2. Finding a non-square is an easy computation in general since about half of
the elements of Fq are non-squares. For e ciency it is desirable to choose u to be
small, or otherwise to choose u to speed up multiplications by u.
6.7.2 The map
Theorem 12. Let q be an odd prime power. Let A,B be elements of Fq such that
AB(A2 ≠ 4B) ”= 0. Let u be a non-square in Fq . Let
Ô
be a square-root function for
Fq . De ne R as the set)
r œ Fq : 1 + ur2 ”= 0, A2ur2 ”= B(1 + ur2)2
*
.
The following elements of Fq are de ned for each nonzero r œ R:
v = ≠A/(1 + ur2),
‘ = ‰(v3 +Av2 +Bv),
x = ‘v ≠ (1≠ ‘)A/2,
y = ≠‘

x3 +Ax2 +Bx .
Furthermore v‘xy ”= 0 and y2 = x3 +Ax2 +Bx.
If q © 1 (mod 4) and A2 ≠ 4B is a non-square in Fq then R = Fq .
Proof. v is de ned and v ”= 0: By hypothesis A ”= 0 and 1 + ur2 ”= 0.
v3 + Av2 + Bv ”= 0 and ‘ ”= 0: Note that v + vur2 = ≠A so v2 + Av =
v(v +A) = v(≠vur2). If v2 +Av +B = 0 then v2ur2 = B so, using the de nition of
v, A2ur2 = B(1 + ur2)2, contradicting the de nition of R. Hence v2 + Av + B ”= 0,
so v3 +Av2 +Bv ”= 0, so ‘ ”= 0.
x3 + Ax2 + Bx is a nonzero square and x ”= 0: There are two cases. First
case: ‘ = 1, i.e., v3 + Av2 + Bv is a nonzero square. Then x = v so x3 + Ax2 + Bx
is a nonzero square; and x ”= 0 since v ”= 0.
Second case: ‘ = ≠1, i.e., v3+Av2+Bv is a non-square. Then x = ≠v≠A = vur2.
All factors v, u, r2 here are nonzero so x ”= 0; note also that ‰(x) = ‰(v)‰(u) =
≠‰(v). Furthermore x(x+A) = (≠v≠A)(≠v) = v(v+A) so x2+Ax+B = v2+Av+B
so ‰(x3+Ax2+Bx) = ≠‰(v3+Av2+Bv) = ≠‘ = 1 so x3+Ax2+Bx is a nonzero
square.
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y is de ned, y2 = x3 + Ax2 + Bx, and y ”= 0: x3 + Ax2 + Bx is a nonzero
square so
Ô
x3 +Ax2 +Bx is de ned; all factors in y = ≠‘Ôx3 +Ax2 +Bx are
nonzero, and y2 = x3 +Ax2 +Bx.
If q © 1 (mod 4) and A2 ≠ 4B is a non-square then R = Fq: Fix r œ Fq ,
and write s = ur2. Then ‰(s) œ {0,≠1} while ‰(±1) = 1 so s ”= ±1. In particular
1 + ur2 ”= 0.
Suppose that A2s = B(1 + s)2. Subtract 4Bs to obtain (A2 ≠ 4B)s = B(1≠ s)2.
Multiply to obtain (A2 ≠ 4B)A2s2 = B2(1 + s)2(1 ≠ s)2. By hypothesis ‰(A2 ≠
4B) = ≠1 so ‰((A2 ≠ 4B)A2s2) œ {≠1, 0}, while all of B, 1+ s, 1≠ s are nonzero so
‰(B2(1 + s)2(1≠ s)2) = 1, contradiction. Consequently A2ur2 ”= B(1 + ur2)2.
De nition 10. In the situation of Theorem 12, the decoding function for the Weier-
strass curve E : y2 = x3 +Ax2 +Bx is the function Â : Ræ E(Fq) de ned as follows:
Â(0) = (0, 0); if r ”= 0 then Â(r) = (x, y).
With more work one can extend the de nition of Â to cover elements of Fq
outside R. For example, if A2 ≠ 4B is a square then one can map any square roots
in Fq of (A2 ≠ 2B ±A
Ô
A2 ≠ 4B)/(2uB) to ((≠A±ÔA2 ≠ 4B)/2, 0). However, our
main interest is in the case R = Fq , and then this extra work is unnecessary.
6.7.3 Inverting the map
Theorem 13. In the situation of De nition 10:
1. If r œ R then the set of preimages of Â(r) under Â is {r,≠r}.
2. Â(R) is the set of (x, y) œ E(Fq) such that
• x ”= ≠A,
• if y = 0 then x = 0, and
• ≠ux(x+A) is a square in Fq .
3. If (x, y) œ Â(R) then the following element r¯ of R is de ned and Â(r¯) = (x, y):
r¯ =
Y][
≠x/((x+A)u) if y œÒF2q ;≠(x+A)/(ux) if y /œÒF2q .
Proof. 1. If r = 0 then r = ≠r so Â(r) = Â(≠r). If r ”= 0 then Theorem 12 de nes
Â(r) purely in terms of r2 so Â(r) = Â(≠r).
Conversely, assume that Â(r) = Â(rÕ); our goal is to show that rÕ œ {r,≠r}. If
r = 0 then Â(r) = (0, 0), and otherwise Â(r) has nonzero coordinates by Theo-
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rem 12; hence r = 0 if and only if rÕ = 0. The only remaining case is that r ”= 0 and
rÕ ”= 0.
De ne vÕ, ‘Õ, xÕ, yÕ from rÕ as in Theorem 12. Then (xÕ, yÕ) = Â(rÕ) = Â(r) =
(x, y). Furthermore y = ≠‘Ôx3 +Ax2 +Bx and yÕ = ≠‘Õ(xÕ)3 +A(xÕ)2 +B(xÕ)
so ‘Õ = ‘ since
Ô
is a function. Next x = ‘v≠ (1≠ ‘)A/2 and xÕ = ‘ÕvÕ≠ (1≠ ‘Õ)A/2
so vÕ = v. Finally 1 + ur2 = 1 + u(rÕ)2 so rÕ œ {r,≠r} as claimed.
2. Fix r œ R, and write (x, y) = Â(r). If r = 0 then (x, y) = (0, 0) so x = 0; x ”=
≠A; and ≠ux(x+ A) = 0 is a square. If r ”= 0 then (x, y) is de ned in Theorem 12,
and there are two cases. The  rst case is that ‘ = 1; then x = v ”= ≠A since ur2 ”= 0.
The second case is that ‘ = ≠1; then x = ≠v ≠ A ”= ≠A since v ”= 0. In both cases
y ”= 0 by Theorem 12, and ≠ux(x + A) = ≠uv(v + A) = ≠uv(≠vur2) = u2v2r2,
which is a square.
Conversely, assume that (x, y) œ E(Fq), that x ”= ≠A, then if y = 0 then x = 0,
and that ≠ux(x + A) is a square. Our goal is to show that (x, y) œ Â(R). We will in
fact show more: (x, y) = Â(r¯) where r¯ is de ned as in the third part of the theorem
statement.
If y = 0 then x = 0 by assumption. Furthermore y =
Ô
0 œ
Ò
F2q and ≠x/((x +
A)u) = 0 so r¯ is de ned as 0. Hence (x, y) = (0, 0) = Â(0) = Â(r¯) as claimed.
Assume from now on that y ”= 0. The curve equation then implies that x ”= 0.
Now (x+A)u and ux are both nonzero, and both≠x/((x+A)u) and≠(x+A)/(ux)
are squares, so r¯ is de ned and nonzero. We will see below that 1 + ur¯2 ”= 0 and
A2ur¯2 ”= B(1 + ur¯2)2, so r¯ œ R. De ne v¯, ‘¯, x¯, y¯ as in Theorem 12.
If y œ
Ò
F2q then r¯2 = ≠x/((x + A)u) so 1 + ur¯2 = A/(x + A) so v¯ = ≠x ≠ A
so ‰(v¯) = ‰(≠x ≠ A) = ‰(ux) = ≠‰(x). Next v¯2 + Av¯ + B = x2 + Ax + B so
‘¯ = ‰(v¯3 +Av¯2 +Bv¯) = ≠‰(x3 +Ax2 +Bx) = ≠1. Consequently x¯ = ≠v¯ ≠A = x
and y¯ = ≠‘¯Ôx3 +Ax2 +Bx = Ôx3 +Ax2 +Bx = y.
The remaining case is that y /œ
Ò
F2q , i.e., y = ≠
Ô
x3 +Ax2 +Bx. Then r¯2 =
≠(x+A)/(ux) so 1+ur¯2 = ≠A/x so v¯ = x. Now v¯3+Av¯2+Bv¯ = x3+Ax2+Bx so ‘¯ =
1. Consequently x¯ = v¯ = x and y¯ = ≠‘¯Ôx3 +Ax2 +Bx = ≠Ôx3 +Ax2 +Bx = y.
In both cases we have v¯2 +Av¯+B = x2 +Ax+B ”= 0 so A2ur¯2 ”= B(1 + ur¯2)2.
3. Fix (x, y) œ Â(R). We showed above that x ”= ≠A; that if y = 0 then x = 0;
and that ≠ux(x + A) is a square. We also showed that under these conditions r¯ is
de ned and Â(r¯) = (x, y).
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6.7.4 Encoding as strings
Theorem 14. In the situation of De nition 10, assume that q is prime, that q ©
1 (mod 4), and that A2 ≠ 4B is not a square in Fq . De ne b = Âlog2 qÊ.
De ne ‡ : {0, 1}b æ Fq by ‡(ﬂ0, ﬂ1, . . . , ﬂb≠1) =
q
i ﬂi2i. De ne S =
‡≠1({0, 1, 2, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2}). De ne ÿ : S æ E(Fq) as follows: ÿ(ﬂ) = Â(‡(ﬂ)). Then
#S = (q + 1)/2; ÿ is an injective map from S to E(Fq); and ÿ(S) = Â(Fq).
Proof. Note thatR = Fq by Theorem 12; i.e., Â is de ned on all ofFq. The rest of the
proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 11 with „ replaced by Â, · replaced by ﬂ,
Theorem 9 replaced by Theorem 12, and Theorem 10 replaced by Theorem 13.
6.7.5 Application of Â to Curve25519
Curve25519 is the curve y2 = x3+Ax2+Bx overFq with q = 2255≠19,A = 486662,
and B = 1. Here q © 1 (mod 4) and A2 ≠ 4B is a non-square in Fq , so R = Fq.
We take u = 2. We copy from [47] the following standard e ciently computable
square-root function for Fq. Given a square a œ Fq compute b = a(q+3)/8; note that
q © 5 (mod 8), so (q+3)/8 is an integer. Then b4 = a2, i.e., b2 œ {a,≠a}. De neÔa
as |b| if b2 = a and as --bÔ≠1-- otherwise. Here |b|means b if b œ {0, 1, . . . , (q ≠ 1)/2},
otherwise ≠b.
Computing ÿ takes 1 square-root computation, 1 inversion, 1 computation of ‰,
and a fewmultiplications. Note that the inversion and the square-root computation
can be combined into one exponentiation, as in [47]. The computation of ‰ can also
be combined into the square-root computation as follows. First compute a power
of v3+Av2+Bv as above, obtaining a square root of v3+Av2+Bv if v3+Av2+Bv
is a square. If the square of this power turns out to match v3+Av2+Bv then ‘ = 1
and x = v. Otherwise ‘ = ≠1, x = vur2, and x3 +Ax2 +Bx = ur2(v3 +Av2 +Bv);
multiply the previous power by r and by a precomputed power of u to obtain a
square root of x3 +Ax2 +Bx.
Similar comments apply to computing the inverse map. Checking for P œ ÿ(S)
takes 1 squaring and a computation of ‰ to obtain ‰((x+A/2)2≠A2/4) = ‰(x(x+
A)).
This map and its inverse seem simplest to describe in Weierstrass coordinates,
but maps to and from Edwards form, and other curve shapes, are also easily ob-
tained.
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6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we illustrated how widespread censorship is in today’s communica-
tion, and we indicated some of the important measures taken to circumvent it. We
discussed how public-key encryption, in particular elliptic-curve encryption, poses
a security problem for protocols aiming at censorship circumvention. These proto-
cols naturally send points on EC and these points are easy to distinguish.
To make these points indistinguishable from uniformly random strings we pre-
sented two maps: Elligator 1 and Elligator 2. They both e ciently map points on
a single curve to bit-strings indistinguishable from random and back. About every
second point of a curve can be mapped, but the tests to verify if the point can be
mapped are easy.
Elligator 1 builds on the function from [133]. This map has a restricted number
of curves that can be used with it, but does not exclude curves that are fast and
secure according to the state-of-the-art criteria. This chapter presents the secure
curve Curve1174 that was designed speci cally for Elligator 1. Additionally, criteria
to create new secure curves are discussed. Elligator 2 is comparable to Elligator 1
with respect to performance, but can work with wider range of curves, for example
with Curve25519. Both maps presented in this chapter can be used with a wide
range of existing ECC protocols.
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Chapter 7
LightMix: mixing with minimal
real-time asymmetric
cryptographic operations
7.1 Introduction
Digital messaging has become a signi cant form of human communication, yet cur-
rently most of these systems do not provide basic protections of untraceability and
unlinkability of messages. These protections are fundamental to freedom of in-
quiry, freedom of expression, and increasingly to online privacy. Grave threats to
privacy exist from global adversaries who construct tra c-analysis graphs detailing
who communicates with whom.
To provide anonymity online, a popular approach is onion routing, such as
implemented in the widely used system ToR [111]. Onion-routing systems, how-
ever, have limitations on the level of anonymity achievable: most signi cantly, be-
cause they route di erent sessions of messages along di erent paths and they
do not perform random permutations of messages, they are vulnerable to a va-
riety of tra c-analysis attacks—for example [287, 99], as well as intersection at-
tacks [52, 104, 101].
By contrast, mix-nets hold fundamentally greater promise to achieve higher lev-
els of anonymity than do onion-routing systems because mix-nets are resilient
against tra c-analysis attacks. Speci cally, since all mix-net messages travel
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through the same  xed cascade of mixnodes, observing the communication paths
of messages within a mix-net is not useful to the adversary. Also, mix-nets can pro-
cess larger batches of messages than can onion-routing systems, which is impor-
tant because the batch size is the size of the anonymity set. Using a  xed cascade
achieves resilience against intersection attacks [52].
The Internet of Things (IoT) is gradually becoming a part of everyday life. Evi-
dence of this process includes the existing and projected explosive growth of mo-
bile and light-weight devices connected to the Internet [273]. New IoT services often
inherit approaches popular for modern Internet services, including centralized ar-
chitectures, use of clouds, and identi cation in place of authentication. Together,
these approaches facilitate over-collection of data [213] and extensive user pro l-
ing. Communication anonymity is a fundamental technology that can reduce pri-
vacy risks. It is also a building block that will support the development of other
protection mechanisms, such as anonymous authentication within the IoT [6].
Mix-nets provide strong anonymity guarantees for their users. Adopting mix-
nets in the IoT environment, however, is not straightforward due to the high com-
putational costs imposed by current secure mix-net designs, due to their frequent
use of asymmetric cryptographic operations on clients. Such expensive operations
reduce battery life of a mobile device and reduce the computational capacity avail-
able for the device’s main purpose. For example, implementing public-key encryp-
tion on passive RFID tags [15] will severely limit their capability to perform other
operations.
In this chapter we introduce LightMix, a new approach to anonymous com-
munications. LightMix is a new variant of  xed-cascade mixing networks (mix-
nets). LightMix uses a precomputation phase to avoid all computationally-intensive
public-key cryptographic operations in its core real-time protocol. Senders partici-
pate only in the real-time phase. Thus, senders never perform any public-key op-
erations after an initial key-exchange during a one-time registration process. Light-
Mix has drastically lower real-time cryptographic latency than do other mix-nets.
Through its use of precomputation, and through its novel key management, Light-
Mix is markedly di erent from all previous mix-nets. Due to its lack of public-key
operations in its core real-time phase, it is well suited for applications running on
computationally restricted devices in the IoT, as well as on mobile devices with re-
stricted battery life, including smartphones.
In summary, in addition to its minimal use of real-time asymmetric crypto-
graphic operations and its resistance to tra c analysis, LightMix enjoys each of the
136
following advantages: First, LightMix scales linearly (in number of users, number
of mixnodes, and batch size). Second, unlike onion-routing and some mix-nets,
its scalable design does not limit batch size, which means that LightMix can sup-
port large anonymity sets. Third, clients do not perform any complex public-key
operations. Therefore, LightMix has low power consumption for clients, making
it especially well-suited for applications on light-weight devices, including chat on
smartphones.
Our main contributions are the design, preliminary analysis, and proof-of-
concept implementation of LightMix, a new mix-net variant that, through precom-
putation, achieves lower real-time computational latency than do all existing mix-
nets (traditional and re-encryption), while still bene ting from the strong anonymity
properties of mix-nets over onion-routing systems.
In the rest of this paper we review related work, provide an overview of Light-
Mix, describe the core LightMix protocol, explain some protocol enhancements,
provide security arguments, compare performance of LightMix with that of other
mix-nets, present timings of our proof-of-concept implementation, discuss several
issues raised by LightMix, and present our conclusions.
7.2 System overview
Before de ning LightMix’s core protocol, we  rst explain our architecture and com-
munication model, adversarial model, and security goals.
7.2.1 Architecture and communication model
LightMix is a newmix-net protocol that provides anonymous communication for its
users (senders and receivers). The main goal is to ensure unlinkability of messages
entering and leaving the system, though it is known which users are active at any
given moment.
LightMix has nmixnodes that comprise a  xed cascade: all nodes are organized
in a  xed order from the  rst node to the last. Within the LightMix system this or-
der can be systematically changed and rotated, without a ecting users in any way.
Any message sent by a user is forwarded through all n servers. As with any mix-
net, LightMix collects a certain number of messages in a batch before processing
them. Section 7.9 discusses our strategy for assembling batches, though details
may depend on the application.
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To become a LightMix user, one must  rst establish for each mixnode a shared
key. Section 7.3.2 provides more details on how these keys can be established.
Round keys derived from the shared keys are used in each round of communication.
A round begins with the start of batch processing.
For each round, — messages are collected and randomly ordered. Eachmessage
must have the same length, and all messages in a batch are processed simultane-
ously. The other messages are not accepted and are sent in a subsequent round.
Every message is assigned to a corresponding incomingmessage slot, and is leaving
mix node from an output slot. The relationship between an incoming slot and an
output slot is de ned by a random permutation selected by a mix node for the given
round.
To process messages quickly in real time, LightMix performs precomputations
that do not involve any user. The precomputations are performed in a separate
phase during which LightMix executes all public-key encryptions, enabling the real-
time computations to be carried using only fast multiplications.
7.2.2 Adversarial model
We assume authenticated communication channels between all mixnodes. Thus,
an adversary can eavesdrop, forward, and delete messages betweenmixnodes, but
not modify, replay, or inject new ones, without detection. For any communication
not among mixnodes, we assume the adversary can eavesdrop, modify, or inject
messages at any point of the network.
The goal of the adversary is to compromise the anonymity of the communica-
tion initiator, or to link inputs and outputs of the system. We consider applications
where initiators are users of the LightMix system. We do not consider adversaries
who aim to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
An adversary can also compromise users; however, we assume that at least
two users are honest. Mixnodes can also be compromised, but at least one of
them needs to be honest for the system to be secure. We assume compromised
mixnodes to be malicious but cautious: they aim not to get caught violating the
protocol.
We envision a deployment model in which there are dedicated trusted data cen-
ters serving as the mixnodes (perhaps competitively awarded). As such, they are
incentivized not to be kicked out. By contrast, some mix-nets allow the mixnodes
to enter and leave with low cost.
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An implication of our deploymentmodel is that it is su cient to be able to detect
a cheating node with su cient probability at some point. By contrast, in more  ex-
ible deployment models, the nodes should prove more stringently that they have
computed correctly before the output is opened. LightMix does require that the
exit node commit to its output prior to being able to read the system output, which
protects against certain adaptive attacks.
7.2.3 Security goals
LightMix aims to satisfy each of the following two security properties:
1. Anonymity: A protocol provides anonymity if the adversary cannot map any
input message to the corresponding output message, with a probability sig-
ni cantly better than that of random guessing, even if the adversary compro-
mises all but two users and all but one mixnode.
2. Integrity: A protocol provides integrity if at the end of every run involving —
honest users, (a) either the — messages from the honest users are delivered
unaltered to the intended recipients, or [(b) a malicious party is detected with
a non-negligible probability and (c) no honest party is proven malicious].
7.3 The core protocol
We now present the core LightMix protocol, beginning with some preliminary nota-
tions and concepts, followed by a detailed speci cation.
7.3.1 Preliminaries
We introduce the primitives and notations used to describe the protocol. There
are nmixnodes that process — messages per batch. For simplicity we assume here
that the system already knows for each sender what position to use. When imple-
menting the system this assignment can, for example, be achieved by including the
sender’s identity (possibly a pseudonym) when sending a message to the system.
All computations are performed in a prime-order cyclic group G satisfying the
decision Di e-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The order of the group is p, and g is a
generator for this group. LetGú be the set of non-identity elements ofG.
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LightMix uses a multi-party group-homomorphic cryptographic system. We
make use of a system based on ElGamal, described by Benaloh [39], though any
such system could be used. This system works as follows:
• ei œ Zúp: the share for mixnode i of the secret key e.
• d: the public key of the system, based on the mixnode shares of the secret
key: d =
r
i g
ei .
• E(m) = (gx,m · dx), x œR Zúp: encryption of message m under the system’s
public key d. We call gx the random component and m · dx the message com-
ponent of the ciphertext. When applying encryption on a vector of values,
each value in the vector is encrypted individually—each with a fresh random
value—and the result is a vector of ciphertexts.
• Di(gx) = (gx)≠ei : the decryption share for mixnode i computed from the
random component of a ciphertext using the mixnode’s share of the secret
key. As with encryption, applying this function on a vector of random values
results in a vector of corresponding decryption shares.
To decrypt a ciphertext (gx,m · dx), all parties need to cooperate because the de-
cryption shares for all mixnodes are required to retrieve the original message:
m · dx ·rni=1Di(gx)
= m · (rni=1 gei)x ·rni=1(gx)≠ei
= m.
The LightMix protocol uses the following values:
• ri,a, si,a œ Gú: random values (freshly generated for each round) of mixnode
i for slot a. Thus, ri = (ri,1, ri,2, . . . , ri,—) is a vector of random values for the —
slots in the message map at mixnode i. Similarly, si is also a vector of random
values for mixnode i.
• ﬁi: a random permutation of the — slots used by i. The inverse of the permu-
tation is denoted by ﬁ≠1i .
• ki,j œ Gú: a group element shared between mixnode i and the sending user
for slot j. These values are used as keys to blind messages.
• Mj œ Gú: the message sent by user j. Like other values in the system, these
values are group elements. They can be easily converted from, for example,
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an ASCII-encoded string. The group size determines the length of an individ-
ual message that can be sent.
For readability we introduce the following shorthand notations:
• Ri: the direct product of all local random r values through mixnode i; i.e.,
Ri =
ri
j=1 rj .
• Si: the product and permutation of all local random s values:
Si =
Y][s1 i = 1ﬁi(Si≠1)◊ si 1 < i Æ n .
•  i(a): the permutation performed by LightMix through mixnode i, i.e., the
composition of all individual permutations:
 i(a) =
Y][ﬁ1(a) i = 1ﬁi( i≠1(a)) 1 < i Æ n .
• ki and k≠1i : the vector of keys shared between mixnode i and the users for
all — slots and their inverses, respectively; ki = (ki,1, ki,2, . . . , ki,—) and k≠1i =
(k≠1i,1 , k≠1i,2 , . . . , k≠1i,— ).
• Kj : the product of all shared keys of the sending user for slot j: Kj =rn
i=1 ki,j .
• K is a vector of products of shared keys for the — slots; K = (K1,K2, . . . ,K—).
7.3.2 Protocol description
We now present the core protocol. In this explanation we focus on simplicity and
clarity; see Sections 7.4 and 7.6 for a discussion of possible security issues and
enhancements. We separately discuss each of the three protocol phases: setup,
precomputation, and real time.
Setup
In the setup phase, the mixenodes establish their secret shares ei and the shared
public key d, which are used for the multi-party homomorphic encryption scheme.
The users also establish their keys ki,j , which they share with all mixenodes.
This can be done using any (o ine) key distribution method. One way to derive
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these keys is using a Di e-Hellman key exchange. The resulting key can be used as
a seed to derive unique values for ki,j for every session. Depending on the chosen
key distribution protocol, this would be the only time a user is possibly required
to perform an asymmetric cryptographic operation. The key exchange must be
performed once for each user, and this exchange can be carried during the user’s
enrollment into the system.
Precomputation
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node n Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node n
E(r1,1)
E(r1,2)
E(r1, )
E(r1,1 · r2,1)
E(r1,2 · r2,2)
E(r1,  · r2, )
E(Qni=1 ri,1)
E(Qni=1 ri,2)
E(Qni=1 ri, )
E(Qni=1(ri,1) · s1,4)
E(Qni=1(ri,2) · s1,3)
E(Qni=1(ri, ) · s1,1)
E(Qni=1(ri,1) · s1,4 · s2,3)
E(Qni=1(ri,2) · s1,3 · s2,1)
E(Qni=1(ri, ) · s1,1 · s2,2)
Figure 7.1: A schematic example of the  rst two steps of the precomputation phase, which
result in the values E( n(Rn)◊ Sn).
Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node n Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 Node n
m1 ·
Qn
i=1(ki,1)
m2 ·
Qn
i=1(ki,2)
m  ·
Qn
i=1(ki, )
m1 ·
Qn
i=2(ki,1) · r1,1
m2 ·
Qn
i=2(ki,2) · r1,2
m  ·
Qn
i=2(ki, ) · r1, 
m1 ·
Qn
i=3(ki,1) · r1,1 · r2,1
m2 ·
Qn
i=3(ki,2) · r1,2 · r2,2
m  ·
Qn
i=3(ki, ) · r1,  · r2, 
m1 · ·
Qn
i=1(ri,1)
m2 · ·
Qn
i=1(ri,2)
m  ·
Qn
i=1(ri, )
m1 · ·
Qn
i=1(ri,1) · s1,4
m2 · ·
Qn
i=1(ri,2) · s1,3
m  ·
Qn
i=1(ri, ) · s1,1
m1 · ·
Qn
i=1 ri,1 · s1,4 · s2,3
m2 · ·
Qn
i=1(ri,2) · s1,3 · s2,1
m  ·
Qn
i=1(ri, ) · s1,1 · s2,2
Figure 7.2: A schematic example of the  rst two steps of the real-time phase, which result in
the values n(M◊ Rn)◊ Sn.
The precomputation phase is performed only by the mixenodes, without any
involvement from the users. It is performed once for each real-time phase. Shared
values are established to circumvent the need for public-key operations during the
real-time phase. The precomputation phase comprises three di erent steps given
below. The goal of the precomputation phase is to compute the values n(Rn)◊Sn,
which are used in the real-time phase. Figure 7.1 shows a schematic example of the
 rst two steps of the precomputation phase.
Step 1 - Preprocessing. The mixnodes start by generating fresh r, s, ﬁ values. Then
they collectively compute the product of all of their individual r values under en-
cryption using the public key d of the system, which was computed during the setup
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phase. This computation takes place by each mixnode i sending the following mes-
sage to the next mixnode:
E(Ri) =
Y][E(r1) i = 1E(Ri≠1)◊ E(ri) 1 < i Æ n .
Each mixnode encrypts its own r values and uses the homomorphic property of the
encryption system to compute the multiplication of this ciphertext with the input it
receives from the previous mixnode. Eventually, the last mixnode sends the  nal
values E(Rn) to the  rst mixnode as input for the next step.
Step 2 - Mixing. In the second step, the mixnodes together mix the values and
compute the results  n(Rn) ◊ Sn, under encryption. This is accomplished having
every mixnode i send the following message to the next mixnode:
E( i(Rn)◊ Si)
=
Y][ﬁ1(E(Rn))◊ E(s1) i = 1ﬁi(E( i≠1(Rn)◊ Si≠1))◊ E(si) 1 < i Æ n .
As with the  rst step, the last mixnode sends the  nal encrypted values E( n(Rn)◊
Sn) to the  rst mixnode. These  nal values now must be decrypted together by all
mixnodes, which happens in the last step of the precomputation.
Step 3 - Postprocessing. To complete the precomputation, the mixnodes decrypt
the precomputed values. Each mixnode i computes its decryption shares Di(x),
where (x, c) = E( n(Rn) ◊ Sn)). The message parts c are multiplied with all the
decryption shares to retrieve the plaintext values  n(Rn) ◊ Sn. This computation
can be carried out either using another pass through the network (in which every
mixnode multiplies in its own decryption share), or by having all mixnodes send
their encryption shares to the last mixnode, which can then perform the multipli-
cation. The last mixnode to be used in the real-time phase stores the decrypted
precomputed values.
Real time
For the real-time phase, each user constructs its input by taking its message m
and multiplying it with its combined shared key k to compute the blinded message
m ◊ k. This blinded message is then sent to the mix-net. One option would be to
send the blinded messages to the  rst mixnode. Once enough blinded messages
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are received, they are combined to yield the vectorM◊K. As in the precomputation
phase, the real-time phase can again be split into three steps. Figure 7.2 gives a
schematic example of the  rst two steps.
Step 1 - Preprocessing. During the preprocessing step, the mixnodes take out the
keys k they share with the users and add in their r values to blind the original mes-
sages. This computation is performed by each mixnode i sending the following to
the next mixnode:
M◊ K◊ (
iŸ
j=1
k≠1j ◊ rj) = M◊ K◊ (
i≠1Ÿ
j=1
k≠1j ◊ rj)◊ k≠1i ◊ ri .
The last mixnode sends the  nal values M ◊ Rn = M ◊ K ◊
rn
j=1 k
≠1
i ◊ ri, which
are the blinded versions of the original messages, to the  rst mixnode as input
for the next step. Now the user-speci c keys k are taken out and replaced by the
user-independent values r.
Step 2 - Mixing. The second step performs the mixing to hide the association be-
tween sender and receiver. The s values are added in to hide which input message
corresponds to which output message. Each mixnode i (except the last mixnode)
sends the following message to the next mixnode:
 i(M◊ Rn)◊ Si
=
Y][ﬁ1(M◊ Rn)◊ s1 i = 1ﬁi( i≠1(M◊ Rn)◊ Si≠1)◊ si 1 < i < n .
Finally, the last mixnode computes:
 n(M◊ Rn)◊ Sn = ﬁn( n≠1(M◊ Rn)◊ Sn≠1)◊ sn .
Now every mixnode performed its mixing, destroying the associations between
senders and receivers. The last step retrieves the permuted original messages.
Step 3 - Postprocessing. The last mixnode can perform the  nal step. This mixn-
ode retrieves the locally stored precomputed values  n(Rn) ◊ Sn. To retrieve the
permutedmessages it now needs only to perform the following computation, using
the result from the previous mixing step:
 n(M) =  n(M◊ Rn)◊ Sn ◊ ( n(Rn)◊ Sn)≠1 .
How the messages are then delivered to the recipients depends on the applica-
tion and is independent from LightMix. This step concludes the real-time phase, in
which no public-key operations are performed.
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7.4 Protocol integrity
The cryptographic construction presented in Section 7.3 expects the mixnodes and
users to be honest but curious (they follow the protocol but may try to learn as
much as possible). As for most mix-net protocols [80, 242, 183, 250], LightMix re-
quires additional measures to ensure that mixnodes cannot tamper with the mes-
sages nor with the  ow without detection. In this section, we augment the protocol
to protect its anonymity and integrity against malicious attacks by users and by
compromised mixnodes, which we shall call “adversarial mixnodes.”
The overall strategy relies on the following assumption: We assume that com-
promised mixnodes are malicious but cautious. Each user periodically sends “trap”
dummy messages. After the round completes, the user requests to open the path
for the slot in which she sent dummy messages. In response, all messages ex-
changed and values used in this path during the real-time and precomputation
phases are veri ed. This additional security mechanism is practical, and its cost
and complexity is similar to that required for any mix-net.
7.4.1 Integrity of values and messages
To enable honestmixnodes to veri ably detect anymaliciousmixnodes that employ
incorrect values or permutations in the precomputation or real-time phase, Light-
Mix augments communications with proofs. To this end, all messages exchanged
between mixnodes are signed using a digital signature scheme with existential un-
forgeability under an adaptive chosen-message attack [154]. In addition, during
precomputation, each mixnode commits to the permutation ﬁj it applies to the
incoming slot j using a perfectly hiding commitment (Commit) scheme [161] and
signs that commitment. All the nodes broadcast their signed commitment using a
reliable broadcast (Broadcast) protocol [115] [293]. Doing so makes it possible to
reconstruct and verify all individual values ri,j , si,j and ﬁi,j that mixnode j applies
to slot i.
In the real-time phase, the users become involved, making the process more
complicated because they do not perform any public-key operations during the
real-time phase. The values that we need to verify that depend on the users are
the ki,j values (shared between a mixnode i and the user in slot j), and themj ·Kj
values (the blinded message that a user sends in slot j).
Because the k values are shared between a mixnode and a user, we need them
to agree on the commitments to these values. If we detect an anomaly involving
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the k values, and a mixnode and user disagree on the value used, the commitment
needs to provide proof of who misbehaved.
For this task, the following procedure can be followed in case the k values are
derived from a seed that is agreed upon by a mixnode and user during the setup
phase. After establishing this seed, the mixnode will compute a commitment of
the seed and provide this commitment to the user. The mixnode generates the
commitment in a way that enables the user to reveal the commitment and prove to
other parties that the mixnode generated the commitment. The user must verify
the commitment during the setup phase. This veri cation requires an additional
public-key operation, though it will be performed only once provided the protocol
runs without any disturbance.
Message integrity at entry
Messages at entry to LightMix need to arrive at LightMix and pass through the non-
permuted part of the protocol without any undetected modi cation. Providing in-
tegrity of messages at this point is a challenge if one wishes to keep clients free
from using any asymmetric cryptography during the real-time phase. We propose
a construction where message authentication codes (MACs) are generated over
the input message to the LightMix system.
To accomplish this goal, we introduce additional key values li,j , shared between
mixnode i and the user for slot j, established and committed to in a similar way as
for the k values. When the user sends the blinded messagemj ·Kj to the system,
the user also sends the following messages:
hj = Hash(mj ·Kj) and (MAC l1,j (hj), . . . ,MAC ln,j (hj)) .
During the real-time phase, the  rst mixnode starts by checking its corresponding
MAC value in the list. If it is incorrect, the mixnode informs the other mixnodes
and does not forward the computed value for this slot. If theMAC value is correct,
it forwards the h values and theMAC values for the other mixnodes, together with
its basic computed values.
Each subsequent mixnode follows the same procedure. At the end of the  rst
step of the real-time phase, all mixnodes have checked theirMAC values on the re-
ceived h values, or the value is not processed any further. It is hard to enforce that
the hj value is related to the actual message that is being modi ed and forwarded
further during Step 1 of the real-time phase. This value, however, is veri ed during
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trap opening. Section 7.4.3 provides more details on how to pinpoint the misbehav-
ing party.
7.4.2 Message tagging detection
A message-tagging attack is an attack where the adversary can mark a message at
some point during the process, such that it is recognizable when it is output, com-
promising unlinkability between the inputs and outputs [268]. To perform a tagging
attack unnoticed, the tag should also be removed before the messages are output.
Tagging attacks are a threat to all mix-nets that use some form of malleable encryp-
tion, such as homomorphic encryption or group multiplications, where valid mes-
sages can be recognized when output by the mix-net. For example, P tzmann [262]
presents such an attack on re-encryption mix-nets.
A simple example of a tagging attack is the following: The last mixnode multi-
plies the blinded message in one of the slots j with an additional factor t in the  rst
step of the real-time phase. Now the blindedmessage in slot j will bemj ·
rn
i=1 ri,j ·t
at the end of the  rst step, whereas the values in the other slots stay the same.
When the last mixnode performs Step 3, it will see the  nal messages before it out-
puts them. If the messages are recognizable as valid outputs, it will observe that
one of the messages does not seem to be valid. If this invalid message becomes
valid when multiplied with t≠1, this message is likely the tagged one. The mixnode
can now link the message, and possibly the recipient, to the sender. The mixnode
can remove the tag and output the original messages, making it unobservable for
the users and other mixnodes that a tagging attack took place.
Detection. To protect against these kinds of attacks and make them detectable,
only small changes are needed to the protocol:
• Precomputation Phase - Step 3: The mixnodes no longer send out their de-
cryption shares to retrieve the precomputed values. Instead, they keep their
shares secret and publish only a commitment to them. The last mixnode also
publishes a commitment to the message component of the ciphertext. The
commitments can be computed, for example, using only one signature per
mixnode for the decryption shares for all slots simultaneously. The plain-
text results of the precomputation phase are thus no longer retrieved in that
phase itself.
• Real-Time Phase - Step 3: The output of the mixing step n(M◊ Rn)◊ Sn is
published by the last mixnode. Afterwards, all mixnodes release their decryp-
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tion sharesDi(x) and themessage component of the ciphertext c. The output
messages are then computed as follows, where (x, c) = E( n(Rn)◊ Sn):
 n(M◊ Rn)◊ Sn ◊ c◊
nŸ
i=1
Di(x) .
Because the mixnodes committed to all of the values necessary to retrieve the
precomputed value, they cannot change these values to take out a possible tag
anymore. The output of the mixing step does not reveal anything yet about the
messages, because the r and s values are still included. The precomputed value to
take out these values is retrieved only after the output of the mixing step is made
public. Therefore, the last mixnode would not know from which output slot a pos-
sible tag should be removed before the output of the mixing step is made public.
Once the output is made public, the tag cannot be removed because all computa-
tions for the third step are  xed and can be veri ed by anyone. This technique is
helpful to detect the malicious party once a trap is opened (see Section 7.4.3).
7.4.3 Sending and verifying trap messages
To ensure the protocol is functioning correctly, we let users send trapmessages with
a certain probability, and request to open message paths of these traps. Opening
of a path includes veri cation of all messages exchanged between mixnodes, the
incoming message from the user, as well as intermediate values and permutations.
Sending trap messages and requesting to open them
To send a trap, a user starts by forming a message with a round ID, user ID, and
statement that this is the dummy message. She calculates aMAC of this message
with every key li,j shared between mixnode i and the user for slot j. The trap is
then the message together with its MAC values. It is encrypted according to the
protocol and sent to the entry mixnode. After the round is over, the trap message
appears at the output. Nodes verify the correctness of the round ID and MAC
values. If the round ID or at least one of the MAC values is incorrect, they do not
proceed. Otherwise, they send a user an authenticated message notifying her that
the dummy is received, including an incremented counter of all dummies received
from this user.
If a user does not receive any noti cation message, because a dummy was
tagged or because one of theMAC values was not accepted by the disputing mixn-
ode, she initiates a veri cation procedure. She sends a request to open the path
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with her dummy message directly to all mixnodes, again signed by the MAC . If
there is a mixnode disputing the validity of the MAC intended for him, and if the
mixnode and user cannot agree on the key li,j that is supposed to be used, the
commitment to the seed of key li,j (made by the mixnode and veri ed by the user
during setup) is opened.
This process allows the key value to be retrieved, and the correctness of the
MAC signed by this key is veri ed. If the retrieved key value does not correspond
to what the mixnode claims, it must either agree to open the path, or be considered
malicious. Otherwise if the key does not correspond to what the user claims, the
user’s request is dropped. If the user still wants to insist on veri cation, it has an
option to sign the request with her private key.
Once it is established that the given user in the given round sent a trap, the user
receives a noti cation, if the user has not received one before. Thenmixnodes start
opening the path in the precomputation phase of the message slot j in which the
user sent his trap in the particular round.
Path opening for the precomputation phase
For the input slot j that we want to verify, the mixnodes have to decrypt exchanged
messages for this slot and compute the r values in the non-permuted part. For
the permuted part, mixnodes subsequently reveal the corresponding permutations
and decrypt exchangedmessages to obtain the s values. Doing so we can follow the
computation through the mix-net and verify whether the precomputed value that
was output was correctly computed.
To check, for example, whether mixnode i performed its computation correctly,
that mixnode needs to present the signature from the previous mixnode on the val-
ues it received. The next mixnode will also have to present the signature it received
from mixnode i to obtain proof what values were output by mixnode i. Once all
information about the input, output, and values used in the expected computation
are known, due to the signatures, commitments, and threshold decryption, it can
be veri ed whether mixnode i performed the computation as expected.
Path opening for the real-time phase
Malicious mixnodes can also employ incorrect messages, values, and permutations
in the real-time phase. We wish to make the mixnodes accountable for their be-
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havior. One challenge is that malicious users may try to victimize some honest
mixnodes by providing inconsistent inputs and later deny having done so.
First, the mixing step is veri ed. This check is performed in a similar fashion
as for the precomputation phase. For the preprocessing step, a comparable ap-
proach is followed. To verify whether the correct input from the user to the system
is used, all the keys l for theMAC values for the suspicious slot are output. The pur-
pose is to detect if a mixnode or user changed the input. Because the values were
processed in the mixing step, during the  rst step of the real-time phase, all mixn-
odes accepted the MAC values and thus should be able to provide a correct key.
The mixnodes also reveal their r and k values for the corresponding slot, and the
mixnodes check whether they performed their computations correctly. Although
the mixnodes committed to the r values, they have not committed to individual k
values. Therefore the sender must be involved in this process. The sender will also
release all the k values it used for this message.
If a k value released by the sender does not match the one released by the cor-
responding mixnode, either the mixnode or the sender is misbehaving. The sender
might do this to blame a mixnode of misbehaving to cause it to be removed from
the system. This dispute needs to be resolved by having the user reveal the com-
mitment by the mixnode on the shared keys. Doing so might also reveal k values
used in previous sessions, but these values are only one of the components of K
and therefore do not leak the original messages. There are two possibilities: either
the user was malicious, in which case we do not care about his or her previous
messages, or the mixnode was malicious, in which case we consider the k values
to be compromised already. This procedure will reveal who acted maliciously and
modi ed the output message.
7.4.4 Integrity analysis
We shall argue informally that, if any of the messages are altered by any node, (a)
no honest party can be proven malicious, and (b) at least one malicious party is
detected with non-negligible probability.
No honest party is proven malicious An honest mixnode can be targeted by
somemalicious colluding users or mixnodes that provide inconsistent inputs. If the
output is corrupted by n ≠ 1 colluding mixnodes that provide incorrect decryption
shares, then validating the commitments will reveal this fact. Because the commit-
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ment scheme is secure, malicious mixnodes cannot publish incorrect commitments
without detection.
If the previous mixnode has provided inconsistent input, then the current mixn-
ode can prove its correctness by providing the input signed by the previous mixn-
ode, since all messages exchanged between mixnodes are digitally signed. If a
mixnode falsely claims that the previous mixnode has provided incorrect input, it
will have to provide the input signed by the previous node as proof. In both cases,
the adversary will be successful only if the digital signature scheme is not secure.
If the user has provided inconsistent input and claimed falsely that the mixnode
is malicious, then the mixnode can prove its innocence using the MAC value re-
ceived from the mixnode. If the user and the mixnodes show disagreement about
the key used for computing the MAC value, the seed for generating the key is re-
vealed. In the setup phase, the mixnode generates a commitment to the seed, and
the user veri es the commitment. Thus, the user can successfully claim a di erent
seed for that commitment only when the commitment scheme is not secure.
At least one malicious party is detected with non-negligible probability We
assume our adversary is malicious but cautious. So, if there is even a slight chance
of a malicious node being detected and thrown out of the system, it will refrain
from engaging in any such mischief. We now show that if an adversary behaves
maliciously, there is a signi cant probability that it will be caught.
Let p denote the probability with which a user will send a trap message. In each
round there are a total of — messages. The expected number of trap messages in a
batch is – = p—.
We want to calculate the probability that the adversary will be detected even if it
modi es only one path. When paths are opened, the probability that the corrupted
path will be chosen among one of the – trap paths is
!—≠1
–≠1
"
/
!—
–
"
= –/— = p.
Thus, in case of malicious behavior, at least one of the adversarial nodes will be
caught with probability p. If p = 1/2, we can use 2— slots to ensure an anonymity
set of —, while having a signi cant probability to detect a malicious node.
7.5 Anonymity analysis
We analyze the anonymity of the LightMix protocol. First, we state a precise de -
nition for a desired anonymity property. Second, we sketch a proof that LightMix
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satis es this de nition. Third, we explain why LightMix resists well-known attacks
on mix-nets.
7.5.1 Formal anonymity analysis
Motivated by [300, 64], we de ne our desired anonymity property in the form of a
game between an adversaryA and a challenger C, where the adversaryA is a prob-
abilistic polynomial time (PPT) Turing machine. Upon request, C runs the protocol
and returns the outputs toA. For ease of exposition, we  x the number of users to
— and assume each user sends a message during every round. Our static adversary
A is allowed to compromise all but two users, as well as all but one mixnode be-
fore execution begins. The challenger C executes the protocol on behalf of honest
nodes and users, whileA acts on behalf of the compromised users and nodes. The
adversary can eavesdrop on all messages among the mixnodes, but it cannot mod-
ify them; thus, C also sends a copy of every communication between two honest
parties along with its source and destination to A. We denote the output of the
adversary from this game as ÈA|CÍ.
The anonymity game works as follows:
Setup phase: The challenger C runs the setup for all honest nodes, and provides
all public information to the adversary A.
Query phase: As many times as A requests, C takes input messages in the form
of (sender, message)-pairs for all the — slots from A, and runs the LightMix
protocol with those inputs.
Challenge phase: A chooses two honest users S0 and S1 and two distinct mes-
sages mÕ0 and mÕ1. A also chooses messages for all other honest users as m,
wherem /œ {mÕ0,mÕ1}, and sends this challenge to C. The challenger C tosses a
uniform random coin to obtain a bit b, and assignsm0 = mÕb andm1 = mÕ1≠b,
the messages corresponding to users S0 and S1, respectively. The challenger
C then runs the protocol with these input messages, and gives the output
message set to the adversary.
Query phase: After the challenge run, as many times as A requests, C takes mes-
sage inputs from A and runs the LightMix protocol again.
Output phase: Finally, the adversary outputs b as its guess for b.
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The adversary’s advantage in the anonymity game is equal to Pr[0 = ÈA|CÍ | b =
0]≠ Pr[1 = ÈA|CÍ | b = 0]. We now de ne the anonymity property as follows:
De nition 1. A protocol maintains anonymity if the advantage of the adversary in the
anonymity game is negligible.
The following theorem states that the LightMix protocol satis es De nition 1.
Theorem 15. If E is a CPA-secure group-homomorphic encryption system, and Com-
mit is a perfectly-hiding non-interactive commitment scheme, then LightMix o ers
anonymity as de ned in De nition 1 in the random oracle model.
Sketch. We prove the security of LightMix by reduction from the security of the en-
cryption system E . In our argument, we use an equivalent modi ed version of the
standard encryption game used to de ne the security of E : on challenge message
pair (m0,m1), the challenger CE of the encryption system returns a ciphertext pair
(E(mb), E(m1≠b)) instead of just one ciphertext E(mb).1
Without loss of generality, we assume that A can compromise — ≠ 2 users and
n ≠ 1 nodes. Let S0 and S1 be any two honest users and let i be the only honest
mixnode in the system.
During the setup phase, the challenger C initiates the CPA gamewith the encryp-
tion challenger CE , and ensures that the encyption public key in LightMix is the same
as the public key in the CPA-security game with CE . In the query phase, C can easily
simulate the honest nodes, including the decryption shares for those nodes. It can
do so because it manages and checks the hashing (random) oracle queries made by
the adversary for its commitments to messages as well as permutations, and since
it can open the committed decryption shares (obtained using the perfectly-hiding
commitment scheme) with its own choice of values.
In the challenge phase, C assigns the corresponding messages m0 = mÕbˆ and
m1 = mÕ1≠bˆ, as determined by a random bit bˆ. In addition, it chooses s values (say
si,0 and si,1) for the slots of S0 and S1 at honest node i such thatm0/m1 = si,0/si,1.
The challenger C then runs the challenge phase with the CPA-security challenger
CE with si,0 and si,1 as two challenge messages. CE returns with a ciphertext pair
E(si,b) and E(si,1≠b). The anonymity-game challenger C uses this response pair in
the precomputation phase for node i and slots S0 and S1. This way the challenger
C embeds its decryption challenge from the CPA-security game into an unknown
permutation for an honest player in the anonymity game of LightMix.
1By de ning an appropriate hybrid in the simulation, this modi ed game can be easily shown equiv-
alent to the standard CPA-security encryption game.
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In the real-time phase of LightMix, the challenger C runs the protocol in a stan-
dard manner, except at the mixing step for node i. Here, we use si,1 and si,0 for
slots S0 and S1, resepctively, such that m0si,1 = m1si,0. Doing so allows C to open
any of two honest real-time messages to any of them0 andm1 values.
Finally, during the postprocessing step of the real-time phase, the challenger C
knows all permutations except for two slots associated withm0 andm1 (i.e., except
for mÕ
bˆ
and mÕ1≠bˆ). As a result, it can open the decryption shares appropriately for
all other messages. Since m0si,1 = m1si,0, the challenger can open m0 and m1 in
any order.
In the end, if the anonymity game adversary A predicts the bit bˆ correctly, the
challenger C knows that its choice of si,1 and si,0 for slots S0 and S1 in the real-time
phase matched the challenge ciphertexts used in the precomputation phase. In
this case, it outputs b = 1 to the encryption game challenger CE . Otherwise, if the
adversary guesses bˆ incorrectly, the challenger C outputs 0 to CE .
As a result, if the LightMix protocol does not provide anonymity, we can apply
it to break the CPA-security of the underlying group-homomorphic encryption sys-
tem, a contradiction.
7.5.2 LightMix resists standard mix-net attacks
We explain how LightMix resists standard attacks on mix-nets. There are several ac-
tive attacks against  xed-cascademix-nets. The literature can be confusing because
there is no common nomenclature for these attacks, so we de ne each attack type
we discuss.
Many of these attacks are based on adding, deleting, or modifying messages
in the mix-net at the entrance. An adversary can either block incoming messages
from —≠1 users, or replace them from the batch with her own, allowing her to trace
a target message. Such attacks are called n≠ 1 or  ooding attacks [80].
Replay attacks [80] [52] work by retransmitting a message from a previous ses-
sion. These attacks can work only if encryption or re-encryption is deterministic. A
generalization of these attacks is called a blending attack [114] and happens when
the adversary manipulates messages that are in the same batch that includes the
target messages. Dingeldine et al. [114] discuss a number of countermeasures.
Section 7.4.2 addresses tagging attacks and our protections against them. Because
the K, R, and S values are never reused, LightMix protects against replay attacks (see
Section 7.4).
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Contextual attacks [268], sometimes referred as tra c-con rmation attacks [269],
communication pattern attacks [268], and intersection attacks [51], analyze the time
when particular senders and receivers participate in the protocol, their communi-
cation patterns, and how many messages they send and receive. Only unobserv-
able [260] systems protect against this type of attack. These attacks are sometimes
included in the following category of attacks.
Intersection attacks and statistical disclosure attacks [52, 104, 101] make use of
mix-net topologies that allow users to choose routes freely for their messages (free
mix routes). In such systems, sets of messages in a batch of a mixnode can be dis-
tinguished, for example, since they come from di erent mixnodes or have di erent
route lengths. Assuming that users often use the same routes for their messages,
these routes can be distinguished by analyzing network  ow data. Because Light-
Mix uses a  xed cascade of mixnodes [52], LightMix is not susceptible to this family
of attacks.
Tra c-analysis attacks are targeted at connection-based anonymity systems, as
opposed to message-based systems. These connection-based systems often do
not batch and permute incoming packets, and they use free mix routes. This ap-
proach permits an adversary to distinguish these paths based onmeasures such as
counting packets [287] and timing communications [99]. These attacks do not work
on LightMix because LightMix permutes messages in batches using a  xed cascade
of nodes.
7.6 Protocol enhancements
We describe two optional extensions of LightMix that extend its functionality and
improve its e ciency.
7.6.1 Return path
It is easy to extend LightMix to enable a receiver to send an immediate response
through the mix-net, for example, to acknowledge receiving a message. To accom-
plish this goal, the nodes generate additional random values sÕ and compute the
permuted products SÕ during the precomputation phase. Also, the nodes and users
generate fresh keys kÕ, that will be used to encrypt the return message.
For a return path, the mixnodes apply the inverse permutations ﬁ≠1 so that
the responses will arrive at the original senders. Unless the recipient who sends a
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response shares keys with the system, no fresh rÕ values are needed because the
message would not enter the system blinded and hence Step 1 of the real-time
phase could be skipped. In Step 2, the system applies the inverse permutations
ﬁ≠1 and fresh sÕ values. In Step 3, to encrypt the response to the original sender,
instead of multiplying only with its decryption component, each node multiplies
with the product of its decryption component and kÕ value.
7.6.2 Network handler
Introducing an untrusted network handler reduces latency. In Steps 1 and 3 of the
precomputation and real-time phases, only products of values known by the indi-
vidual nodes are computed (see Section 7.3.2). To compute these products, it is not
necessary to make a full pass through the mix-net. Instead, each node can send
its values to an untrusted third party, which we will call the network handler, who
can compute the products and return the results to the mix-net. Doing so reduces
latency of the network signi cantly because each node can send its values simul-
taneously to the handler, instead of forwarding its local result to the next node
sequentially. The network handler does not learn any secret value, and it computes
only values that would anyway become public.
The network handler, and each of the mixnodes, is a single point of failure. In
the event of failure, however, because the handler performs only public operations,
it can be easily replaced by another entity—for example, by one of the mixnodes.
7.7 Comparison with other mix-nets
We compare LightMix with well-known  xed-cascade mix-net approaches based
on performance. Speci cally, as summarized in Table 7.1, we compare the per-
formance of the core LightMix protocol with that of each of the following three
competing approaches: original mix-net and hybrid mix-nets, re-encryption mix-
net, and re-encryption mix-net with precomputation.
For each approach, we compare the precomputation and real-time costs, fur-
ther compared by number of single-party public-key operations, multi-party public-
key operations, and multiplications (each by client and by mixnodes). Note that,
when using ElGamal encryption, the multiplication of two ciphertexts requires two
multiplications.
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The original mix-net [80] requires each sender to perform n encryptions; each
of the n mixnodes in the cascade performs one decryption per message and —
decryptions per batch. In total, all mixnodes perform n decryptions per message
and —n decryptions per batch. Hybrid mix-nets [242, 183] require the same amount
of asymmetric encryptions, but on a smaller plaintext.
In re-encryption mix-nets [250], each client performs one encryption of its mes-
sage using the mix-net’s shared public key. Each node re-randomizes every mes-
sage, instead of decrypting each one as with original mix-nets, resulting in one
public-key operation and one multiplication of ciphertexts per message per node.
In addition, the nodes need to decrypt the output of the mix-net in a multi-party
computation.
Re-encryptionmix-nets can be improved in a straightforward way using precom-
putation to perform the public-key operations necessary for the re-randomization,
similarly to LightMix’s strategy. As shown in Table 7.1, however, with regard to real-
time computation, LightMix outperforms re-encryption mix-nets with precomputa-
tion.
Universal re-encryption mix-nets perform much more slowly because they re-
quire senders to encrypt messages with public keys of their recipients.
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7.8 Proof of concept
We implemented a proof-of-concept protoype in Python, including tagging detec-
tion and the network handler, as discussed in Sections 7.4.2 and 7.6.2, respectively.
Each mixnode includes a keyserver (to establish shared keys with the users) and a
mix-net server (to carry out the precomputations and real-time computations). For
the precomputation, each mixnode uses parallel processes for the computation of
the encryptions and the decryption shares. In the real-time phase, all operations
are performed in a single thread.
We performed experiments by running the protoype on Amazon Web Services
(AWS) instances, with each node comprising a c3.large with two virtual processors
and 3.75 GB of RAM. For all values, we used a prime-order group of 2048 bits.
On the AWS instances, each 2048-bit ElGamal encryption took approximately
10 milliseconds on average, and the computation of a decryption share took ap-
proximately 5 milliseconds. Multiplication of group elements took only a fraction of
a millisecond.
For our experiments we performed 100 precomputation and real-time phases
for selected batch sizes up to 1000 with  vemixnodes. Table 7.2 gives observed tim-
ings on the network handler for selected batch sizes using  ve mixnodes, without
any enhanced security mechanisms. We measured elapsed time on the network
handler from the time it instructs the nodes to start until either the precomputa-
tion  nished successfully, or until it computed the  nal responses to be sent to the
users in the real-time phase. Table 7.3 gives timings for the real-time phase per
node and for the network handler, in both CPU and wall clock time. These timings
show the low computational load on the nodes during this phase.
These timings demonstrate the high performance of the system in the real-time
phase. The precomputation can be easily accelerated by performing more com-
putations in parallel. Additional processors would signi cantly improve the time it
takes to compute all necessary encryptions and decryption shares. For the real-
time phase, a network connection with low latency would improve the timings.
7.9 Discussion and future work
We now brie y discuss how to arrange messages into batches and how to deal with
node failures. We also outline some of our future plans.
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Table 7.2: Timings measured on the network handler from the start of the phases until the
 nal values or responses are computed. Timings are in seconds (wall clock) for 100 runs of
the precomputation and real-time phases, for various batch sizes using  ve mixnodes.
Batch Precomputation Real time
size Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
10 0.48 0.07 0.07 0.02
50 1.99 0.04 0.21 0.04
100 4.00 0.30 0.38 0.06
200 7.74 0.09 0.75 0.08
300 11.46 0.13 1.09 0.08
400 15.24 0.11 1.44 0.08
500 19.08 0.23 1.80 0.11
1000 37.94 0.19 3.58 0.12
Table 7.3: Mean timings in seconds (CPU and wall clock) for 100 runs of the real-time phase
of the LightMix protocol measured on the mixnodes and network handler, for various batch
sizes using  ve mixnodes. For the mixnodes the mean time is taken over all mixnodes.
Batch Mixnode Network handler
size CPU Wall CPU Wall
10 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.07
50 0.04 0.16 0.02 0.21
100 0.07 0.30 0.02 0.38
200 0.14 0.60 0.04 0.75
300 0.22 0.87 0.06 1.09
400 0.29 1.15 0.07 1.44
500 0.36 1.45 0.09 1.80
1000 0.73 2.88 0.19 3.58
Batch strategy. LightMix follows the “threshold and timed mixing strategy” from
Serjantov et al. [286], where a new round is started every t seconds only if there
are at least — messages in the bu er. We expect at least — users to be active at
any given time. When a smaller number of users is active, this strategy can lead to
increased latency or even disruption. At the cost of increased energy consumption,
one design choice is to inject dummy messages when needed to ensure enough
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tra c to have — messages every t seconds. Alternatively, empty slots can be used
to verify if the precomputation was performed correctly, by revealing all committed
values for these slots, where empty slots to use should be chosen at random.
Node failure. Because LightMix uses a  xed cascade of nodes, it is important to
consider what happens if a node fails. First, we consider a node failure to be a highly
rare event because we expect each node to be a highly reliable computing service
that is capable of seamlessly handling failures. Second, the system will detect node
failure and notify the senders and the other nodes; senders will be instructed to
resend using a new cascade (e.g., the old cascade without the failed node). Each
node can detect failures by listening for periodic “pings” from the other nodes.
To minimize possible disruption caused by a single failure, at the cost of increas-
ing the precomputations, the following option can be deployed: Each node can
have a reserve of precomputations ready to use for certain alternative cascades.
For example, this reserve can include each of the alternative cascades formed by
removing any one node from the current cascade.
7.10 Conclusion
LightMix builds on the strong anonimity properties of mix-nets, and improves real-
time cryptographic performance by eliminating real-time public-key operations in
its core protocol. By replacing real-time public-key operations with precomputa-
tions, and by avoiding the user’s direct involvement with the construction of the
path through the mixnodes, LightMix reduces computational costs for users. Even
though the adversary may know all senders and receivers in each batch, she can-
not link any sender and receiver unless all mixnodes are compromised. LightMix
enables lightweight devices and smartphones to communicate anonymously using
less battery power and with higher real-time performance.
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